Hammond

I. Introduction

We now partially reverse the order of the trial court denying any fees at all under the private attorney general doctrine (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5) to Larry Agran, the prevailing party in Hammond v. Agran (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1181 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 876 ] (Hammond I). In doing so we come to the following conclusions:

(1) The trial court was correct in not awarding any fees based on Agran’s trial work in Hammond I. As one seeking elective office, Agran had a specific, concrete and significant interest in the trial litigation, which involved a challenge to his candidate’s statement for a voters pamphlet.

(2) The trial court was correct to the extent that it did not award fees for Agran’s appellate work in Hammond I for work attributable (a) to the defense of that portion of his candidate’s statement which was claimed to be factually misleading and (b) to his attempt to obtain fees under section 1021.5 just in case he won. Again, as a political candidate, he had specific, concrete and significant interest in defending the veracity of his candidate’s statement: His personal credibility was at stake.

(3) However, the trial court erred to the extent that it…