Forrester

In People v. Sweet (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 78 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 567 ] (Sweet), the defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). At the time of his plea, a defendant convicted of a subsequent DUI offense within five years received increased punishment. After Sweet’s plea, the Legislature amended the statute to extend the five years to seven years. Sweet reoffended more than five but less than seven years later. In Sweet , we held that the statute may constitutionally be applied to prior DUI convictions entered when five years was the maximum period in which prior convictions could be used for increased sentences. (Id. at p. 83.)

Jason Michael Forrester is in a similar predicament. The statute was again amended to extend the seven years to 10 years. (Veh. Code, §§ 23540, 23546.) Faced with the seemingly insuperable Sweet precedent, Forrester asks us to reexamine our holding in light of Stogner v. California (2003) 539 U.S. 607 [ 156 L.Ed.2d 544 , 123 S.Ct. 2446 ], We have, and conclude nothing has changed. Forrester’s enhanced sentence does not violate ex post facto or due process principles. We affirm the judgment.

Factual and Procedural…