Endres

This case raises a single issue, denial of attorney fees to defendants after their special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 1 section 425.16 was sustained as to only one of many causes of action. We affirm, as we explain: Karen Moran, Patricia Moore-Joshi, and Luisa Dunn sued appellants Bernard and Frances Endres and others. Factually, the complaint alleged that plaintiffs were members of the Topanga Christian Fellowship, and that defendants had committed various torts as part of a wrongful attempt to control that church. 2 Against the appealing defendants, the causes of action were defamation, placing in a false light, intrusion upon *954 seclusion, assault, battery, civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and, as to Bernard Endres, a cause of action titled making private facts public.

All defendants made a special motion to strike the entirety of the complaint, contending that the lawsuit was filed to chill their right to free speech and in retaliation for a lawsuit they had filed, and that the complaint should be stricken because its subject matter was ecclesiastical—for example, defendants contended that the court could not…

This case raises a single issue, denial of attorneys' fees to defendants after their special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure [1] section 425.16 was sustained as to only one of many causes of action. We affirm, as we explain:

Karen Moran, Patricia Moore-Joshi, and Luisa Dunn sued appellants Bernard and Frances Endres and others. Factually, the complaint alleged that plaintiffs were members of the Topanga Christian Fellowship, and that defendants had committed various torts as part of a wrongful attempt to control that church. [2] Against the appealing defendants, the causes of action were defamation, placing in a false light, intrusion upon seclusion, assault, battery, civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and, as to Bernard Endres, a cause of action titled making private facts public.

All defendants made a special motion to strike the entirety of the complaint, contending that the lawsuit was filed to chill their right to free speech and in retaliation for a lawsuit they had filed, and that the complaint should be stricken because its subject matter was ecclesiastical — for example, defendants contended that the court…

I concur.

I concur in the disposition. Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16—the SLAPP statute (strategic lawsuit against public participation)—has resulted in numerous appeals that involve various ambiguities and apparent unintended consequences. The Supreme Court stated that once a SLAPP motion “was successful, attorney fees were mandatory under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c).” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141-1142 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 17 P.3d 735 ].)

*957 The court in ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1016-1021 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ] (ComputerXpress) discussed whether a party who prevails on a SLAPP motion as to some causes of action but not others, is a prevailing party for purposes of an attorney fees award under the SLAPP statute. The court concluded, “The approach adopted in the cases applying those analogous statutes, under which partial success reduces but does not eliminate the entitlement to attorney fees, therefore should be applied here.” ( 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020 , italics added.)

There appears to be a caveat expressed in a United States Supreme Court case involving an “analogous” statute—title…