Sorenson appeals from a decision of the District Court holding him and his former partner, Theo. 0. Lydecker, liable to the United States Government for rentals on a lease with the Department of Agriculture of certain property owned by the Government and a contract with the Commodity Credit Corporation for the delivery of certain dehydrated potatoes. It is not questioned that the United States may sue on these contracts.

A. The Lease Agreement. The partners leased certain lands from the United States at an agreed rental, which lease was amended changing the date for the rental payments. Thereafter the partnership was dissolved, Lydecker assuming all Sorenson’s liabilities under the lease. Thereafter the lease was again amended changing the amounts of the rentals and the dates of the payment. It is not questioned that the alterations after the dissolution of the partnership are material.

Sorenson contends that the district court erred in not holding him free of liability on the lease under the provisions ©f California Corporations Code, § 15036(3) which reads:

We agree with the district court that Sorenson has not maintained his burden of proof, that the United States had knowledge before the last modification of the lease that Lydecker had agreed to assume the existing obligation to pay the rentals on the original lease. The evidence shows no more than that the partnership had been dissolved. Nothing was shown of Ly decker’s assumption of Sorenson’s liability.

B. The suit on the potato contract with the Commodity Credit Corporation was not barred by the statute of limitations.

The Commodity Credit Corporation is empowered by Congress to make such contracts in the usual course of its corporate business and the contract was so made. Concerning such usual contracts made in the course of its business, 15 U.S.C.A. 714b(e) provides:

Sorenson contends for the first time on appeal that the suit was so barred and for the purposes of this opinion it is assumed that the suit was brought against him more than six years after the claimed breach of the contract.

Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., provides, so far as pertinent:

Concerning the failure, as here, of Sorenson to set forth in his answer or by motion or at the trial his defense of the above statute limiting the time on which the suit in the potato contract could be brought, Rule 12(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. provides:

It is apparent that Sorenson is not now entitled on appeal to rely on the above time limitation. Van Sant v. American Express Co., 3 Cir., 169 F.2d 355 .

However, he contends, alternatively, that the time limitation requires us to hold under 15 U.S.C.A. § 714b(c) that the district court was without jurisdiction to proceed after the six years succeeding the breach of the contract, citing Berry v. Heller, D.C.E.D.Pa., 79 F.Supp. 476 and Matheny v. Porter, 10 Cir., 158 F.2d 478 .

Neither of these cases is applicable, in both the liability itself was created by statute not by contracts made in the usual course of corporate transactions. As to such specific statutory liabilities they hold that the complaint must show affirmatively that the suit is brought in the statutory time. In Berry v. Heller, 79 F.Supp. at page 477 the district court states:

In Matheny v. Porter, the Tenth Circuit states [ 158 F.2d 479 ):

The judgment is affirmed.