Suda, alleging he is an American bom citizen of the United States, appeals from a decision dismissing his amended complaint seeking under 8 U.S.C., § 903 , to establish that he is such a citizen.

The amended complaint was filed after the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 280 , 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq., became effective on December 24, 1952. Of this we have held in Fujii v. Dulles, 9 Cir., 224 F.2d 906 , that the amended complaint shall be deemed as filed as of the date of filing of the original complaint.

The pertinent portion of the amended complaint is as follows:

It will be noted that, unlike in the Fujii case, the State Department had approved the certificate that Suda had lost his United States citizenship on December 18, 1952, six days before the Act became effective. The district court held that the decision of the Department of State that Suda had lost his citizenship was of no avail to him because the department had not advised him it was so decided. Here, as in the Fujii case, the district court failed to apply the principle of liberal construction of the Schneiderman case in which the Supreme Court stated of such loss of citizenship, that:

Nowhere in the statute is it required that one affected by such a decision must be notified thereof. It is the fact of denial which was here determined six days before the Immigration and Nationality Act became the law which is significant.

The district court further held that the above allegation of the complaint fails to state the exact date on which the Vice-Consul denied his application for a passport. Here should be applied the decision of United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 , 75 S.Ct. 513 , 99 L.Ed.-, that under the saving clause of the Immigration and Nationality Act the Suda litigation continued as if that Act did not exist. Furthermore it is apparent that, since the amended complaint is deemed filed as of December 22, 1952, its allegation that the Vice-Consul had then denied him his application for a passport clearly showed a denial before that date.

The judgment dismissing the complaint is reversed and the district court ordered to consider the case on its merits.