Raphael

INTRODUCTION

In In re Marriage of McDonald (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 509 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 160 ] (McDonald), the Court of Appeal held that a workers’ compensation lump sum award pursuant to a settlement agreement 1 received by an injured *620 spouse after a marital separation was the injured spouse’s separate property. The question presented in this appeal is whether such a lump sum settlement award received before separation is the injured spouse’s separate property. We hold that the portion of such an award attributable to disability or pension payments owed during the marriage or medical expenses paid with community funds is community property, but the remainder of the award is the injured spouse’s separate property. The trial court in this case found the entire lump sum award received by defendant and appellant June S. Bloomfield (wife) was community property despite evidence that most of the award was attributable to postseparation disability and life pension payments and future medical expenses. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment ordering wife to pay one-half of her lump sum award to plaintiff and respondent Gilmore E. Raphael (husband) and remand this…

I have grave concerns about the correctness of the majority’s holding that a workers’ compensation lump sum permanent disability award received during the marriage is separate property. (Northwestern Redwood Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1920) 184 Cal. 484 [ 194 P. 31 ] [workers’ compensation permanent disability benefits are community property]; cf. In re Marriage ofStenquist (1978) 21 Cal.3d 779 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 582 P.2d 96 ]; In re Marriage of Jones (1975) 13 Cal.3d 457 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 108 , 531 P.2d 420 ]; In re Marriage of Fisk (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1698 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 95 ]; In re Marriage of McDonald (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 509 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 160 ] [payments received postseparation or postdissolution are separate property].) I also have grave concerns about the propriety of the majority’s conclusion that certain documents may have been received into evidence, and therefore may be relied on to support the majority’s opinion, when the trial court expressly stated the documents had not been received into evidence. I will, however, leave these concerns for another case in which the issues are properly before us.

I dissent on the ground that the entire case, including trial,…

In In re Marriage of McDonald (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 509 , 125 Cal.Rptr. 160 ( McDonald ), the Court of Appeal held that a workers' compensation lump sum award pursuant to a settlement agreement [1] received by an injured spouse after a marital separation was the injured spouse's separate property. The question presented in this appeal is whether such a lump sum settlement award received before separation is the injured spouse's separate property. We hold that the portion of such an award attributable to disability or pension payments owed during the marriage or medical expenses paid with community funds is community property, but the remainder of the award is the injured spouse's separate property. The trial court in this case found the entire lump sum award received by defendant and appellant June S. Bloomfield (wife) was community property despite evidence that most of the award was attributable to post-separation disability and life pension payments and future medical expenses. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment ordering wife to pay one-half of her lump sum award to plaintiff and respondent Gilmore E. Raphael (husband) and remand this matter to the…