Plaintiff-appellant Scott, a screen director, was discharged by defendant-appellee RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., on November 26, 1947, after his participation as a witness in hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities of the United States House of Representatives. At the time of the discharge, Scott was working with RKO under an unexpired written contract dated February 10, 1947.

This case is the third of three discharged witnesses of the motion picture industry to come on appeal to this court. The previous cases are Loew’s, Inc. v. Cole, 9 Cir., 185 F.2d 641 , and Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 9 Cir., 216 F.2d 844 . The statement of this case will be abbreviated by reference to the two prior cases.

The complaint herein was filed January 21, 1948. Meanwhile, Scott had been indicted in the District of Columbia for refusal to answer the committee’s questions. Of this crime he was convicted on June 22, 1950. Sentence of one year was imposed on September 27, 1950, and the term of service thereunder was completed about July 28, 1951.

RKO in its notice of discharge to Scott asserted he had breached the “morals clause” of his contract and hurt the company by his conduct at the hearings, the clause reading as follows:

Parenthetically, we now quote Cole’s contract clause and Lardner’s:

jn Lardner’s case we held as a matter 0f iaw that there was a breach by Lardner the express conditions and the implied conditions of Lardner’s contract,

In Scott's case the jury on February 1952, found in his favor on special interrogatories and with a general verdiet. The trial judge granted a new trial upon the ground that the jury s verdict was gainst the weight of the evidence, Later Scott s case was submitted to the same trial judge for decision on the same evidence which the jury had seen and heard. The judge then entered findings and a judgment on September 29, 1955, in favor of the defendant, holding the contract breached by Scott, the breach not waived, and the discharge justified,

The findings and conclusions were as follows:

We are confident that the morals clause in Scott’s contract was no weaker from management’s position than Lardner’s. If there be shades of the two, Scott’s clause was the stronger or stricter. The implied condition of every California contract of employment was the same. See Lardner’s case, supra.

At the hearings, the conduct of the witnesses was not distinguishable.

Here Scott makes a frontal attack on our decisions in the previous two cases, particularly Lardner’s. It is done with some persuasiveness. However, we believe Lardner’s case was correctly decided and further believe that it should stand as authority here. An opposite result in two companion cases so nearly alike would discredit the law.

The appellant attacks the insertion of the phrase in the findings and conclusions reading as follows: “In pursuance to the Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 , the court finds:”

The findings certainly are broader and more inclusive than our decision in Lardner’s case. We are not sure of the trial court’s meaning in the use of the words “In pursuance to.” Probably they mean no more than “following.” It can be argued the judge has gone beyond the Lardner case and made extensive independent findings. It could be said “In pusuance to” was a parenthetical reference to Lardner, or it could be argued he thought he was compelled to go at least as far as Lardner’s case, and said so.

In any event, the judgment should be and is affirmed.