Watkins
Watkins v. County of Alameda
Opinion
dissent Opinion
Pollak, J.
As set out in the majority opinion, the County of Alameda and its agents and agencies (collectively, the county) have appealed a writ of mandate issued at the behest of several residents of Alameda County who are recipients of general assistance (GA). The writ directs the county to discontinue the time limitation of GA benefits to otherwise qualified persons who are unemployable for reasons other than physical, mental or emotional incapacity, or their age. The appeal questions the meaning of an “employable individual” as that term is used in Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 17001.5, subdivision (a)(4). In my view, the trial court correctly determined *351 that “employable” is not synonymous with “able-bodied and mentally competent” and that the term must be construed “fairly and equitably based upon practical employability factors.” In upholding the county’s artificial definition of employability, defensible only as a means of reducing the county’s welfare costs, the majority approves a definition that is at odds with the entire scheme of GA and with innumerable decisions of the courts of this state. While section 17001.5 authorizes counties to place certain restrictions on…
Opinion
McGUINESS, P. J.
In the 1990's, the Legislature amended the statutory scheme governing general assistance (GA) in order to allow counties to adopt specified restrictions on benefits and thereby obtain relief from the fiscal burdens of the state-mandated program. [1] The allowable restrictions were enacted as exceptions to the broad statutory mandate requiring counties to provide aid to indigent residents. One such restriction is authorized by Welfare and Institutions Code [2] section 17001.5, subdivision (a)(4) (hereafter section 17001.5(a)(4)), which permits a county to place a time limit upon the receipt of GA benefits by an "employable individual."
Relying upon the authorization contained in section 17001.5(a)(4), appellant County of Alameda implemented a time limitation on the receipt of GA benefits by "employable" recipients, generally defined as persons under 64 years of age who have no physical, mental, or emotional incapacity that prevents them from working. At the urging of a number of GA recipients who challenged the county's GA time limitation, the trial court issued a writ of mandate directing the county to construe the term "employable individual" with reference to…
lead Opinion
McGUINESS, J.
In the 1990’s, the Legislature amended the statutory scheme governing general assistance (GA) in order to allow counties to adopt specified restrictions on benefits and thereby obtain relief from the fiscal burdens of the state-mandated program. 1 The allowable restrictions were enacted as exceptions to the broad statutory mandate requiring counties to provide aid to indigent residents. One such restriction is authorized by Welfare and Institutions Code 2 section 17001.5, subdivision (a)(4) (hereafter section 17001.5(a)(4)), which permits a county to place a time limit upon the receipt of GA benefits by an “employable individual.”
Relying upon the authorization contained in section 17001.5(a)(4), appellant County of Alameda implemented a time limitation on the receipt of GA *326 benefits by “employable” recipients, generally defined as persons under 64 years of age who have no physical, mental, or emotional incapacity that prevents them from working. At the urging of a number of GA recipients who challenged the county’s GA time limitation, the trial court issued a writ of mandate directing the county to construe the term “employable individual” with reference to…