Sipple

Appellant Donald Sipple appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court dismissed his complaint in favor of respondents Foundation for National Progress, doing business as “Mother Jones,” and Richard Blow (hereinafter sometimes referred to individually, or collectively as respondents). In this appeal we determine whether an article published by Mother Jones was privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d), therefore subjecting appellant’s defamation action against respondents to the protection of the “anti-SLAPP” (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. We decide in the affirmative.

Contentions

Appellant contends that the trial court (1) erred in ruling an article published by Mother Jones was privileged; (2) erred in finding that the anti-SLAPP statute applied; and (3) abused its discretion by refusing to stay the motion to dismiss in order to permit discovery or, alternatively, in finding that appellant had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits.

Facts and Procedural Background

Appellant, a nationally known political consultant, is the owner of Sipple: Strategic Communications, Inc., which produces advertising…

Appellant Donald Sipple appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court dismissed his complaint in favor of respondents Foundation for National Progress, d.b.a. "Mother Jones," and Richard Blow (hereinafter sometimes referred to individually, or collectively as respondents). In this appeal we determine whether an article published by Mother Jones was privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d), therefore subjecting appellant's defamation action against respondents to the protection of the "anti-SLAPP" (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. We decide in the affirmative.

Appellant contends that the trial court (1) erred in ruling an article published by Mother Jones was privileged; (2) erred in finding that the anti-SLAPP statute applied; and (3) abused its discretion by refusing to stay the motion to dismiss in order to permit discovery or, alternatively, in finding that appellant had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits.

Appellant, a nationally known political consultant, is the owner of Sipple: Strategic Communications, Inc., which produces advertising for political candidates and other businesses. His clients…

Concurring and Dissenting. — How far can a new concept stretch? How should it fit with other, preexisting, concepts? These are recurrent issues, and they arise here. Here we consider the reach of the new concept embodied in the SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. As a legislative creation, its reach is defined by legislative intent. Clearly it is intended to protect the exercise of free speech rights from the burdens of unmeritorious litigation, and to do so at an early stage. The majority quite properly emphasizes this objective, and places an expansive construction on the statute. However, notwithstanding my respect .for the opinion of my colleagues and the expansive reading they give to this aspect of the Legislature’s intent, and even though the Legislature has expressly directed that the statute be construed “broadly,” I do not agree that the Legislature intended the SLAPP concept to reach quite so far as the majority holds.

Here we consider an article about a “spin doctor.” Yet at this stage of the proceedings, the record does not permit determination of who is doing the spinning. Any legal conclusions we draw must be uninfluenced by any…