Pearl

Pearl v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.

Good Law
13 Cal. App. 4th 1023·16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805·1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 172·93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1400
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaFebruary 24, 1993D014094California3,199 words

Opinion

Opinion

Work, J.

Julius J. Pearl appeals a summary judgment in favor of General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) dismissing his claim against GMAC seeking declaratory relief regarding a pledge of stock he made to GMAC. Specifically, he asked the court to confirm that his purported termination of the pledge agreement was effective to preclude his responsibility for future loans made by GMAC to Palomar Truck Corporation and Castle Motors Inc. (jointly. Palomar) under a revolving credit arrangement known as a “flooring” line of credit. Pearl contends on appeal his purported termination of the pledge agreement was effective, because Civil Code section 2815 applies to pledge agreements and allows him to revoke the pledge agreement as to future transactions. He further contends his section 2815 rights were not waived by the language of the pledge agreement and, even if there was a waiver, such waiver would be void as against public policy. Since we agree section 2815 applies to the pledge agreement and conclude the language in the agreement did not effect a waiver of his section 2815 rights, we reverse the summary judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to enter…

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