Plaintiffs seek an injunction against defendants to restrain and enjoin them from receiving or accepting any money or thing of value from plaintiffs contrary to the provisions of Section 302, Subsections (A) and (B) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended. 29 U.S.C.A. Section 186 .

Plaintiffs Conditioned Air and Refrigeration Co., Bell and Hughes, Inc., and Baird Sheet Metal Works are California corporations.

Plaintiffs Earl Griffith and John Dyer are co-partners, doing business as Griffith-Dyer.

All plaintiffs are engaged in businesses which come under the category of plumbing and pipe fitting. Their employees are members of the defendant Local Union No. 246 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada. The plaintiffs are all members of the Associated Plumbing Contractors of Central California, Inc., which is a member of the Northern California Conference of the Plumbing and Heating Industry.

The defendants are Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Labor-Management Relations Trust; Local Union No. 246 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada; Valley Group Negotiating Committee and Pipe Trades District Council No. 36 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, and Paul L. Reeves who is chairman of District Council No. 36 and a trustee of the Labor-Management Relations Foundation hereinbefore mentioned.

That under date of July 20, 1952, the Valley Group Negotiating Committee, predecessor to Pipe Trades District Council No. 36, acting as the agent of Local Union (among others) 246 of the United Association of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Northern California Conference of the Plumbing and Heating Industry, Inc., acting on behalf (among others) of the Associated Plumbing Contractors of Central California, Inc. A copy of this agreement is attached as Exhibit “A” to the stipulation of facts filed herein on February 20, 1956. Under this contract the employers, including the plaintiffs, recognized the Union (the Negotiating Committee) as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of all employees performing work covered by the agreement.

That in the summer of 1953 a collective bargaining agreement was entered into between the plaintiffs and the Valley Group Negotiating Committee acting as the agent (among others) of Local Union No. 246. A copy of this agreement is attached to the stipulation of facts marked Exhibit “B”. In this agreement the plaintiffs recognized the Union (Negotiating Committee) as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of its employees performing work under the agreement.

That about the month of April, 1954, the Negotiating Committee demanded that plaintiffs sign agreement amending Exhibit “B” attached to the stipulation. Plaintiffs refused to do so and in about the month of May, 1955, the Negotiating Committee caused the employees of plaintiffs to strike, whereupon plaintiffs signed and executed such amendment, a true copy of which is attached to the stipulation of facts and marked Exhibit “C”. The amendment to the contract did not change the recognition provisions of the prior contracts. Exhibit “C” among other things provided as follows:

That on or about the 9th day of February, 1954, Associated Plumbing Contractors of Central California, Inc. and certain individual employers who were licensed contractors under the laws of the State of California and the defendant Local Union No. 246 entered into a trust indenture writing entitled “Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Labor-Management Relations Trust.” A copy of this trust is attached to defendants’ answer and marked Exhibit “B”; on the second day of August, 1955 said trust was amended and its name was changed to “Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Labor-Management Relations Foundation”. A copy of said amendment is attached to defendants’ answer marked Exhibit “C”. This amendment increased the Board of Trustees to 12, 6 to be appointed by the Union and 6 to be appointed by the Associated Plumbing Contractors of Central California, Inc. The amendment also added a paragraph (Article VI-A) on the subject of arbitration.

That a collective bargaining agreement dated June 17, 1955, was entered into between the District Council No. 36 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada (successor to the Valley Group-Negotiating Committee) acting as the agent (among others) of Local Union No. 246 and Valley Mechanical Contractors Council, Inc., acting as the agent (among others) of Associated Plumbing Contractors of Central California and other individual employers. A copy of this agreement is attached to defendants’ answer marked Exhibit “A”. Section 16 of said agreement provides:

“Section 16: Labor-Management Relations.

“(A) Where a labor-management set up exists by agreement between the Local Employer, regardless of its name or organization, and a Local Union affiliated with the Union requiring that payment or payments be made, all Individual Employers covered by this agreement shall, if and when they perform work in the-territorial jurisdiction of such Local,, make the required payment or payments.

Demand was made by District Council No. 36 upon the plaintiffs to execute a ■collective bargaining agreement in the form of said Exhibit “A”. Plaintiffs Lave, and each of them has, refused to ■execute such agreement or to pay into the trust any of the sums specified in accordance with the terms of said agreement except the amounts specified in the fifth cause of action set forth in the complaint. District Council No. 36 is prepared to cause the employees of plaintiffs to strike to obtain the inclusion of Section 16 in said Exhibit “A” in a collective bargaining agreement with the plaintiffs.

The answers of defendants admit that Local Union No. 246 is a representative of employees, but deny that as to the employees here involved it is a “representative” of employees who are in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended, or at all. Defendants further admit that District Council No. 36 is as to the employees here involved a “representative” of employees within the meaning of said section and that its predecessor Valley Group Negotiating Committee, was such a “representative” but deny that it or said Committee is or was as to the employees here involved “a representative of employees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of said Section.” Under the stipulation of facts filed herein it was stipulated:

The cause came on for trial on the 8th day of August, 1956. The plaintiffs were represented by Roth and Bahrs, George O. Bahrs, appearing, and Paul K. Doty. The defendants were represented by P. H. McCarthy, Jr. Each party moved for a summary judgment based upon the pleadings and the stipulation of facts on file. It was stipulated that the motions and the trial on the merits would be submitted based upon the pleadings and the stipulation of facts. The cause was then argued by counsel for the respective parties. All matters were taken under submission by the court.

' At the outset, the defendants contend that this court lacks juridiction of the cause for two reasons: first, that the dollar volume of interstate business transacted by each plaintiff is too small to adversely affect interstate commerce, and that in this type of suit the volume of business of the individual plaintiffs may not be aggregated; second, that the complaint fails to allege that the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000 as required by Section 1331, U.S.C. Title 28.

It is my conclusion that the volume of business transacted by each plaintiff as set forth in the stipulation is sufficient to establish that the employees of each plaintiff are employed in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended. N. L. R. B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601 , 307 U.S. 609 , 59 S.Ct. 668 , 83 L.Ed. 1014 . With respect to failure of the complaint to allege that the sum or value in controversy exceeds $3,000, I am satisfied that under the provisions of Section 302(e) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended, such an allegation is not required. Said section reads as follows:

The fact that the jurisdictional amount of $3,000 was expressly excluded from the provisions of Sections 301 and 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended, is not persuasive that the failure to make such exclusion in Section 302 operates to include such jurisdictional requirement. Sections 301 and 302 relate to suits for damages by private persons. Section 302(a) and (b) make it unlawful to do the things proscribed by the provisions 'thereof. It is public rights which are being protected, and in my opinion the provisions of Section 302(e) grant jurisdiction to this court without regard to the sum or value in controversy if the volume of commerce of each plaintiff is not .de minimis.

We will now pass to the basic issues which remain. Section 302(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended, provides as follows:

Section 302(b) of the same Act provides as follows:

Section 302(c) of the same Act states -that:

of paying, either from principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer, and employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of the employees may agree upon and in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the administration of such fund and there are no neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agreement provides that the two groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such dispute, or in event of their failure to agree within a reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by the district court of the United States for the district where the trust fund has its principal office, and shall also contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund, a statement of the results of which shall be available for inspection by interested persons at the principal office of the trust fund and at such other places as may be designated in such written agreement; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or annuities.” Section 302(d) provides as follows:

There is no dispute between the parties over the facts that the collective bargaining agreement (Exhibits “B” and “C” attached to the stipulation of facts) did and that the collective bargaining agreement (Exhibit “A” attached to the defendants’ answer) does provide that each individual employer covered by the collective bargaining agreement, on work covered by said collective bargaining agreement, shall pay into the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Labor-Management Relations Foundation (a trust) (Exhibits “B” and “C” attached to defendants’ answer) ten ($0.10) cents per hour for each hour worked by each employee of each individual employer covered by the said collective bargaining agreements. It is also clear that the Valley Group Negotiating Committee was a labor organization and was recognized by the employers as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all employees of the individual employers performing work covered by the agreement and that District Council No. 36 (the successor of the Committee) a labor organization, was recognized as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the individual employer performing work covered by the collective bargaining agreement.

The Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Labor-Management Relations Foundation was created by, and its trustors are, Associated Plumbing Contractors, Inc. (a nonprofit membership corporation composed of individual employers, members and non-members of said Association) and Plumbers and Steam Fitters Local Union No. 246 (a labor organization, a local Union).

The collective bargaining agreement (Exhibits “B” and “C” attached to the stipulation) provide “where a labor-management set up exists by agreement between the local Master Plumbers Association, regardless of its name or organization, and a local Union affiliated with the Committee requiring that payment or payments be made, all individual employers covered by this agreement shall, if and when they perform work in the territorial jurisdiction of such Local make the required payment or payments,” and that “the individual employers covered by this agreement consent and agree to be bound by the terms of the effective Health and Welfare Trust Agreement, pension trust agreement and agreement creating any labor-management set up.” The collective bargaining agreement (Exhibit “A” attached to defendants’ answer) contains similar provisions.

The Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Labor-Management Relations, Foundation does not conform to the requirements of Section 302(c) (5) and the defendants do not contend that it does. The defendants maintain that the trust is not a “representative” within the meaning of the provisions of Section 302; that the trust is a separate entity and that Section 302 does not outlaw or forbid payments to and acceptance by those persons and entities who or which are not “representatives”. Defendants further point out that six of the trustees of the trust are selected by the employers and that six are selected by Local Union No. 246, which fact prevents the Local Union from dominating and controlling the actions of the trustees.

As noted above, Section 302 makes it unlawful for any employer to pay or -deliver or to agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value to any representative of any of his employees •or for any representative of any employees to receive or accept or agree to receive or accept from the employer any money or other thing of value.

The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, states: “The terms “commerce’, ‘labor disputes’, ‘employer’, “employee’, ‘labor organization’, ‘representative’, ‘person’, and ‘supervisor’ shall have the same meaning as when used in subchapter II of this chapter as amended by this chapter.” Section 142, subsection 3, U.S.C.A. Title 29.

Section 152, subsection 4, Title 29 U. S.C.A., states: “The term ‘representatives’ includes any individual or labor organization.” Subsection 5 of Section 152 states: “The term ‘labor organization’ means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.”

The Supreme Court of the United States had occasion to interpret the meaning of the word “representative” as used in Section 302. United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299 , 76 S.Ct. 400 , 100 L.Ed. 335 . The Court held that the term “representative” in section 302 is not limited to the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees, but includes any person authorized by the employees to act for them in dealings with their employers. The Court also stated that a narrow reading of the term “representative” would substantially defeat the purposes of the Act.

It is conceded that the Valley Group Negotiating Committee was, and that District Council No. 36 is a representative of employees of the plaintiffs within the meaning of Section 302. It is further conceded that Local Union No. 246, one of the founders of the Trust, is a “labor organization”. The question remains, however, whether Local Union 246 is a “representative” within the meaning of Section 302. It is true that the Collective Bargaining Agreements state that the employers recognize the the Valley Group Negotiating Committee under one contract, and the District Council No. 36 in the other contract, as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees of the employers. The Court, however, is not bound by such declaration, but must determine from the documents in this case the true and legal status of Local No. 246. Iii executing the collective bargaining agreements, the Valley Group Negotiating Committee and District Council No. 36 expressly acted as agent of Local 246 and other local unions.

Pertinent parts of the collective bargaining agreement dated July 1, 1955 (Exhibit “A” attached to the answer of the defendants) read as follows:

Similar provisions are contained in the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the Valley Group Negotiating Committee (Exhibits “A”, “B” and “C”, attached to stipulation of facts).

I am satisfied from an analysis of the quoted provision of the collective bargaining agreements that Local Union No. 246 is in fact and in law a party to such agreements, and ^therefore a “representative” of the employees of the plaintiffs within the meaning of Section 302.

Is the Plumbing and Pipe-fitting Labor-Management Relations Foundation a “representative” of the employees of plaintiffs? The Trust recites that “Whereas there is presently no effective machinery whereby the provisions of applicable collective bargaining agreements can be policed and enforced and whereby the general public can be protected from imperfect, improper and unsanitary installation, poor or shoddy materials or poor or improper work and workmanship, and

“Whereas, the absence of such effective machinery is producing chaos in the Plumbing and Pipe-fitting industry and is endangering the wages, rates of pay, hours of labor and other conditions of employment of the employees and destroying the trust and confidence of the public in the employers and in the plumbing and pipe-fitting industry,

“Now, therefore, to correct this situation, to protect the wages, rates of pay, hours of labor, and other conditions of employment of the employees, to restore the trust and confidence of the public in the employers and the plumbing and pipe-fitting industry, this Trust is created.”

The stated purposes of the Trust are to perform and perfect “an organization for the purpose of improving the relationship between the employers and employees making up the plumbing and pipe-fitting industry and the general public, and to enforce the collective bargaining agreement and the provisions thereof covering work within the jurisdiction of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe-fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, to protect the wages, rates of pay, hours of labor, and other conditions of employment of the employees in the plumbing and pipe-fitting industry and to protect the general public from imperfect, improper and unsanitary installations, poor or shoddy materials and poor or improper work and workmanship.”

The only specific purposes of the Trust are to enforce the collective bargaining agreement and the provisions thereof, covering work within the jurisdiction of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe-fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, and to protect the wages, rates of pay, hours of labor and other conditions of employment of the employees in the plumbing and pipe-fitting industry. The other stated purposes are vague and uncertain.

The Trust agreement states that the Board of Trustees is authorized to, and shall have the power to pay out of the assets of the Trust, at the sole and exclusive discretion of the trustees, for, among other things, “to protect the wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment of the employees in the plumbing and pipe-fitting industry, * * * to enforce the collective bargaining agreements and the provisions thereof, covering work within the jurisdiction of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe-fitting Industry of the United States and Canada.” The Board of Trustees is authorized to “employ such executive, administrative, accounting, clerical, secretarial and legal personnel and other employees and assistants, as may be necessary in connection with the carrying out of the Trust and to pay or cause to be paid, out of the Trust the compensation and expenses of such personnel and assistants, the cost of office space, furnishings and supplies and other expenses of the Trust.”

It must be presumed that the Trust will carry out the specifically stated provisions for which it was formed, and which are above quoted. The Trust J comes within the term “labor organiza- j) tion” as defined in Subsection 5 of Sec-!' tion 152, Title 29 U.S.C.A., and is a “rep: j resentative” of the employees under Sec-1 tion 4 of Section 152. It is my view that the Trust is a “representative” of the employees of the plaintiffs. It is clear under the decision of United States v. Ryan, supra, that a “representative” is not limited to the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees. The fact that the Trust agreement contains an arbitration clause cannot operate to validate acts prohibited by Section 302.

It is clear to me that if the| plaintiffs were required to make the 1 payments in question to Local Union ' 246, such payments and receipt would be forbidden by Section 302. The fact that-j the payments are to be made to the Trust does not, in my opinion, alter the situation, since the Trust under the documents under review, is likewise a “representative” of the employees of the-plaintiffs. Furthermore, it is my view that the prohibition in Section 302 forbidding the payment of money or other thing of value to a representative, or the receipt thereof by a representative, is not limited to cash or tangible property. The expression, “other thing of value” would include the benefits flowing from the use or application of the money paid. Under the Trust in question, the payments required to be made by the plaintiffs are to be devoted to enforcement of the collective bargaining agreements, to protect wages, hours of labor, conditions of employment, and to hire personnel, furnish office space, et cetera, to carry out such purpose. It is my view that this constitutes payment of a thing of value to Local 246. The fact that the control of the Trust is equally divided between the employers and the representatives of the employees does not change the situation in view of the provisions of the Trust agreement.

The defendants have cited the cases of United Marine Division I. L. A. Local 333, A. F. of L. v. Essex Transportation Company, 3 Cir., 216 F.2d 410 ; Rice-Stix Dry Goods Company v. St. Louis Labor Health Institute, D.C.E. No. 22 LRRM 2528; People v. Cilento, 207 Misc. 914 , 143 N.Y.S.2d 705 ; and Bay Area Painters and Decorators Joint Committee, Inc., v. Orack, 102 Cal.App.2d 81 , 226 P.2d 644 . In the Essex case, payments by the employer were to be made to six trustees of a welfare fund. From aught that appears in the opinion of the Court the Trust providing for the welfare fund was in strict compliance with the requirement of Section 302(c) (5). Admittedly, the Trust here involved does not so comply. In the Rice-Stix case, the Court concluded that the Health Institute was a corporation independent of the labor union which was a representative of the bargaining unit of the employees of the plaintiff. The fund created was to be used for health purposes. In neither of the cases was there a trust agreement containing provisions such as the quoted provisions of the Trust here in question. The Cilento case involved a' construction of the Penal Statute of the State of New York, and in my opinion, the correct decision was reached under the facts and the applicable law.

In the Orack case, the Court determined that the agreement in question did not constitute a monopoly or a restraint of trade under the law of the State of California. It did not involve Section 302 of Title 29 U.S.C.A.

My attention has been called to a memorandum order made by the Honorable Edward P. Murphy, United States District Judge, Northern District of California, in the case of Sheet Metal Contractors Association of San Francisco v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association, 145 F.Supp. 626 . In his memorandum order Judge Murphy stated that the purposes for which the Board (Joint Industry Board) was established are not entirely clear. I have had the opportunity of examining the Trust Agreement establishing the Joint Industry Board. I find nothing in the agreement to indicate that it was any purpose of the Joint Industry Board to enforce the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the employees of the plaintiff or to protect the wages, rates of pay, hours of labor or other conditions of employment of such employees, or to expend its fund for such purposes.

I am aware that labor-management plans are to be encouraged. I recognize that great strides have been made in such fields to the benefit of labor, management and the public. As a Judge, however, as stated by counsel' for the defendant, my duty is to determine whether the cloth is cut to fit the pattern laid down by the Legislature. It is not for the Court to push or pull the pattern to fit the cloth already cut or to trim the cloth already cut to fit the pattern.

Accordingly, the motions for summary judgment are denied and judgment is ordered for the plaintiffs.

Counsel for the plaintiffs are directed to prepare and file findings of fact, conclusions of law, and form of judgment, in accordance with the rules of this Court.

The Clerk of this Court is directed to forthwith mail copies of this order to respective counsel.