J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court

Felix Frankfurter once made fun of the tendency of courts to look at legislative history rather than the actual words of the statute. “[Tjhis *1571 is a case for applying the canon of construction of the wag who said, when the legislative history is doubtful, go to the statute,” he wrote. (Greenwood v. United States (1956) 350 U.S. 366, 374 [ 100 L.Ed. 412, 419 , 76 S.Ct. 410 ].)

The instant writ petition presents a variation on Frankfurter’s observation. In the wake of this court’s decision in Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 ], the Legislature modified the prescribed release forms by which contractors and subcontractors waive mechanics’ lien rights. While the Legislature clearly was “responding” to the decision, reports of Halbert’s Lumber’s death are somewhat exaggerated. There is no clear statement in the history of the new legislation that the old (unmodified) forms should be interpreted differently than they were in Halbert’s Lumber. Nothing in the actual changes in the statutory text makes them retroactive and the Legislature passed up the perfect opportunity to undo Halbert’s Lumber regarding the old…

Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 ] was an unjust decision at *1585 odds with authoritative texts and the Supreme Court (see id. at pp. 1243-1244), as well as with statutes, the legislative history discussed in the opinion, 1 and the plain language of the release. The words “this document shall become effective to release pro tanto” plainly indicated that the release was partial, i.e., to the extent of the payment. Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of pro tanto was even set forth in the release before this court in Halbert’s Lumber. “For so much; for as much as may be; as far as it goes.” (Black’s Law Diet. (6th ed. 1990) p. 1222, col. 2.) Although it purports to be a primer on interpretation, Halbert’s Lumber violates several of the cardinal rules, e.g., that every part of a statute or instrument must be given effect to the extent possible (Civ. Code, § 3541; Code Civ. Proc., § 1858) and should be interpreted reasonably (Civ. Code, § 3542). This court simply excised the words pro tanto; the effect of the Halbert’s Lumber decision was to render the phrase meaningless.

California Mechanics’ Liens and Other Remedies…

Brown & Brown, Howard B. Brown and Ronald J. Mandell for Real Party in Interest.

OPINION

SILLS, P.J.

Felix Frankfurter once made fun of the tendency of courts to look at legislative history rather than the actual words of the statute. "[T]his is a case for applying the canon of construction of the wag who said, when the legislative history is doubtful, go to the statute," he wrote. ( Greenwood v. United States (1956) 350 U.S. 366, 374 [ 100 L.Ed. 412, 419 , 76 S.Ct. 410 ].)

The instant writ petition presents a variation on Frankfurter's observation. In the wake of this court's decision in Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal. App.4th 1233 [ 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 298 ], the Legislature modified the prescribed release forms by which contractors and subcontractors waive mechanics' lien rights. While the Legislature clearly was "responding" to the decision, reports of Halbert's Lumber 's death are somewhat exaggerated. There is no clear statement in the history of the new legislation that the old (unmodified) forms should be interpreted differently than they were in Halbert's Lumber. Nothing in the actual changes in the statutory text makes them retroactive and the…