Friday appeals from a summary judgment denying his claim against the United States for damages in the amount of $61,386.85 and costs for injuries received by him from a collision of his automobile with another automobile driven by one Lacy, which was caused by an alleged negligently driven truck hitting the rear of Lacy’s car and forcing it to the wrong side of the road in the path of Friday’s car. The wrongdoing truck belonged to the United States and was then being used in its service in transporting one Fennerty, its driver, on U. S. Highway 30 in the State of Idaho. Further negligence of the United States is alleged as follows:

We do not agree with the holding of the district court that this alleged conduct of Wells, whose real name was agreed to be West, in putting on the highway such a dangerous combination of a man mentally incapable of driving an automobile safely, and the automobile which thereby became a powerfully dangerous instrument, does not state a cause of action. It is a separate cause of action from that of Fennerty’s different negligence.

Nor do we agree with district court that West’s choice between sending or not sending such a dangerous combination on a public highway is a discretionary function within Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 , 73 S.Ct. 956 , 97 L.Ed. 1427 . As suggested in 346 U.S. at page 42 , 73 S.Ct. at page 971 , this was a decision not at the “planning” put rather at the “operational level”.

Concerning the separate negligence Of Fennerty and West, each is denied in the answer. With regard to Fennerty it was agreed that, while not acknowledging that he was negligent, he gave $5,000 to Friday for which he and Mrs. Friday made the following agreement not to sue Fennerty, for the claim Friday alleges amounts to over $61,000:

It is apparent that the above reservation does not release “any other tort feasor” for “acts by or liability” of such other tort feasor. Thus by its language, are excepted all other tort feasors whether independent or joint.

With regard to the liability of the United States for the acts of its agent, Fennerty, it is elemental that both may be sued and each held liable for the tort. That is to say, the government is a tort feasor through its agent. On the question whether the release of Fennerty released the employing United States for its tort feasance above stated, it is significant that the act itself provides- with particularity that a release of the United States releases the employee. 'The obvious inference from this specific provision is that a release of the tort feasor employee does not release the tort feasor employer, the United States, at least where rights against the United States are reserved. United States v. First Security Bank, 10 Cir., 1953, 208 F.2d 424, 427-428 . In that case rights against the government were specifically reserved.

We think the action against the United States was reserved in the agreement not to sue the Fennertys by the provision that “this release shall not is;sue to the benefit of any tort feasor ■* * * against who[m] a liability may be predicated by reason of * * r* acts by * * * on the part of the said other tort feasors or tort feasors causing or ■contributing to the damages qnd injuries ■suffered by the undersigned.”

It is also apparent that the above release does not purport to be a payment for all the injuries suffered by Mr. and Mrs. Friday. It is no more than a set-flement of a disputed claim. In such ■settlements, it is quite possible that the •dispute over the claim makes it such a ■doubtful one that the settlement may be .for a mere minor fraction of the injuries .suffered by the person accepting the settlement payment.

In a case involving independent tort feasors, the Idaho court has held that a release of one releases the other only where the release purported by its terms to indemnify the plaintiff completely for his loss. The court stated this rule by quoting a California ease involving “joint tort” feasors as follows:

Valles v. Union Pac. R. R., 1951, 72 Idaho 231, 239 , 238 P.2d 1154, 1159 .

It was unnecessary in that case to apply this rule to joint tort feasors, since the ease involved independent tort fea-sors, and the court expressly stated that it held “neither way * * * as to joint tort-feasors”.

The above dictum of the Valles case, citing the California rule that the injuries themselves shall be fully compensated in both independent and in joint negligence settlements of claims was preceded in another Idaho case by an even more striking dictum in a separate tort feasor case, stating that in both separate and joint tort feasor cases the settlement with one reduces the liability of the other only to the extent pf the amount paid. In Young v. Anderson, 33 Idaho 522 , at page 524, 196 P. 193 at page 194, 50 A.L.R. 1056 , the court stated:

We are the more impressed that these dicta state the law of Idaho by the following language of the court in the Val-les case in concluding its opinion in 72 Idaho at page 240 , 238 P.2d at page 1160 :

This language accords with Wigmore’s statement of the rule that a release to one of several joint tort feasors is a discharge of all is merely a “surviving relic of the Cokian period of metaphysics”.

The judgment is reversed.