John Foster Dulles, as Secretary of State v. Quan Yoke Fong

237 F.2d 496 John Foster DULLES, as Secretary of State, Appellant, v. QUAN YOKE FONG, Appellee. No. 15006. United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit. October 1, 1956. Rehearing Denied November 14, 1956. Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Max F. Deutz, James R. Dooley, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant. Kathleen Parker, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee. Before DENMAN, Chief Judge, and LEMMON and HAMLEY, Circuit Judges. DENMAN, Chief Judge. 1 This is an appeal by Dulles from a judgment of the district court, declaring appellee to be a citizen of the United States. The suit was filed under Section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940 1 on December 23, 1952, by appellee, a Chinese who was born in China on February 13, 1930. 2 Dulles' appeal makes two primary contentions. One is that the district court lacked jurisdiction to act under Section 503 because the failure to act on the application of May 13, 1952 in the period to December 23, 1952, is not a denial of a right of a claimed national of the United States. The other contention concerns the orders of the court denying Dulles' motion for a new trial to introduce evidence of blood tests of appellee and his alleged…

This is an appeal by Dulles from a judgment of the district court, declaring appellee to be a citizen of the United States. The suit was filed under Section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940 1 on December 23, 1952, by appellee, a Chinese who was born in China on February 13, 1930.

Dulles’ appeal makes two primary contentions. One is that the district court lacked jurisdiction to act under Section 503 because the failure to act on the application of May 13, 1952 in the period to December 23, 1952, is not a denial of a right of a claimed national of the United States. The other contention concerns the orders of the court denying Dulles’ motion for a new trial to introduce evidence of blood tests of appellee and his alleged parents, and Dulles’ denied motion for a new trial on the contention that he had new evidence of the blood tests. Dulles’ brief makes no contention that, if the jurisdiction exists and the court did not err with regard to the motions, the judgment should be reversed.

I. Jurisdiction under Section 503 Existed for Appellee’s Complaint.

May 13, 1952: Appellee filed an application with the United States Consulate in Hong Kong for a passport to come to the United…

(dissenting).

Because of the trial judge’s cavalier denial to the appellant of a reasonable opportunity to present his defense, I am forced to dissent.

On June 1, 1955, the appellee put on three witnesses. The District Judge announced that the matter would not yet stand submitted, but would await “the receipt of the blood and the report of the doctor,” after which “we will have to have the doctor here to testify what it means”.

On July 1, 1955, the appellant made a “Motion for Supplemental Order to Require Plaintiff [appellee] to Furnish Blood Sample”, whereby it was sought to require the appellee to appear at Hong Kong before a physician “or other persons to be designated by the Court, and there to furnish and permit such physician or other persons to take a sample or samples of his blood in sufficient quantities so that such blood may be transported to the United States of America and there be examined and tested by a physician, hematologist, serologist, or other person for blood grouping and type”.

On August 16, 1955, the Court announced that it was denying the appellant’s motion, and was ordering judgment for the appellee. At no time did the appellant formally close its…