People v. Lee

Defendant Tracey Donnell Lee appeals after pleading guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by a juvenile offender (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (e)), 1 two counts of possession of a concealed firearm (§ 12025, subd. (a)(2)), two counts of unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)), and three counts of carrying a loaded firearm (§ 12031, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted one “strike” allegation, based on a prior juvenile adjudication. He was sentenced to a prison term of eight years eight months.

On appeal, defendant contends that his prior juvenile adjudication cannot be used as a “strike” because he did not have the right to a jury trial during the prior juvenile proceeding. We reject this claim and affirm the judgment.

*1312 I. BACKGROUND

The facts underlying defendant’s offenses are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. We briefly note that defendant was originally charged with 22 counts, including various weapon possession offenses, criminal threats, assault, discharging a firearm with gross negligence, discharging a firearm at a dwelling, discharging a firearm at an unoccupied vehicle, burglary, possession of methamphetamine, and unlawful…

I concur. A juvenile court adjudication does not offend Apprendi and Jones. 1 “The California Supreme Court has succinctly explained Apprendi in the following terms: ‘This is what Apprendi teaches us: Except for sentence enhancement provisions that are based on a defendant’s prior conviction, the federal Constitution requires a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of every element of a sentence enhancement that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the “prescribed statutory maximum” punishment for that crime. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1076 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 901 ].) Jones, which preceded Apprendi, stated: “One basis for that possible constitutional distinctiveness [of prior convictions] is not hard to see: unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense ... a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.” (Jones, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 249.) “Thus, Jones’ recognition of prior convictions as a constitutionally permissible sentencing factor was rooted in the concept that prior…

I respectfully dissent. Because the defendant did not have the right to a trial by jury in the juvenile court proceeding, I would find that the use of defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication to increase defendant’s sentence under the “Three Strikes” law violates the United States Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ].

An examination of Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466 , and related Supreme Court decisions supports this result. In Apprendi , the United States Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 490.) The “narrow” prior conviction exception stems from the view that “there is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.” (Id. at pp.…

Certiorari Denied June 14, 2004. See 124 S.Ct. 2840 .

BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

Defendant Tracey Donnell Lee appeals after pleading guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by a juvenile offender (Pen.Code, § 12021, subd. (e)), [1] two counts of possession of a concealed firearm (§ 12025, subd. (a)(2)), two counts of unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)), and three counts of carrying a loaded firearm (§ 12031, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted one "strike" allegation, based on a prior juvenile adjudication. He was sentenced to a prison term of eight years, eight months.

On appeal, defendant contends that his prior juvenile adjudication cannot be used as a "strike" because he did not have the right to a jury trial during the prior juvenile proceeding. We reject this claim and affirm the judgment.

The facts underlying defendant's offenses are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. We briefly note that defendant was originally charged with 22 counts, including various weapon possession offenses, criminal threats, assault, discharging a firearm with gross negligence, discharging a firearm at a dwelling, discharging a firearm at an unoccupied vehicle,…