PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR INTERVENTION OF MINOR CHILD ERICK RODRIGUEZ

On September 24, 2003, Erick Rodriguez, petitioner’s minor child, through a guardian ad litem, filed a notice of motion and motion to intervene under Rule 24 and lodged an application to appoint Otoniel Solis (his uncle) as guardian ad litem for the intervention and a complaint in intervention. The Court afforded the proposed intervenor and the parties an opportunity to file supporting or opposing memoranda; however, on October 8, 2003, Erick refiled the previously filed documents. Respondents tardily filed an opposition to the motion on October 28, 2003, and proposed intervenor filed a reply on October 29, 2003.

Oral argument was held before Magistrate Judge Rosalyn M. Chapman on October 29, 2003. Jaime Jasso, attorney-at-law, appeared on behalf of the proposed intervenor and petitioner, and Kathryn M. Ritchie, Assistant United States Attorney, appeared on behalf of respondents.

BACKGROUND

On May 29, 2003, petitioner Juan Almar-az Rodriguez filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging respondents’ final order removing him from the United States and an application for stay of removal pending adjudication of the merits of the habeas corpus petition. On September 8, 2003, respondents filed an opposition to the habeas corpus petition, and petitioner filed a reply on September 24, 2003. On September 26, 2003, Chief United States District Judge Consuelo B. Marshall granted petitioner’s application for a stay of removal pending adjudication of the habeas corpus petition.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 applies to motions to intervene in habeas corpus petitions. See, e.g., Saldano v. Cockrell, 267 F.Supp.2d 635, 640-41 (E.D.Tex.2003); Mir v. Smith, 521 F.Supp. 446, 447-50 (N.D.Ga.1981); United States ex rel. Carmona v. Ward, 416 F.Supp. 276, 277-80 (S.D.N.Y.1976). Rule 24(a)(2) governs a party’s application for intervention as of right in the federal courts, League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir.1997); Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810 , 817 (9th Cir.2001), and Rule 24(b)(2) provides for permissive intervention by a party.

Under Rule 24(a)(2), a timely application to intervene shall be permitted:

Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). However, the party seeking to intervene as of right must meet four requirements:

Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir.2003), pet. for cert. filed, - U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 570 , - L.Ed.2d -, 72 USLW 3184 (2003); United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 397 (9th Cir.2002). “Each of these four requirements must be satisfied to support a right to intervene.” Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1083 .

The Court finds the proposed intervenor, who will be referred to as “Erick,” has not met his burden to show petitioner does not adequately represent Erick’s interests. See City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 398 (“The prospective intervenor bears the burden of demonstrating that existing parties do not adequately represent its interests.” (citation omitted)); Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 268 F.3d at 822-23 (same). To the contrary, the Court finds Erick’s interests are adequately represented by petitioner. In making this finding, the Court has considered the following factors:

Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 268 F.3d at 822; City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 398 .

By his habeas petition, petitioner ultimately seeks cancellation of an order removing him from the United States, so he may remain in the United States with his family, including Erick. Petition, at 23-24. Erick’s interest is identical: to prevent petitioner’s removal from the United States. “When an applicant for intervention and an existing party have the same ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation arises[,]” Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086 ; League of United Latin American Citizens, 131 F.3d at 1305 , and “a compelling showing should be required to demonstrate inadequate representation.” Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086 . Here, Erick has made no such compelling showing.

Indeed, Erick does not cite even one case allowing intervention by a minor child in similar federal habeas proceedings challenging the removal of a parent. Moreover, Erick does not explain why petitioner is unable to raise the statutory and constitutional challenges he wants to raise, especially since Erick and petitioner are represented by the same law firm. In short, Erick has not demonstrated that his interests are not adequately represented by petitioner, his father, and his motion to intervene as of right should be denied. See Fritts v. Niehouse, 604 F.Supp. 823, 827 (W.D.Mo.1984) (wife did not have right to intervene where her and her husband’s interests were identical and husband and wife were represented by same law firm), affirmed by, 114, F.2d 1170 (8th Cir.1985) (Table).

Alternatively, Erick seeks permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2), which provides, in part:

Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(2). Generally, there are three necessary prerequisites for allowing permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2):

San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir.1999); Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir.1998). In addition, other relevant factors to consider include:

Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.1977).

Initially, Erick has failed to satisfy the first prong of the permissive intervention standard because he “asserts no independent basis for jurisdiction.” Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 839 (9th Cir.1996). Erick is seeking to intervene in his father’s habeas corpus proceeding. However, an “[a]pplication for writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242 . It is petitioner, not Erick, who may statutorily seek habeas corpus relief. Nor may Erick act as a “next friend” to his father, who has filed his own habeas corpus petition and does not need a “next friend.” See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163-64 , 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1727 , 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (“[O]ne necessary condition for ‘next friend’ standing in federal court is a showing by the proposed ‘next friend’ that the real party in interest is unable to litigate his own cause due to mental incapacity, lack of access to court, or other similar disability.”); Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (same), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 2073 , 155 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2003).

Furthermore, even if Erick satisfied the necessary prerequisites for permissive intervention, such intervention should be denied because Erick’s interests are adequately represented by petitioner. People of the State of California v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 792 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir.1986). For all these reasons, Erick’s request to intervene should be denied.

ORDER

The Court denies the motion of Erick Rodriguez, a minor, to intervene in this action and, accordingly, further denies Erick’s application to appoint Otoniel Solis as his guardian ad litem and to file a complaint in intervention.

The Clerk of Court is ordered to serve this Order on the proposed intervenor and the parties.

. Erick is a United States citizen, Complaint in Intervention at 2:10-11, and, thus, not subject to removal.