Beck

On February 2, 1951, we filed our opinion and decision in this case reversing the judgment of the District Court. 9 Cir., 191 F.2d 150 .

On March 31, 1952, the Supreme Court granted appellees’ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and made the following order:

On June 11, 1952, after hearing argument, we made an order of remand to the District Court to be effective in the event the parties were unable or unwilling to stipulate as to certain additional facts. Being now of the view that there is no need for any remand, and that there are no additional facts of any possible significance that, as a matter of law, bear upon the decision in this cause, we hereby vacate and set aside our order of June 11, 1952.

Pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Court, we have further considered the cause in the light of Beck v. West Coast Life Insurance Co., 38 Cal.2d-, 241 P.2d 544 . Upon reconsideration, we adhere to our former decision 191 F.2d 150 .

Beck v. West Coast Life Insurance Company, 38 Cal.2d-, 241 P.2d 544 , involved a contract of insurance, made, executed and to be performed in the State of California. * Hence it was a contract governed by and to be interpreted according to the law…

(concurring).

It is impregnably founded as judicial doctrine that “the social interest served by refusing to permit the criminal to profit by his crime is greater than that served by the preservation and enforcement of legal rights of ownership.” 1 An early pronouncement settled this principle in the *628 field of life insurance 2 There the murderer sometimes has no right even against the insurer. 3 Since the right of a beneficiary,

either original or alternate, is ordinarily not a vested interest in proceeds of a policy, no statute is required to carry out the principle. Nor is the doctrine of constructive trusts applicable or necessary here, as it might be with vested property rights. 4 If it were applied in this case, the murderer should be held trustee, not for the alternate beneficiary, his mother, but for the murdered wife’s heirs or estate. 5 Since title did not automatically lodge in the slayer by operation of law, it would seem a matter of supererogation to vest the fund in him in order to compel him to hold as trustee in virtue of this judicial doctrine. If the gift failed then, normally the proceeds would fall into inttstacy. 6 But it is said — - and we may agree…

198 F.2d 626 BECK, v. DOWNEY et al. No. 12642. United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit. July 18, 1952. Writ of Certiorari Denied Nov. 10, 1952. See 73 S.Ct. 170 . Charles I. Rosin, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant. Ben C. Cohen, Alfred Lubin, Los Angeles, Cal., Morris Lavine, Los Angeles Cal., for appellees. Before HEALY, Circuit Judge, and FEE and GOODMAN, District Judges. PER CURIAM. 1 On February 2, 1951, we filed our opinion and decision in this case reversing the judgment of the District Court. 9 Cir., 191 F.2d 150 . 2 On March 31, 1952, the Supreme Court granted appellees' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and made the following order: 3 'PER CURIAM. 4 The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in the light of Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., (38 Cal.2d * * * ), 241 P.2d 544 , decided by the Supreme Court of California on March 21, 1952.' 343 U.S. 912 , 72 S.Ct. 646 . 5 On June 11, 1952, after hearing argument, we made an order of remand to the District Court to be effective in the event the parties were unable or unwilling to stipulate as to certain additional…