Dabney

Dabney v. Dabney

Bad Law
104 Cal. App. 4th 379·127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 917·2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 5153·2002 Daily Journal DAR 14157·2002 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 12057
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaDecember 16, 2002B155292California5,328 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Gilbert, J.

However reasonable a court’s decision may seem, it must be based on a cause of action. Absent this essential ingredient the court lacks jurisdiction to act.

Here we conclude the probate court erred in ordering a cotenant who is also a trust beneficiary to execute documents for a lot line adjustment. The *381 court’s order bears out Professor Witkin’s observation that “the Probate Code is a fertile field for the discovery of jurisdictional limitations.” (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Jurisdiction, § 314, p. 888.) We affirm other portions of the court’s order.

Facts

Sam Dabney owned a family home at 940 Andante Road in Santa Barbara. He also owned a studio home on neighboring property at 940.5 Andante. During his lifetime, he transferred a 14.59 percent interest in the studio home to his daughter, Hilary Dabney.

Sam directed that on his death his property be divided into a marital trust and a bypass trust. Sam’s widow, Mary Catherine, is the life beneficiary and their daughter, Hilary, is the residual beneficiary of the marital trust. Hilary is the life beneficiary of the bypass trust and her issue is the residual beneficiary. Mary Catherine was named…

Concurring Opinion

Yegan, J.

I concur in the result under compulsion of California Supreme Court precedent. Here there are three things of which I am fairly certain: First, subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal without having first made objection thereto in the trial court. General principles of consent, estoppel, waiver, and theory of trial have no application. (See, e.g., Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union (1968) 69 Cal.2d 713, 721 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 213 , 447 P.2d 325 ]; Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 295, 298 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 347 P.2d 668 ]; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1977) Appeal, §§ 383, p. 383 [estoppel], 388, p. 439 [waiver], 399, pp. 451-452 [theory of trial].)

Second, the Court of Appeal and its justices must accept and follow California Supreme Court precedent. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) But as the late Bernard Witkin would say, just because we are bound, does not *385 mean we are gagged. (Witkin, Manual on Appellate Court Opinions (1977) pp. 168-169; see also People v. Musante (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 156, 159-162 [ 162 Cal.Rptr.…

Opinion

However reasonable a court's decision may seem, it must be based on a cause of action. Absent this essential ingredient the court lacks jurisdiction to act.

Here we conclude the probate court erred in ordering a cotenant who is also a trust beneficiary to execute documents for a lot line adjustment. The court's order bears out Professor Witkin's observation that "the Probate Code is a fertile field for the discovery of jurisdictional limitations." (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Jurisdiction, § 314, p. 888.) We affirm other portions of the court's order.

Sara Dabney owned a family home at 940 Andante Road in Santa Barbara. He also owned a studio home on neighboring property at 940.5 Andante. During his lifetime, he transferred a 14.59 percent interest in the studio home to his daughter, Hilary Dabney. [1]

Sam directed that on his death his property be divided into a marital trust and a bypass trust. Sam's widow, Mary Catherine, is the life beneficiary and their daughter, Hilary, is the residual beneficiary of the marital trust. Hilary is the life beneficiary of the bypass trust and her issue is the residual beneficiary. Mary Catherine was named trustee…

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