Davis appeals from a summary judgment of the district court dismissing his action on his complaint seeking damages for three alleged false representations made by appellees’ agents in connection with his employment by appellees to serve as a dentist for their employees in Okinawa. Two of the occasions of the alleged misrepresentations are claimed to have been made in New York and one in California.

The New York Misrepresented tions. One is that Davis, a dentist with a New York practice and a member of and employed by the Board of Health of New York, was induced to give up his practice and city employment and leave New York with his wife and travel to California and ship his dental machines and appliances there under a promise in an advertisement made by an appellees’ employee in a New York newspaper that he would have a year’s employment by appellees as a dentist in Okinawa and that his transportation to and from Okinawa would be paid by appellees. This was followed by a second representation in New York by an employee of the corporations that Davis would be employed by them in Okinawa for a year, and that if he went to California the appellees there were ready to make such a year’s contract with him.

Assuming this misrepresentation is an actionable tort for which Davis could recover damages for loss of business, transportation costs, etc., it appears that when he came to California the corporations refused to make such a contract with him. Then, instead of suing on the misrepresentations, he entered into a contract for his services in Okinawa for only as long as his employers desired it, a part of the consideration for that contract being his agreement to the effect that there had been no such misrepresentation. This appears in the disclaimer clause, section 22, of the California contract, providing:

We think that in view of the provisions of this clause Davis has no right to recover on the statements in New York relative to his year’s employment.

The second claimed misrepresentation in New York is a statement to Davis by a Mr. Gardner, an agent of the appellees, with whom the newspaper advertisement advised him to consult. Davis stated to Mr. Gardner, it appears from the answer to Interrogatory 4,

We think that Mr. Gardner’s statement of his conception as to his principals’ views on the right of Davis to engage in private practice is not tortious conduct on which Davis could rely for a recovery of damages.

The California Misrepresentations. Before executing the above contract for his employment in Okinawa, Davis had a discussion with several persons, one of them being a Mr. Doyle, an employee of the corporations, which he describes as follows:

“I asked Mr. Doyle for a definite contract setting forth the provisions with regard to private work, but he told me that it would not be possible to sign such special contract because only a general contract was available for all employees. He stressed the fact before Mr. Fassett and Mr. Keenan that the contract with the employees called only for emergency dental work and that any work that we might do, other than work of an emergency nature, would be between the patient and myself.”

Davis contends that these representations of the corporations’ employee Doyle caused him to enter into the contract in which it was stated that his employment was terminable at the will of the appel-lees and in which he was not given the right to his private practice. With regard to the right to private practice, there was a specific provision, 15(c), that his professional conduct in Okinawa was controlled by the law and governmental regulations which prohibited his private practice. The contract also contained Section 22, the disclaimer clause above quoted.

The question whether he can claim damages for so being induced by the corporations’ employee Doyle to execute the contract with its disclaimer clause is one of California law. In California the provision of the clause “that no promises or understandings have been made other than those stated above” precludes any recovery from the innocent principal for prior false statements of his agent.

The controlling decision is Harnisch-feger Sales Corp. v. Coats, 4 Cal.2d 319 , 48 P.2d 662, 663 , where the contract was for the purchase of a power shovel arid the trial court awarded the purchaser damages from the selling corporation for fraudulent misrepresentations of its agent. On reversing the court held that the following provision in the contract:

precluded a recovery from the principal, the court further holding that the defrauded party could rescind the contract.

On this issue the Harnischfeger case relied on dicta in Gridley v. Tilson, 202 Cal. 748 , at page 751, 262 P. 322 , and Speck v. Wylie, 1 Cal.2d 625 , at page 627, 36 P.2d 618 , 95 A.L.R. 760 . All three of these cases recognize the right of the party deceived by the misrepresentations to have the contract rescinded, a remedy not here sought by Davis.

The appellees contend that the amended complaint fails to state a non-California citizenship required to create a diversity jurisdiction, appellant relying on a mere statement of residence in New York. Appellant offers to amend to show diversity, as we have the power to do under 28 U.S.C. § 1653 . Assuming that we allowed the amendment and that diversity were established, we nevertheless affirm the judgment of dismissal since appellant has no cause of action. See Brooks v. Yawkey, 1 Cir., 200 F.2d 663 .

The judgment is affirmed.