People v. SUPERIOR COURT (BRADWAY)

Steven J. Carroll, Public Defender, Mark Kirkness, Matthew Braner, and Gary Nichols, Deputy Public Defenders, for Real Party in Interest.

The People of the State of California petition for a writ of mandate commanding respondent court to vacate its order of May 24, 2002, granting real party in interest Gabriel John Bradway's motion to dismiss the allegation of special circumstances under Penal Code [1] section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15) on grounds the statute, as amended in 2000 by the passage of Proposition 18 (Stats.1998, ch. 629, § 2, enacted as Prop. 18, approved by voters, Prim. Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) eff. Mar. 8, 2000), is unconstitutionally vague, and to enter a new and different order denying the motion. The question essentially presented is whether the change in the wording of such special circumstance due to the 2000 amendment, from murder committed "while" lying in wait to "by means of lying in wait, renders the special circumstance unconstitutionally vague in violation of the United States Constitution. We answer the question in the negative and issue a writ of mandate to reinstate the lying-in-wait special circumstance for Bradway's trial.

On November 5,…

The People of the State of California petition for a writ of mandate commanding respondent court to vacate its order of May 24, 2002, granting real party in interest Gabriel John Bradway’s motion to dismiss the allegation of special circumstances under Penal Code 1 section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15) on grounds the statute, as amended in 2000 by the passage of Proposition 18 (Stats. 1998, ch. 629, § 2, enacted as Prop. 18, approved by voters, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) eff. Mar. 8, 2000), is unconstitutionally vague, and to enter a new and different order denying the motion. The question essentially presented is whether the change in the wording of such *301 special circumstance due to the 2000 amendment, from murder committed “while” lying in wait to “by means of’ lying in wait, renders the special circumstance unconstitutionally vague in violation of the United States Constitution. We answer the question in the negative and issue a writ of mandate to reinstate the lying-in-wait special circumstance for Bradway’s trial.

Background and Procedure

On November 5, 2001, Bradway was charged in a criminal complaint with first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) by personal use…

In my view the adoption of Proposition 18, which eliminated the temporal distinction between lying in wait as a means of establishing premeditation for first degree murder (Pen. *312 Code, § 189) 1 and lying in wait as a special circumstance permitting imposition of the death penalty (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), brought to fruition the concern Justice Kennard expressed in her concurring opinion in People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1146-1147 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 375 , 847 P.2d 55 ] (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.). In her opinion, Justice Kennard stated: “Unlike first degree murder perpetuated by lying in wait, the lyihg-in-wait special circumstance must provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing capital and noncapital cases, so that the death penalty will not be imposed in an arbitrary or irrational manner. [Citation.] Recent decisions of this court have given expansive definitions to the term Tying in wait,’ while drawing little distinction between Tying in wait’ as a form of first degree murder and the lying-in-wait special circumstance, which subjects a defendant to the death penalty. [Citations.] Constrained by the principle of stare decisis, I concurred in the more recent of these…