Melnyk

Does a car thief have standing to attack an allegedly illegal search and seizure of the vehicle? No.

A Fountain Valley patrol officer found Richard Robert Melnyk sleeping in an automobile in a restaurant parking lot about 1:45 a.m. on December 22, 1989. A mother and her baby were also sleeping inside. After an acrimonious detention and the arrival of backup officers, police searched the interior of the vehicle. Purloined property was found within, and the automobile itself was subsequently discovered to be stolen.

(1a) Despite some authority to the contrary (see People v. Glick (1988) 203 Cal. App.3d 796, 799 [ 250 Cal. Rptr. 315 ]), we believe the law is clear that an auto thief, like a second-story man apprehended in the victimized premises, has no standing to assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen car. In Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ], the United States Supreme Court discussed that very point: "The Court in Jones [v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257 ( 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 )] was quite careful to note that `wrongful' presence at the scene of a search would not enable a…

Does a car thief have standing to attack an allegedly illegal search and seizure of the vehicle? No.

A Fountain Valley patrol officer found Richard Robert Melnyk sleeping in an automobile in a restaurant parking lot about 1:45 a.m. on December 22, 1989. A mother and her baby were also sleeping inside. After an acrimonious detention and the arrival of backup officers, police searched the interior of the vehicle. Purloined property was found within, and the automobile itself was subsequently discovered to be stolen.

Despite some authority to the contrary (see People v. Glick (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 796, 799 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 315 ]), we believe the law is clear that an auto thief, like a second-story man apprehended in the victimized premises, has no standing to assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen car. In Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ], the United States Supreme Court discussed that very point: “The Court in Jones [v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257 ( 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 )] was quite careful to note that ‘wrongful’ presence at the scene of a search would not enable a defendant to object…

Concurring.—I agree with my colleagues that Melnyk had no expectation of privacy in the car he stole. (See United States v. Salvucci (1980) 448 U.S. 83, 92, 95 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 619, 628-630 , 100 S.Ct. 2547 ] [defendant’s possession of stolen mail did not confer automatic standing]; People v. Solano (1977) 19 Cal.3d 760, 763-764 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 725 , 566 P.2d 627 ] [burglar may not vicariously assert homeowner’s right to assert

*1535 knock-notice requirement].) 1 But, that conclusion arguably would not resolve the propriety of denying his motion to suppress evidence if Officer Mario Miramontes’s detention of the car and its occupants was unlawful. (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 899 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 582 P.2d 957 ] [illegal detention required suppression of stolen goods found on defendant].) 2 However, using a more thorough explication of the facts, I conclude the detention was proper.

About 1:45 a.m., Miramontes saw an occupied automobile in a shopping center lot between a closed bank and a restaurant which was about to close. He noticed the car had no front license plate and was backed up against the wall of the bank. Because there had been burglaries in the area in the…