Dyer

David Dyer appeals from the judgment (order of commitment) entered following a court trial at which he was determined to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.) 1 He contends the trial court erred in concluding that his underlying crime of cruelty to an animal involved the use of force or violence as required by section 2962, subdivision (e)(2)(F). We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

In November of 1997, members of the Oroville Fire Department were dispatched to the scene of a trailer. Upon arrival, the firefighters looked into the window of the trailer, saw fire coming from a barbecue inside and blood on the floor, and began to pry open the locked door. Appellant opened the door and told the firefighters to get out of his home. After several attempts to get him to leave the burning trailer, the firefighters physically pulled him from the trailer and detained him.

Inside the trailer, the firefighters found a dog with blood dripping from an approximately 10-inch laceration to its neck, an ignited barbecue, a large plate with a fork and knife on it, and a pocketknife with two broken blades covered with dog hair. Appellant had blood…

I respectfully dissent.

The majority concludes that the broad language of Penal Code section 2962, subdivision (e)(2)(P) permits a mentally disordered offender (MDO) finding based on any crime in which the offender used force or violence, including force or violence directed against an animal. 1 I interpret the statute to apply only if the threat or use of force or violence in the commission of the crime for which the person was sentenced to state prison is force or violence directed against a human being. (See § 2962, subd. (b).)

There can be no dispute that appellant’s crime was vile and despicable. I agree with the majority that his act of slashing the throat of the dog was “a violent and heinous offense.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 456.) It merited the conviction and the punishment that he received. But, regardless of how contemptible the crime, I cannot conclude that it supports institutionalization under the MDO statute in addition to, and after completion of, the sentence specified for the offense. No matter how wrong the act, I conclude the law does not permit it.

*458 Section 2962, subdivision (e)(2)(P) should not be extended to crimes directed at animals without a…

David Dyer appeals from the judgment (order of commitment) entered following a court trial at which he was determined to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen.Code, §§ 2962 et seq.) [1] He contends the trial court erred in concluding that his underlying crime of cruelty to an animal involved the use of force or violence as required by section 2962, subdivision (e)(2)(P). We affirm.

In November of 1997, members of the Oroville Fire Department were dispatched to the scene of a trailer. Upon arrival, the fire fighters looked into the window of the trailer, saw fire coming from a barbecue inside and blood on the floor, and began to pry open the locked door. Appellant opened the door and told the firefighters to get out of his home. After several attempts to get him to leave the burning trailer, the firefighters physically pulled him from the trailer and detained him.

Inside the trailer, the firefighters found a dog with blood dripping from an approximately 10-inch laceration to its neck, an ignited barbecue, a large plate with a fork and knife on it, and a pocketknife with two broken blades covered with dog hair. Appellant had blood on his hands and arms from the…