White

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211 and 212.5, subd. (b)). 1 The jury found true the allegation that the murder was committed in the commission of a robbery. Defendant was sentenced to life in state prison without possibility of parole pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). Additionally, the jury found that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of each offense and, pursuant to section 12022.5, he was sentenced to an additional, two years.

Defendant contends that the judgment against him must be reversed because (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for self-representation; and (2) the prosecutor improperly commented upon the fact that defendant did not testify in his own behalf.

No discussion of the facts concerning the offense is required by the issues defendant raises. The following procedural history is, however, relevant.

On March 24, 1988, defendant was represented by the public defender at his preliminary hearing.

On May 19, 1988, an information charging defendant with the crimes for which he was convicted was filed, to which…

I concur in the judgment. I believe that as a general proposition, a motion by a defendant to discharge counsel and proceed in propria persona, made so close to an upcoming trial date that the date must be vacated, witnesses resubpoenaed and schedules rearranged, is not made within a “reasonable time” under the Windham standard. (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 8 , 560 P.2d 1187 ].) The tardiness of the motion does not mean that it must be denied; it simply means that the decision of whether or not to grant it is discretionary with the trial court. (Id., at p. 124.) On the other hand, a timely pro se motion brought by a defendant who is able to proceed in that manner (cf. People v. Manago (1992) 220 Cal.App.3d 982, 986 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Watkins (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 595, 600 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 5 ]) must be granted. (People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 124 .)

When the defendant in this case finally made an unequivocal motion to represent himself, on November 1, 1989, he said that he knew he could not be ready for trial by November 28, and that he did not know how much time would be needed. But when he said this, the trial date had been…

WOODS (A.M.), P.J.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211 and 212.5, subd. (b)). [1] The jury found true the allegation that the murder was committed in the commission of a robbery. Defendant was sentenced to life in state prison without possibility of parole pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). Additionally, the jury found that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of each offense and, pursuant to section 12022.5, he was sentenced to an additional two years.

Defendant contends that the judgment against him must be reversed because (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for self-representation; and (2) the prosecutor improperly commented upon the fact that defendant did not testify in his own behalf.

No discussion of the facts concerning the offense is required by the issues defendant raises. The following procedural history is, however, relevant.

On March 24, 1988, defendant was represented by the public defender at his preliminary hearing.

On May 19, 1988, an information charging defendant with the crimes for which he was convicted was…