Consaul

The issue presented in this appeal of the superior court’s order denying a petition for writ of mandate brought by appellants Robert and Eva Consaul and Thomas Ahrens is whether certain dwelling unit allocations made by the City of San Diego (the city) to Ahrens’s development project, under the terms of an interim development ordinance (IDO), created a vested right in Ahrens to proceed with the development of the project, even though no building permits were applied for or obtained as contemplated by the IDO procedure. We conclude the trial court correctly denied Ahrens’s petition for writ of mandate which would have required the city to set aside its rezoning decision which placed the subject property in single-family residential zoning, some time after a preliminary dwelling unit allocation of 26 units had been made under the IDO. The record demonstrates the city’s action was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor totally lacking in evidentiary support. (Code Civ. Proc., 1 § 1085.) Neither does the record show any prejudicial abuse of discretion by the city in taking the zoning action that it did. (§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) We affirm.

Factual and Procedural…

I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority as to the

facts of this matter, the applicable standard of review, and the controlling precedent as set forth by our Supreme Court in various cases. I would, for the reasons set forth below, reverse.

Appellants Robert and Eva Consaul and Thomas Ahrens (collectively, Ahrens) own a 1.06-acre of undeveloped land in a highly urbanized area of *1803 San Diego (City). Ahrens petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate after their land was downzoned from multifamily residential (R-1000) to single-family dwelling (R1-5000). The superior court denied the petition without stating what standard of review it used. Ahrens timely appealed.

The primary issue presented is whether Ahrens acquired a vested right to develop the property by spending 22 months and $60,000 obtaining all discretionary approvals for their project, including allocations of permits in compliance with City’s Interim Development Ordinance (IDO). The administrative record undisputedly supports Ahrens’s contention they had received all discretionary approvals, but City urges us to limit the vested rights doctrine to cases where the owner had obtained vested…

HUFFMAN, Acting P.J.

The issue presented in this appeal of the superior court's order denying a petition for writ of mandate brought by appellants Robert and Eva Consaul and Thomas Ahrens is whether certain dwelling unit allocations made by the City of San Diego (the city) to Ahrens's development project, under the terms of an interim development ordinance (IDO), created a vested right in Ahrens to proceed with the development of the project, even though no building permits were applied for or obtained as contemplated by the IDO procedure. We conclude the trial court correctly denied Ahrens's petition for writ of mandate which would have required the city to set aside its rezoning decision which placed the subject property in single-family residential zoning, some time after a preliminary dwelling unit allocation of 26 units had been made under the IDO. The record demonstrates the city's action was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor totally lacking in evidentiary support. (Code Civ. Proc., [1] § 1085.) Neither does the record show any prejudicial abuse of discretion by the city in taking the zoning action that it did. (§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) We affirm.

According to the…