Magee

Glen Everrette Magee was convicted of being an accessory to the robbery of Douglas N. (Pen. Code, § 32.) The issue presented is whether the jury was properly instructed and, if not, the appropriate standard of review.

The jury was instructed that the People were required to prove that a felony occurred, in this case a robbery. Efowever, the trial court, with the agreement of both trial counsel, did not instruct the jury with the elements of robbery, thus leaving the jury with no means of determining whether the People proved all of the statutory elements of a robbery.

We conclude that this failure violated Magee’s right to have the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime as required by the due process clause of the Constitution. (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [ 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-1073 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 ].) Our conclusion is contrary to the decision issued by the Fourth District in People v. Shields (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 228 ],

We also conclude that this error is subject to the harmless error analysis of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ], and, in this case, the…