Appellant sought an injunction in the District Court restraining and enjoining appellee from making any seizure, collection or distraint of any property belonging to appellant under the authority of an assessment for income taxes, interest and penalties made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue against appellant, for the calendar year 1951. This income tax return appellant had duly filed.

Appellee moved to dismiss, filing a supporting affidavit. The District Court treated the motion as one for summary judgment, heard the matter, and ordered dismissal. This is an appeal from that order of dismissal.

A taxpayer’s right to enjoin the collection of taxes is limited by statute under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, effective August 17, 1954.

In that Code, § 7421 provides:

§ 6212(a) provides that after the Secretary or his delegate determines there is a deficiency, he “is authorized to send notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer by registered mail.”

§ 6213 provides that within ninety days after the notice authorized in § 6212 is mailed, the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the proposed deficiency.

In such an event, § 6212(c) (1) provides that the Secretary or his delegate shall have no right to determine any additional deficiency of the taxpayer for the same taxable year.

Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, similar restrictions on the taxpayer’s right of injunction existed.

Section 272, as amended, provided:

This Section then gives the taxpayer the right, within ninety days, to petition for a redetermination of the deficiency, and no assessment, distraint or proceeding in court for collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted “until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such ninety day period,” nor if such a petition is filed, “until the decision of the Board has become final,” and if attempted, “[it] may be enjoined.”

The facts are undisputed. On March 11, 1955, the Commissioner sent a notice of deficiency by registered mail to the taxpayer at the wrong address. This notice is conceded by both parties to be ineffective for any purpose.

On April 14, 1955, the Commissioner mailed a notice of deficiency by ordinary mail to the taxpayer at his correct address. It was received by taxpayer the following day.

The appellant filed no petition for re-determination of the deficiency with the Tax Court at any time.

On July 22 1955 (more than ninety days after the notice had been received) when no action was taken by the taxpayer, appellee gave written notice and demand for payment, and issued a warrant of distraint.

The sole question presented is whether the notice of deficiency so received by the taxpayer is a valid statutory notice. If so, appellant has no defense to the threatened levy and distraint. If not, appellee has no authority to levy and distrain, and should be enjoined from doing so until after notice has been given by registered mail, the expiration of the ninety day period, and the failure of taxpayer to petition.

The earlier cases, particularly those heard by the Tax Court, applied the statutory construction rule, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and held that “notice by registered letter” meant notice in that way, and in no other way; that notice by ordinary mail, or manual delivery, was insufficient.

Day v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 161 ; Hamilton v. Commissioner, 13 T.Ct. 747, 749 ; Wilson v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 1280, 1290 ; Heinemann Chemical Co. v. Heiner, 3 Cir., 1937, 92 F.2d 344 ; citing Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282 , 49 S.Ct. 129 , 73 L.Ed. 379 , where there appears this language, interpreting the 1924 Act:

But, argues the Government, the statute now has been revised; it does not now so “limit”; it merely “authorizes” one method of giving notice. It points out that the 1924 Act provided that notice “shall be sent by registered mail,” the 1926 Act, § 274(a), 26 U.S.C.A.Int. Rev.Acts, p. 203 was revised to provide that the Government was “authorized” to so send the notice; that this word “is a permissive word at most; ” that the real objective is actual notice. If notice by registered mail was deemed indispensable, runs the Government’s argument, it would have been simple for the Congress to have so provided; i. e., “notice must be served by registered mail.” We believe that this Court should attempt to give effect to the manifest intent of Congress, when it changed the requirement “shall use registered mail,” to the permissive “may use registered mail.” We presume the purpose of using registered mail is first, to provide the safest economical. method of insuring that in the greater majority of cases, notice is actually received by the taxpayer from his Government; second, to create some commonly accepted factual basis to permit, in good conscience, the initiation of the ninety day period against the taxpayer, without requiring the Government to face the almost impossible task of proving actual notice to the taxpayer.

But the heart of the taxpayer’s right is to have actual notice, which enables him to petition his Government if he so desires. This he had here, under the notice he admittedly received by ordinary mail.

We believe a broader interpretation of the language is followed in the more recent court cases. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Stewart, 6 Cir., 186 F.2d 239, 241 , 24 A.L.R.2d 793 :

We do not go as far as the majority did in Dolezilek v. C. I. R., 1954, 94 U.S. App.D.C., 97, 212 F.2d 458 , in here holding that actual notice, plus a ninety-day period thereafter within which the taxpayer may act, satisfies the statute, and that a literal compliance is unnecessary. There the majority opinion held that the mailing of an undelivered registered letter starts the ninety-day period running, where the taxpayer had actual notice within the ninety-day period by manual delivery and “adequate time remaining within such period for preparing and filing * * * ” his protest. The dissent of Judge Miller points out that he believes the legislative intent was that “the notice must actually reach the taxpayer * * * before limitation begins to run from the date of mailing,” and in conclusion he states:

We agree with this reasoning. Here' the essential purpose of the statute was accomplished. The rights of the taxpayer were protected. He received ae-tual notice in sufficient time to petition the: Tax Court to stay the levy and dis-traint, had he desired so to do. He chose not to do so, and he cannot now complain of an alleged technical deficiency which deprived him of no rights.

Our conclusion herein as to the sufficiency of the notice is based upon the circumstances of this case and our reasoning is not meant as authority for holding that actual notice is sufficient in all cases where another specific kind of notice is prescribed.

Affirmed.

. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1340 . . Rule 12(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. . 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 . . 26 U.S.C.A. § 7421 . . 26 U.S.C.A. § 6212 . . 26 U.S.C.A. § 6213 . . 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1939), § 272. . Internal Revenue Act of 1924, § 274(a), 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev.Acts, p. 56.