The appellants, Citizens National Trust & Savings Bank of Los Angeles, hereinafter referred to as the “Bank” and Dulien Steel Products, Inc., of California and Dulien Steel Products, Inc., referred to herein as the “Steel Co.” seek to reverse judgments in favor of J. B. Londono, a citizen and resident of Colombia and referred to in this opinion as “Mr. Londono”, in the aggregate sum of $236,355.51. The bank’s liability was fixed at the sum of $120,312.88.

The judgment provided that upon satisfaction by the Steel Co. it would also be satisfied as against the Bank and in the event the Bank satisfied any part or all of the judgment against it, the Bank would be *378 subrogated to the extent of such payment to the rights of Mr. Londono against the Steel Co.

This litigation arose out of two separate transactions. The complaint in the trial court was in three counts. The first count is against the Steel Co. for alleged breach of warranty respecting the quality of the wire sold. The second count is against the Bank for breach of contract by payment to the Steel Co. of $214,000 without obtaining a bill of lading required by a letter of credit. The third count was disposed of by the trial court and is not involved in these appeals. The two separate causes of action were tried together without objection.

At the outset of the trial Mr. Londono offered parol evidence tending to prove over strenuous objections of the Bank and the Steel Co. the wire was warranted as to quality. The trial court overruled the objections to evidence that purported to establish the sale was by sample.

The admission of the parol evidence to vary or add to the terms of the written contract of sale presents the controlling question to be determined on these appeals. The agreement of sale presents the keystone of this litigation. If the parol evidence was not admissible, then the many assignments of error must fall by the wayside until they present proper justiciable controversies.

The contract of sale was in writing subscribed by the parties and upon its face purported to be a complete agreement covering the sale of “unused government surplus barbed wire, as purchased by the seller from Interior Department”.

In overruling the objections of the Bank and of the Steel Co. to the admission of parol evidence the court engaged with counsel for the Steel Co. in the following colloquy:

In identifying the subject matter, parol evidence would properly be admitted to identify the portion of the wire, “as purchased by seller from Interior Department”, sold to Londono. Londono at the most would be entitled to wire of no better quality than the best of the lot purchased from the .Interior Department.

The trial court in this respect was correct. It admitted evidence, parol and physical, showing the quality of the wire agreed to be sold. However, the plaintiff was not satisfied to limit the evidence to a mere showing of the agreed quality. He proceeded to introduce parol evidence of fraudulent representations, which had the effect of adding to the written contract a warranty, as expressed by the court in its Findings V:

*379 It is apparent the court used parol evidence to rewrite the contract of sale for the parties. This is violative of the settled law of California. Inasmuch as the judgment against both appellants was predicated upon parol evidence contrary to section 1856 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 1625 of the Civil Code of California, the court was in error in admitting parol evidence for purposes other than •clarification of the terms of the agreement. If Londono had been defrauded his action would have been predicated on fraud, a tort, not upon a breach of warranty, an action on a contract. Dougherty v. California Kettleman Oil Royalties, 13 Cal.2d 174, 183 , 88 P.2d 690, 694 ; Merchants’ Ice •& Cold Storage Co. v. Globe Brewing Co., 73 Cal.App.2d 828, 834 , 167 P.2d 503, 507 ; Firpo v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 80 CalApp. 122, 251 P. 657 ; 1 Cal.Jur.2d p. ■625 ; 37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 94, p. 393; 24 Am.Jur., Sec. 254, p. 85.

We think the case of Germain Fruit Co. v. J. K. Armsby Co., 153 Cal. 585, 595 , 96 P. 319 , 323 is controlling and binding upon this court inasmuch as the factual situation is very similar to the case at bar. It was therein stated:

See also Yuba Mfg. Co. v. Stone, 39 Cal.App. 440 , 179 P. 418 ; El Zarape Tortilla Factory v. Plant Food Corp., 90 Cal. App.2d 336 , 203 P.2d 13 .

Judgments appealed from are hereby reversed and the causes are remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed.