Garcia

In the absence of a class action waiver, California law authorizes classwide arbitrations and vests jurisdiction in our trial courts to determine whether in a particular case that approach “offer[s] a better, more efficient, and fairer solution” than the alternatives. (Keating v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 584, 613 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 645 P.2d 1192 ], reversed on another ground in Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 1 , 104 S.Ct. 852 ]; Lewis v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 935 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 69 ]; Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1319-1322 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 315 ].) Until last year, we applied these rules to arbitrations governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ( 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; Blue Cross of California v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 42, 60 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 ]; Sanders v. Kinko’s, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1113-1114 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 766 ])—but no longer. The Supreme Court has spoken, and the foundational issue—whether a particular arbitration agreement prohibits class arbitrations—must (in FAA cases) henceforth be decided by the arbitrators, not the courts. (Green Tree…

I concur with the result, which is to send this matter back to the trial court so it can send it to the arbitrator for the process to begin. I disagree with the way we are accomplishing that end. This should *305 not be a reversal. Rather, we should dismiss the appeal, since the order “appealed” from was interlocutory, the trial court not having fully ruled on the matters that were before it. The arbitrator, charged under Green Tree with the responsibility for dealing with matters in the first instance, has never seen this case. Accordingly, the matter is at least two steps removed from being ready for our review.

I also disagree with our issuance of an opinion, much less a published one. The history of this case calls for nothing more than our issuance of an order dismissing the appeal and sending the matter to the trial court with a citation to Green Tree. Unfortunately, the majority opinion carries with it the implication that the trial judge is incapable of reading Green Tree and following it without some amplification from us. I think otherwise.

The problem with issuing an opinion is that it purports to make certain determinations before such matters have been fully…

VOGEL (MIRIAM A.), J.

In the absence of a class action waiver, California law authorizes classwide arbitrations and vests jurisdiction in our trial courts to determine whether in a particular case that approach "offer[s] a better, more efficient, and fairer solution" than the alternatives. ( Keating v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 584, 613 , 183 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 645 P.2d 1192 , reversed on another ground in Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1 , 104 S.Ct. 852 , 79 L.Ed.2d 1 ; Lewis v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 935 , 225 Cal.Rptr. 69 ; Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1319-1322 , 231 Cal.Rptr. 315 .) Until last year, we applied these rules to arbitrations governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ( 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; Blue Cross of California v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 42, 60 , 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 ; Sanders v. Kinko's, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1113-1114 , 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 766 ) — but no longer. The Supreme Court has spoken, and the foundational issue — whether a particular arbitration agreement prohibits class arbitrations — must (in FAA cases) henceforth be decided by the arbitrators, not the…