Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of San Mateo

Good Law
1995 Cal. App. LEXIS 13·31 Cal. App. 4th 418·37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 159·95 Daily Journal DAR 450·95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 281
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaJanuary 9, 1995A062643California4,222 words

Opinion

Opinion

Corrigan, J.

This case is one of first impression concerning statutory preemption. With its passage of the Z’berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973 (hereafter the FPA), the Legislature established a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating the conduct of timber operations. At issue here is whether the FPA preempts a county’s attempt to control, by zoning ordinance, the location of commercial timber harvesting. We conclude the county’s action was not preempted and, further, that it was a reasonable exercise of the zoning authority. Accordingly, we reverse.

Facts and Procedural Background

The FPA was passed in 1973. Its purpose was to “create and maintain an effective and comprehensive system of regulation and use of all timberlands . . . .” (Pub. Resources Code, § 4513.) The California Timberland Productivity Act of 1982 (hereafter the TPA) requires cities and counties to zone described timberlands as “timberland production zones,” or TPZ’s. The TPA is intended to protect properly conducted timber operations from being prohibited or restricted due to conflict or apparent conflict with surrounding land uses. The Legislature directed that this policy is to be implemented “by…

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