Thompson

It is a felony to have sex — including intercourse, oral sex, sodomy and digital penetration — with a person who is so developmentally disabled as to be “incapable ... of giving legal consent,” provided “this is known or reasonably should be known to the person committing the act.” (Pen. Code, §§ 261, subd. (a)(1), 286, subds. (g), (h), 288a, subd. (d), 289, subds. (b), (c).) This is true even if the victim purports to consent. (People v. Griffin (1897) 117 Cal. 583, 585 [ 49 P. 711 ], overruled on another point in People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 536 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 393 P.2d 673 ].) Obviously, it is the proper business of the state to stop sexual predators from taking advantage of developmentally disabled people. Less obviously, however, in doing so, the state has restricted the ability of developmentally disabled people to have consensual sex.

Here, a group home for the developmentally disabled hired defendant Jason Markeith Thompson to help care for its residents, including victim Renee R. Defendant betrayed this trust by sexually violating her. Renee, who is trusting and docile, did not resist; instead, she dissociated — at trial, she was able to…