Gonzales v. Barber, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, San Francisco, Cal

This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to a native of the Philippine Islands held for deportation.

The questions presented are: (1) whether appellant has been twice convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude and (2) whether the lawful coming into the continental United States from its possession the Philippine Islands by a native thereof prior to the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 456 , is an “entry” into the United States within the provisions of § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, formerly 8 U.S.C. § 155 . 1

Gonzales, a native of the Philippine Islands, lawfully came into the continental United States at the age of 17 in 1930, and has since resided there. ' In 1941. he was charged with the crime of assault with a deadly weapon with the *400 intent to commit murder. He was tried and convicted of the lesser crime of assault with a deadly weapon, and was sentenced to a term of one year in the Alameda County Jail, of which he served ten months. In 1950, Gonzales was convicted of the crime of second-degree burglary and was sentenced under…

I dissent.

The majority correctly holds that Gonzales has twice been convicted in this country of crimes involving moral turpitude within the meaning of § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917 (formerly 8 U.S.C.A. § 155 ). From the record before us it is clear that appellant came to the United States in 1930 and has since resided continuously therein. He is an alien and is subject to the provisions of Section 155, supra; an order for his deportation has been issued on the ground that he has been convicted *403 and sentenced for the offenses above, mentioned. Therefore he is deportable.

When Gonzales came to the United States he quite obviously made an “entry” into this country in the usual and accepted sense of that term. And generally the plain and obvious meaning of a statute is preferred to a curious, hidden signification. Payne v. Ostrus, 8 Cir., 50 F.2d 1039 , 77 A.L.R. 531 ; United States v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 213 F. 169 . The majority, however, attaches to the word “entry” in the applicable expulsion statute a meaning which is certainly curious and very well hidden. The word, they say, means entry by aliens and by no other class of persons. It is urged that…

207 F.2d 398 GONZALES, v. BARBER, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, San Francisco, Cal. No. 13566. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Sept. 15, 1953. Writ of Certiorari Granted Dec. 14, 1953. See 74 S.C.t 274. Gladstein, Andersen & Leonard, Lloyd E. McMurray, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant. Lloyd H. Burke, U.S. Atty., Charles Elmer Collett, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for appellee. Before DENMAN, Chief Judge, and HEALY and BONE, Circuit Judges. DENMAN, Chief Judge. 1 This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to a native of the Philippine Islands held for deportation. 2 The questions presented are: (1) whether appellant has been twice convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude and (2) whether the lawful coming into the continental United States from its possession the Philippine Islands by a native thereof prior to the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 456 , is an 'entry' into the United States within the provisions of Sec. 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, formerly 8 U.S.C. § 155 . 1 3…