Carron

In this case of first impression, we hold that the crime of stalking (Pen. Code, 1 § 646.9) does not require an intent to kill or cause great bodily injury, but only a specific intent to make a “credible threat” so as to make the threatened person reasonably fear death or great bodily injury. Accordingly, we affirm the stalking conviction and judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

There being no insufficiency of evidence claim, the facts may be stated simply. Our perspective favors the judgment. (People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303-304 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 721 P.2d 110 ].)

Wayne Jackson, the victim, was a male model and sometime actor who met appellant in February 1991. The victim told appellant they could only be friends, but appellant said he had a “crush” on the victim. By July 1991 appellant was obsessed with the victim, telephoning him all night and coming to his residence uninvited.

In the fall of 1991, when the victim went to appellant’s office, he saw photographs of himself all over appellant’s walls.

The victim repeatedly told appellant to leave him alone. Appellant continued to telephone the victim and come to his residence.

In November 1991,…

I concur in the majority’s holdings that no lesser offense instructions were required, error regarding the *1242 definition of “harasses” was harmless and selection of the upper term was appropriate. 1 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that Penal Code section 646.9 does not require an intent to carry out a threat. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1234-1240.) The majority expends significant energy indulging in statutory construction in a case where such analysis is unwarranted. Furthermore, the result of this analysis has effectively rewritten the statute to delete the “credible threat” as an element of the offense.

There is no need for statutory interpretation since Penal Code section 646.9 is clear and unambiguous. (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 213 , 726 P.2d 1288 ]; People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 843 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 57 , 705 P.2d 380 ].) The 1992 version of the section provided, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury is guilty of the…

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General,

Linda C. Johnson and William H. Davis, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

WOODS (Fred), J.

In this case of first impression, we hold that the crime of stalking (Pen. Code, [1] § 646.9) does not require an intent to kill or cause great bodily injury, but only a specific intent to make a "credible threat" so as to make the threatened person reasonably fear death or great bodily injury. Accordingly, we affirm the stalking conviction and judgment.

There being no insufficiency of evidence claim, the facts may be stated simply. Our perspective favors the judgment. ( People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303-304 [ 228 Cal. Rptr. 228 , 721 P.2d 110 ].)

Wayne Jackson, the victim, was a male model and sometime actor who met appellant in February 1991. The victim told appellant they could only be friends, but appellant said he had a "crush" on the victim. By July 1991 appellant was obsessed with the victim, telephoning him all night and coming to his residence uninvited.

In the fall of 1991, when the victim…