Stabio

In this case, where the People made no effort to locate Michael John Stabio for prosecution for more than four years after criminal complaints were filed, we examine whether the lengthy delay between the filing of the complaint and Stabio’s arrest violated his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial.

As we shall explain, we conclude Stabio has met the applicable four-part test set forth in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530-532 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 116-118 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ]. The lower court found Stabio had satisfied the first three parts of the test. With respect to the last part of the test, prejudice, the delay quadrupled the period deemed “generally sufficient” to create a presumption of prejudice for purposes of the speedy trial inquiry. (Doggett v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. _ [ 120 L.Ed.2d 520, 532 , 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2694 ].) At the same time, it surpassed by more than a full year the governing statute of limitations for the crime charged. Because the protracted delay gave rise to a strong presumption of prejudice which was neither “extenuated” by Stabio’s acquiescence nor meaningfully rebutted by the People (ibid.), we hold Stabio has…