Mendly

In this class action involving Los Angeles County general relief benefits, plaintiffs appeal from a December 14, 1992, order denying plaintiffs’ motion to enforce judgment and for permanent injunction. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in refusing to enforce a July 1991 stipulated judgment on two grounds: (1) subsequent legislation (Assem. Bill No. 2883 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 1992, ch. 721) purporting to invalidate the stipulated judgment constitutes an unconstitutional violation *1199 of the contract clauses of the federal and state Constitutions; and (2) as applied to the stipulated judgment, the subsequent legislation violates the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution. As the factual background of this appeal involves a series of legislative amendments involving general assistance aid, we first set out the pertinent legislative framework.

Legislative and Procedural Background

A. Legislative Framework

“County general assistance ‘is a program of last resort for indigent and disabled persons unable to qualify for other kinds of public benefits.’ ” (Whitfield v. Board of Supervisors (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 451, 456 [ 277 Cal.Rptr.…

I respectfully dissent.

In my opinion, what happened here is an affront to the integrity and independence of the judicial branch of government as much as it is a breach of faith with the destitute citizens who put their trust in a contract with Los Angeles County. In a single stroke, the county and state government managed to violate two fundamental constitutional provisions—separation of powers 1 and the contract clause.

To provide context for many of the issues which divide me from my colleagues in this case, I begin with a brief review of general assistance and its place within the overall scheme of welfare in this state.

The societal obligation to support the poor and destitute is not an invention of the welfare state. It has been a recognized feature of Anglo-American law since the time of Henry VIII, when the government began backing up the church and its admonitions to help the poor. “The [law of] 27 Hen. VIII.C.25. contains the first provision by which particular districts are directed to support their poor, so that none of them of very necessity shall be compelled to go openly in begging.” (1 Nolan, A Treatise of the Laws for the Relief and Settlement of the Poor…

In this class action involving Los Angeles County general relief benefits, plaintiffs appeal from a December 14, 1992, order denying plaintiffs' motion to enforce judgment and for permanent injunction. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in refusing to enforce a July 1991 stipulated judgment on two grounds: (1) subsequent legislation (Assem. Bill No. 2883 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 1992, ch. 721) purporting to invalidate the stipulated judgment constitutes an unconstitutional violation of the contract clauses of the federal and state Constitutions; and (2) as applied to the stipulated judgment, the subsequent legislation violates the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution. As the factual background of this appeal involves a series of legislative amendments involving general assistance aid, we first set out the pertinent legislative framework.

"County general assistance `is a program of last resort for indigent and disabled persons unable to qualify for other kinds of public benefits.'" ( Whitfield v. Board of Supervisors (1991) 227 Cal. App.3d 451, 456 [ 277 Cal. Rptr. 815 ].) Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000…