Harrahill

Plaintiffs appeal the judgment of the trial court finding that a City of Monrovia (City) ordinance was not a “truancy ordinance” but was a “police power ordinance,” the effect of which was to regulate off-campus juvenile activity during school hours. We concur with the trial court, and so affirm the judgment.

Facts

In 1994, the City adopted an ordinance (the Ordinance) 1 that prohibits school-age children who are subject to the compulsory education laws from being in public places other than school between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. on days when school is in session. Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional on two grounds: First, they maintained that the City Council has no authority to legislate in the field of education, that field being delegated by the Legislature exclusively to local school districts. “If *764 this Ordinance is an educational ordinance . . . , then it is ultra vires and unconstitutional. Monrovia is a city and not a school board. School boards have the power to enact supplemental rules governing education .... Cities have no power to enact supplemental education ordinances.”

Plaintiffs also maintained that the Ordinance…

I respectfully dissent and would rule that the ordinance is preempted by state law.

“Truancy has long been a concern of the state. . . .” (In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 290 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 224 , 747 P.2d 1152 ].) California has enacted compulsory education statutes that establish a comprehensive mechanism for dealing with student absenteeism. (Ed. Code, § 48260 et seq.) Those statutes define a truant as a student “who is absent from school without valid excuse three full days in one school year or tardy or absent for more than any 30-minute period during the schoolday without a valid excuse on three occasions in one school year, or any combination thereof.” (Ed. Code, § 48260, subd. (a).)

*772 The state truancy scheme provides discipline for students’ failure to attend school, starting with a written warning and escalating for repeated absences—from additional school time and a truancy mediation program up to jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 601 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Ed. Code, § 48264.5, subds. (a)-(d).) If made a ward of the court, the truant is subject to terms of public service, fines, mandatory completion of a truancy prevention…

Plaintiffs appeal the judgment of the trial court finding that a City of Monrovia ordinance was not a "truancy ordinance" but was a "police power ordinance," the effect of which was to regulate off-campus juvenile activity during school hours. We concur with the trial court, and so affirm the judgment.

In 1994, the City adopted an ordinance (the "Ordinance") [1] that prohibits school-age children who are subject to the compulsory education laws from being in public places other than school between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. on days when school is in session. Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional on two grounds: First, they maintained that the City Council has no authority to legislate in the field of education, that field being delegated by the Legislature exclusively to local school districts. "If this Ordinance is an educational ordinance ..., then it is ultra vires and unconstitutional. Monrovia is a city and not a school board. School boards have the power to enact supplemental rules governing education .... Cities have no power to enact supplemental education ordinances."

Plaintiffs also maintained that the ordinance cannot be…