In Re Marriage of Daniels

*1104 Opinion

Appellant Carolyn S. Daniels contends the trial court wrongly ordered, under Civil Code section 4370.6, that she pay certain attorney fees incurred by her former husband in the amount of $3,700. The order to pay these fees, “in the nature of a sanction” under this section, was entered after Carolyn’s counsel failed to return numerous phone calls from opposing counsel and wrongly caused a default judgment to be entered, without attempting to inform opposing counsel that she would seek such a judgment, or conferring with opposing counsel on the outstanding issues in this divorce case. As is explicitly allowed by the applicable law, the order imposed such fees, not on Carolyn’s counsel for these derelictions in her professional capacity," but on Carolyn. On this record, there was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion; the law now explicitly provides that a party or client may be ordered to pay fees in the nature of a sanction for the obstreperous actions of counsel. (See In re Marriage of Green (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 584, 592 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 872 ]; cf. In re Marriage of Quinlan (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1422 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 850 ].) The trial court’s order recites…

I respectfully dissent. Sanctions were imposed against the wife in this dissolution proceeding in spite of the fact there is no evidence in the record that she personally engaged in any conduct that would subject her to sanctions. The conduct for which the sanctions were imposed was that of the wife’s attorney, and there is also no evidence that the wife was aware of, let alone that she authorized, ratified or otherwise condoned, the conduct of her attorney that gave rise to the sanctions. The husband recognized this, since he did not seek sanctions based on the wife’s conduct but grounded his *1112 sanction motion on the conduct of the wife’s attorney. To sanction a party to litigation under these circumstances is to impose liability without fault, and I am not certain this is what the Legislature intended.

One of the statute’s stated purposes is to “encourag[e] cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” (Civ. Code, § 4370.6, subd. (a), italics added.) It is difficult to understand how attorneys can be encouraged to cooperate if they cannot, as the majority opinion implies, be personally sanctioned for their conduct which may fall outside the scope of Code of Civil…

Appellant Carolyn S. Daniels contends the trial court wrongly ordered, under Civil Code section 4370.6, that she pay certain attorney fees incurred by her former husband in the amount of $3,700. The order to pay these fees, "in the nature of a sanction" under this section, was entered after Carolyn's counsel failed to return numerous phone calls from opposing counsel and wrongly caused a default judgment to be entered, without attempting to inform opposing counsel that she would seek such a judgment, or conferring with opposing counsel on the outstanding issues in this divorce case. As is explicitly allowed by the applicable law, the order imposed such fees, not on Carolyn's counsel for these derelictions in her professional capacity, but on Carolyn. On this record, there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion; the law now explicitly provides that a party or client may be ordered to pay fees in the nature of a sanction for the obstreperous actions of counsel. (See In re Marriage of Green (1992) 6 Cal. App.4th 584, 592 [ 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 872 ]; cf. In re Marriage of Quinlan (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 1417, 1422 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 850 ].) The trial court's…