In Re John Z.

In People v. Vela (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 237 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 161 ( Vela ), the Fifth District held that the crime of forcible rape (Pen.Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) is not committed where a woman consents to initial penetration by the male but the woman withdraws consent during intercourse and the male continues intercourse against the woman's will. [1] ( Id. at p. 243, 218 Cal.Rptr. 161 .)

In People v. Roundtree (2000) 77 Cal. App.4th 846 , 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 921 , Division Four of the First District concluded that Vela was wrongly decided and that the crime of forcible rape could be committed in the circumstances described above. ( Id. at p. 851, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 921 .)

In this case, for reasons that follow, we agree with Roundtree .

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing on a unitary petition (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 602, 777, subd. (a)) filed on behalf of John Z. (the minor), [2] the juvenile court found he committed forcible rape (Pen.Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)—count II) and that his previous disposition had been ineffective (count IV). [3] (Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) He was committed to Crystal Creek Boys Ranch.

On appeal, the minor contends…