Yordamlis

Yordamlis v. Zolin

Good Law
11 Cal. App. 4th 655·14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225·1992 Cal. App. LEXIS 1418·92 Daily Journal DAR 16505·92 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9928
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaDecember 9, 1992A056728California8,739 words

Opinion

lead Opinion

Chin, J.

Introduction

Frank S. Zolin, as Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), appeals from a judgment granting a peremptory writ of mandate setting aside the suspension of respondent Steven William Yordamlis’s driving privilege. The DMV contends that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s decision to overturn the suspension. We disagree. Therefore, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

On March 8, 1991, Officer Bhatnagar of the Fremont Police Department observed Yordamlis driving erratically. After pulling Yordamlis over, Bhatnagar observed that Yordamlis smelled of alcohol and had bloodshot/watery eyes, slurred speech, and an unsteady gait.

Bhatnagar arrested Yordamlis at approximately 7:15 p.m. for violation of Vehicle Code section 23152. 1 Yordamlis elected to submit to a blood test. Based on his belief that the blood test would show a blood-alcohol concentration (BAG) of more than 0.08 percent, Bhatnagar issued Yordamlis an administrative per se order of suspension pursuant to section 13353.2, which requires suspension of the driving privilege of anyone driving with a BAG of 0.08 percent or more. Subsequent analysis of the blood…

dissent Opinion

Werdegar, J.

I respectfully dissent.

The trial court’s task in this case was to determine, using its independent judgment, whether the administrative decision was supported by the weight of the evidence. (Santos v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 537, 545 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 10 ].) On appeal, that determination will be reversed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence (ibid.; Coombs v. Pierce (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 568, 576 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 249 ]) or is based upon an erroneous conclusion of law (Webb v. Miller (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 619, 625 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 50 ]).

In the instant case, the trial court ruled the evidence used by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to support its finding Yordamlis was driving a motor vehicle when he had a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or more was insufficient “as a matter of law.” The trial court based its ruling on (1) lack of foundation for the admissibility of the BAC test results, (2) lack of foundation as to the qualifications of the person who performed the chemical analysis of Yordamlis’s blood test, and (3) failure to demonstrate a relationship between the BAC test results and Yordamlis’s BAC at the time of driving.…

Opinion

Frank S. Zolin, as Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), appeals from a judgment granting a peremptory writ of mandate setting aside the suspension of respondent Steven William Yordamlis's driving privilege. The DMV contends that substantial evidence does not support the trial court's decision to overturn the suspension. We disagree. Therefore, we affirm.

On March 8, 1991, Officer Bhatnagar of the Fremont Police Department observed Yordamlis driving erratically. After pulling Yordamlis over, Bhatnagar observed that Yordamlis smelled of alcohol and had bloodshot/watery eyes, slurred speech, and an unsteady gait.

Bhatnagar arrested Yordamlis at approximately 7:15 p.m. for violation of Vehicle Code section 23152. [1] Yordamlis elected to submit to a blood test. Based on his belief that the blood test would show a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of more than 0.08 percent, Bhatnagar issued Yordamlis an administrative per se order of suspension pursuant to section 13353.2, which requires suspension of the driving privilege of anyone driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or more. Subsequent analysis of the blood sample revealed a BAC of 0.17…

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