Raghavan

Certified for Partial Publication. [*]

MALLANO, Acting P.J.

The summary judgment statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c) permits a trial court to summarily adjudicate "one or more causes of action." ( Id., subd. (f)(1).) At trial, a "cause of action" that has been summarily adjudicated shall be "deemed to be established," and the case "shall proceed as to the cause or causes of action ... remaining." ( Id., subd. (n)(1).) A grant of summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action does not bar other causes of action as to which summary adjudication has been denied. ( Id., subd. (n)(2).) And no one may comment on the grant or denial of a summary adjudication motion to a jury. ( Id., subd. (n)(3).)

In this action, plaintiff sued his former employer, alleging causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, defamation, breach of an implied contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The employer moved for summary adjudication as to each cause of action. The trial court granted the motion in part, leaving only the wrongful termination cause of action, which was tried to a jury. The trial court, relying on the "undisputed facts" that…

The summary judgment statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c) permits a trial court to summarily adjudicate “one or more causes of action.” (Id., subd. (f)(1).) At trial, a “cause of action” that has been summarily adjudicated shall be “deemed to be established,” and the case “shall proceed as to the cause or causes of action . . . remaining.” (Id., subd. (n)(1).) A grant of summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action does not bar other causes of action as to which summary adjudication has been denied. (Id., subd. (n)(2).) And no one may comment on the grant or denial of a summary adjudication motion to a jury. (Id., subd. (n)(3).)

In this action, plaintiff sued his former employer, alleging causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, defamation, breach of *1125 an implied contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The employer moved for summary adjudication as to each cause of action. The trial court granted the motion in part, leaving only the wrongful termination cause of action, which was tried to a jury. The trial court, relying on the “undisputed facts” that supported summary adjudication of the defamation…

I concur, but write separately to emphasize three points.

First, summary adjudication of a cause of action must be (a) denied where the material facts are disputed, and (b) granted only when the undisputed facts establish the moving party’s right to prevail as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c), (f)(1).) In either event, no facts are adjudicated (Soto v. State of California (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 196, 199 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 11 ]), which means an order granting summary adjudication could not support a statement by anyone that any facts had been decided or “established.”

Second, section 437c expressly prohibits any comment by anybody (the trial court, the parties or a witness) about an order granting or denying a motion for summary adjudication. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (n)(3).)

*1140 Third, the trial court’s comments in this case (which were tantamount to a directed verdict) prove the wisdom of the legislative amendments making it clear that, when some but not all causes of action are disposed of by summary adjudication, the remaining causes of action are to proceed to trial on their own merits, unfettered by references to whatever orders the court may…