Taylor

Taylor appeals from a judgment on a complaint of the Interstate Commerce Commission, hereafter the Commission, holding he is a “contract carrier by motor vehicle” under 49 U.S.C.A. § 303 (15) of the Interstate Commerce Act, hereafter the Act, and, since he has no authorization therefor by the Commission, enjoins him from transporting in interstate commerce his lumber in his wholesale business of buying finished lumber in Oregon, transporting it and selling it f. o. b. to retail yards in Idaho.

The Commission contends a policy of Congress requires us to give a liberal interpretation to the Act in favor of estab-ishing that Taylor is a contract and not a private carrier. “Liberal” is a weasel word in this connection. The policy of the Act declares as follows:

One of the modes of transportation subject to the Act, as having “inherent advantages” is that by private carriers of their own property. This is stated in 303(17) as follows:

We think that in interpreting this paragraph and paragraph (15) providing for “contract carriers” later considered, there is no rule of interpretation more liberal for one than the other.

The burden of proof on the Commission is to establish that…