Peart

I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately only to emphasize the anomaly of the result we reach. Under the plurality opinion in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ] (Knight), the conclusion that plaintiff’s claim is barred by primary assumption of the risk rests upon the determination that defendants’ conduct created only risks that are inherent in the recreational operation of a Sea-Doo which, as a matter of law, defendants had no duty to avoid. Despite the enactment of legislation imposing a duty upon persons operating a personal watercraft not to do so “at a rate of speed and proximity to another vessel so that either operator is required to swerve at the last minute to avoid collision” (Harb. & Nav. Code, § 655.7, subd. (c)), we hold, in effect, that the risks created by conduct in violation of this statute are inherent in the recreational operation of a Sea-Doo, and that one who violates this statute was under no duty to refrain from doing so. Putting aside the anomaly of saying that one has no *84 duty to comply with a duty prescribed by statute (which may be attributed to the manner in which the assumption of risk doctrine was…

McGUINESS, P.J.

This case raises the questions whether the recreational use of a Sea-Doo personal watercraft constitutes a sport for purposes of the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, as set out by our Supreme Court in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 , 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ( Knight ) and its progeny, or whether instead the Legislature has preempted the scope of that doctrine as it would otherwise be applied to the use of the sorts of personal watercraft of which the Sea-Doo is an example.

Tracy Peart and minor Adam Peart (Peart), by and through his mother and guardian ad litem Tracy Peart, appeal from a final judgment entered against them and in favor of respondents Paul E. Ferro (Ferro), Julie Ferro, the Ferro Family Trust and minor Jason C. (Jason), through his guardian ad litem Kathryn Magruder, upon the grant of respondents' motion for summary judgment. Appellants contend that: (1) the doctrine of primary assumption of risk is inapplicable to the water sport activity at issue in this case; (2) respondents failed to carry their burden of establishing that, due to the nature of the activity and the parties' relationship to it, they owed no duty of care to…

This case raises the questions whether the recreational use of a Sea-Doo personal watercraft constitutes a sport for purposes of the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, as set out by our Supreme Court in *65 Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ] (Knight) and its progeny, or whether instead the Legislature has preempted the scope of that doctrine as it would otherwise be applied to the use of the sorts of personal watercraft of which the Sea-Doo is an example.

Tracy Peart and minor Adam Peart (Peart), by and through his mother and guardian ad litem Tracy Peart, appeal from a final judgment entered against them and in favor of respondents Paul E. Ferro (Ferro), Julie Ferro, the Ferro Family Trust and minor Jason C. (Jason), through his guardian ad litem Kathryn Magruder, upon the grant of respondents’ motion for summary judgment. Appellants contend that: (1) the doctrine of primary assumption of risk is inapplicable to the water sport activity at issue in this case; (2) respondents failed to carry their burden of establishing that, due to the nature of the activity and the parties’ relationship to it, they owed no duty of care to…