Harrold

This appeal is one of several implied assumption of the risk cases which the Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in the light of Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ]. When first decided by this court in 1990, we reversed a summary judgment in favor of defendant. In that opinion we first discussed the unsettled state of the law in the area of implied assumption of the risk and whether it was subsumed under comparative negligence, urging the Supreme Court to take and decide the issue. We then addressed the case before us, *581 assuming for that purpose the implied assumption of the risk defense indeed survived the advent of comparative negligence. We applied the then prevailing test which focused on the plaintiff’s subjective appreciation and voluntary acceptance of a specific risk. We found there was a triable issue whether the plaintiff was aware of the specific i it,k—the dangerous propensity of the horse defendant assigned her to ride—and thus whether she could be deemed to have voluntarily undertaken that risk.

The Supreme Court granted review and held this case along with more than a dozen other implied assumption of the…

I respectfully dissent once again from a post -Jewett assumption of the risk opinion authored by one of my colleagues. This time, however, the distance between our positions is far narrower and thus this dissent can be much shorter.

, I have no quarrel with the majority’s excellent summary of the primary assumption of the risk doctrine as it applies to operators of commercial sports facilities, including horse-renting stables. I agree such facilities owe a duty not to increase the risk above the level inherent in the athletic activity they are being compensated to supply the public. As the majority holds, in the context of a horse-renting stable this duty ordinarily includes the responsibility “to supply horses which are not unduly dangerous. . . . [and] to warn . . . patrons renting a given horse if that horse has evidenced a predisposition to behave in ways which add to the ordinary risk of horse riding.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 587.)

Now, I concede it is possible to imagine a horse-renting facility catering to experienced riders and advertising the fact its stable is full of wild and dangerous horses just waiting to challenge the abilities of the best wranglers and…

WOODS (Fred), J.

This appeal is one of several implied assumption of the risk cases which the Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in the light of Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 [ 11 Cal. Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ]. When first decided by this court in 1990, we reversed a summary judgment in favor of defendant. In that opinion we first discussed the unsettled state of the law in the area of implied assumption of the risk and whether it was subsumed under comparative negligence, urging the Supreme Court to take and decide the issue. We then addressed the case before us, assuming for that purpose the implied assumption of the risk defense indeed survived the advent of comparative negligence. We applied the then prevailing test which focused on the plaintiff's subjective appreciation and voluntary acceptance of a specific risk. We found there was a triable issue whether the plaintiff was aware of the specific risk — the dangerous propensity of the horse defendant assigned her to ride — and thus whether she could be deemed to have voluntarily undertaken that risk.

The Supreme Court granted review and held this case along with more than a dozen other implied…