Arauz

People v. Arauz

Good Law
5 Cal. App. 4th 663·7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaApril 15, 1992Docket Nos. B058581, B058612California8,217 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Gilbert, J.

Penal Code 1 section 1192.7 prohibits plea bargaining in certain criminal cases. This statute reflects the wishes of the voters as stated in Proposition 8, the so-called Victim’s Bill of Rights.

The prohibition is not absolute. Subdivision (a) of section 1192.7 states that the prohibition applies unless “a reduction or dismissal would not result in a substantial change in sentence.” In this case of first impression, we must decide what is a substantial change in sentence, or to put it another way, a substantial change from what? We conclude that so long as the sentence a *666 judge imposes as a result of a plea bargain is substantially the same sentence the judge would have imposed had there been no plea bargain, the sentence is proper.

Facts

Alexander Carmen Arauz was charged with driving under the influence on May 9,1989, and May 29,1989, with five prior convictions of driving under the influence. Such an offense with three priors is punishable as a felony or misdemeanor. (Veh. Code, § 23175, subd. (a).) The triad of prison punishment for such a felony offense is sixteen months for the mitigated term, two years for the presumptive middle term, or three years for the…

Concurrence in Part

Yegan, J.

The result reached by the majority is unquestionably correct. However, I must respectfully dissent from the rule announced therein. The rule announced by the majority (maj. opn., ante, pp. 665-666) is so amorphous that in reality, there is no rule at all. I too share in the trust, confidence, and integrity in our trial court judges. Nevertheless, the majority rule may allow the trial court to violate at least the spirit of the restriction on plea bargaining passed by the voters as part of Proposition 8, the Victim’s Bill of Rights. (Pen. Code, § 1192.7.)

*672 Three points must be emphasized. One, no person charged with any criminal offense has an entitlement to a plea bargain. Two, to the extent that a plea bargain is contemplated, where the offense is enumerated in Penal Code section 1192.7 subdivision (c), there is an express limitation on the process. Three, at a postconviction sentencing hearing, the trial judge is free to impose whatever disposition is authorized by law. Penal Code section 1192.7 has no effect whatsoever on this later observation. The issues now before the court deal only with an antecedent procedure before the actual sentencing, i.e., disposition by way of…

Opinion

Penal Code [1] section 1192.7 prohibits plea bargaining in certain criminal cases. This statute reflects the wishes of the voters as stated in Proposition 8, the so-called Victim's Bill of Rights.

The prohibition is not absolute. Subdivision (a) of section 1192.7 states that the prohibition applies unless "a reduction or dismissal would not result in a substantial change in sentence." In this case of first impression, we must decide what is a substantial change in sentence, or to put it another way, a substantial change from what? We conclude that so long as the sentence a judge imposes as a result of a plea bargain is substantially the same sentence the judge would have imposed had there been no plea bargain, the sentence is proper.

Alexander Carmen Arauz was charged with driving under the influence on May 9, 1989, and May 29, 1989, with five prior convictions of driving under the influence. Such an offense with three priors is punishable as a felony or misdemeanor. (Veh. Code, § 23175, subd. (a).) The triad of prison punishment for such a felony offense is sixteen months for the mitigated term, two years for the presumptive middle term, or three years for…

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