Farr

I. Introduction

Defendants, Virgil Farr and Gary Willis, appeal after they were each convicted at the conclusion of a court trial of eight felonies occasioned by their participation in numerous forcible sexual assaults and related offenses during a home invasion robbery. They raise sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing issues. In the published portion of this opinion, we address the issue of whether a defendant must personally commit one of the enumerated offenses listed in Penal Code 1 section 667.6, subdivision (d) in order to be subject to mandatory full term consecutive sentencing. We modify the judgment to delete one day of presentence conduct credit as to Mr. Willis but otherwise affirm the judgments.

II. Discussion

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Defendants argue that the trial court could not properly sentence them pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d) 2 because they were only derivatively liable for some of the sexual offenses. We begin by setting forth *839 the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 [ 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 ]; Taylor v. Stainer (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 907, 908-909 ; People v. Barnes (1986)…

A petition for a rehearing was denied May 8, 1997, and appellant’s petitions for review by the Supreme Court were denied August 13, 1997.

[Opinion certified for partial publication. [*] ]

OPINION

TURNER, P.J. —

Defendants, Virgil Farr and Gary Willis, appeal after they were each convicted at the conclusion of a court trial of eight felonies occasioned by their participation in numerous forcible sexual assaults and related offenses during a home invasion robbery. They raise sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing issues. In the published portion of this opinion, we address the issue of whether a defendant must personally commit one of the enumerated offenses listed in Penal Code [1] section 667.6, subdivision (d) in order to be subject to mandatory full term consecutive sentencing. We modify the judgment to delete one day of presentence conduct credit as to Mr. Willis but otherwise affirm the judgments.

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(1a) Defendants argue that the trial court could not properly sentence them pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d) [2] because they were only derivatively liable for some of the sexual offenses. We begin by setting forth the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 [ 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 ];…