Veon

United States v. Veon

Good Law
538 F. Supp. 237
United States District Court, Eastern District of CaliforniaApril 29, 1982CR. S-81-172A-LKKCalifornia7,058 words

Opinion

Opinion

Karlton, J.

OPINION AND ORDER

In 1970 Congress adopted two criminal statutes. One, the Controlled Substances Act (Title II of Pub.L. 91-513, Oct. 27, 1970) contained a provision directed to continuing criminal enterprises and is commonly known by the initials CCE ( 21 U.S.C. § 848 ). The other sought to combat organized crime (Title IX of Pub.L. 91-452, Oct. 15, 1970) and is commonly known as RICO. Both statutes carry a feature rare in American law — namely, a criminal forfeiture of property provision (the CCE provision for forfeiture is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (a)(2); RICO’s provision is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (a)). In each statute Congress also provided the district courts with jurisdiction to enter restraining orders in connection with property subject to such forfeiture. (See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (d) (CCE); 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (b) (RICO)). Until recently these provisions were rarely used. (See Report of the Comptroller General of the United States, “Asset Forfeiture — Seldom Used Tool in Combating Drug Trafficking” (April 10, 1981) (hereinafter Report of the Comptroller General)). Accordingly, there is little guidance as to how and under what circumstances such orders are granted. This…

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