Krupnick

Krupnick v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.

Good Law
1994 Cal. App. LEXIS 915·28 Cal. App. 4th 185·34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39·94 Daily Journal DAR 12808·94 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7009
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaSeptember 9, 1994E006810California63,185 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

McDANIEL, J.

After Judith and Albert Krupnick (plaintiffs) had settled their personal injury action against their tortfeaser, Roy Hester, for $295,000, they yet remained distraught over the manner in which Hester’s insurance company, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, and its *188 employee John McWorter (defendants) had conducted the settlement negotiations. As a result, they commenced the underlying litigation, seeking to recover money, beyond the settlement noted, as recompense for their purely emotional distress. Their action proceeded under a theory then viable under Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 Cal.3d 880 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 842 , 592 P.2d 329 ] (Royal Globe). That theory, now discredited (post), permitted a direct action by a third party against the adverse, first party’s insurance carrier, in those instances where the carrier, in dealing with the third party, had engaged in unfair settlement practices as defined in the Insurance Code.

While plaintiffs’ Royal Globe-type action was pending, the Supreme Court, in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 116 , 758 P.2d 58 ] (Moradi-Shalal), overruled Royal Globe.…

Dissenting Opinion

Timlin, J.

I respectfully dissent.

I

Introduction

In my opinion, the majority opinion, including its disposition, is based on:

(A) the faulty factual premises that:

(B) the equally faulty legal premises that defendants, as a matter of law, cannot be liable to plaintiffs because:

Having now outlined those areas in which I believe the majority’s most misleading statements and mischaracterizations exist, I will discuss them in more detail.

A. The Faulty Factual Premises Upon Which the Majority Opinion Is Based

The majority contends that plaintiffs “admitted” that the approximately three-year delay 1 in settlement was not a problem, and contends that “[Regardless of the spin which plaintiffs have put on [the facts alleged in their complaint], there is nothing finally alleged which amounts to affirmative misconduct.” Both these characterizations of plaintiffs’ position are incorrect.

1. The Plaintiffs Did Not Admit That Defendant’s Delay in Settling Was Not a Problem

A fair reading of the first amended complaint (complaint) clearly shows that the gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim is that (1) defendants delayed in *213 making any attempts to settle plaintiffs’ claim for almost three years;…

Opinion

[Opinion certified for partial publication. [*] ]

OPINION

McDANIEL, J. [*]

After Judith and Albert Krupnick (plaintiffs) had settled their personal injury action against their tortfeaser, Roy Hester, for $295,000, they yet remained distraught over the manner in which Hester's insurance company, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, and its employee John McWorter (defendants) had conducted the settlement negotiations. As a result, they commenced the underlying litigation, seeking to recover money, beyond the settlement noted, as recompense for their purely emotional distress. Their action proceeded under a theory then viable under Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 Cal.3d 880 [ 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 , 592 P.2d 329 ] ( Royal Globe ). That theory, now discredited ( post ), permitted a direct action by a third party against the adverse, first party's insurance carrier, in those instances where the carrier, in dealing with the third party, had engaged in unfair settlement practices as defined in the Insurance Code.

While plaintiffs' Royal Globe -type action was pending, the Supreme Court, in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 [ 250…

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