MEMORANDUM DECISION RE DEFENDANTS COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL 9333 UNION AND COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA DISTRICT 9 UNION’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docs. 38, 43) AND MOTIONS TO STRIKE (Docs. 109,114)

I. INTRODUCTION.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 , claiming that his employer, defendant Pacific Bell, Inc. (“Pacific Bell”), terminated him in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between Pacific Bell and Plaintiffs union, defendants District 9 and Local 9333 of the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (“CWA” or “Union”). Plaintiff also alleges that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by conducting a perfunctory investigation and refusing to take his grievance to arbitration. Plaintiff also brings supplemental state law claims for fraud and defamation.

On December 6, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Wrongful Termination against Defendants Pacific Bell; AT & T Communications of California, Inc.; SBC Telecom, Inc.; Shane Spencer; Alan Brown; Communications Workers of America Local 9333 Union AFL-CIO (“Local 9333” or “Local Union”); and Communications Workers of America District 9 Union AFL-CIO (“District 9”). The Third Cause of Action alleges breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement against all Defendants; the Fourth Cause of Action alleges fraud against the Union Defendants; the Fifth Cause of Action alleges breach of the duty of fair representation against Local 9333 and District 9; and the Sixth Cause of Action alleges defamation by slander against all Defendants.

Before the court for decision are motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants Local 9333 and District 9.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

In October 2005, Plaintiff worked as a cable locator for Pacific Bell, a regional telephone company providing telephone and data transmission services to retail consumers over its telecommunications infrastructure and facilities. Pacific Bell and the Union are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) which states that employees can only be terminated for “good cause.” The CBA also contains a mandatory grievance clause and provides for final and binding arbitration. Plaintiff was a member of the Union, who was the exclusive bargaining agent for a bargaining unit of Pacific Bell employees that included Plaintiff.

Under the CBA, the Union may file a grievance based on any alleged violation of the CBA. (Dec. of D. Flores ¶ 4.) A grievance may be addressed at three stages (“Step 1 through Step 3”), with each step involving a more senior company and union official. (id) If the grievance is not resolved at Step 3, the Union may appeal the Company’s decision to a neutral arbitrator. (Id.) The decision whether to take an unresolved grievance to arbitration is made at the district level. (Id. ¶ 6.) After the matter has been moved to the district level, the local union does not have any continuing obligation regarding the investigation, handling or processing of the grievance. (Id. ¶ 7.)

Pacific Bell vehicles are generally equipped with a Vehicle Tracking Unit (“VTS”), which directly links to Global Positioning Satellites (“GPS”). (Larson Dec. ¶ 3.) Pacific Bell began installing vehicle tracking devices in its service vehicles in 1998. (Id.) Pacific Bell equipped Plaintiffs work vehicle with GPS several years prior to the events at issue in this case. (Id.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff knew his vehicle contained a GPS monitoring device on October 17, 2005. (SUF 20, 23.)

Pacific Bell’s use of GPS data for disciplinary purposes is authorized under the CBA. (Dec. of G. Flores ¶ 3.) In 2004, the Union expressed concerns about Pacific Bell’s use of GPS data for employee discipline. (Id. at ¶ 8-9.) The Union proposed that GPS data not be used at all. (Id.) Pacific Bell rejected this and proposed that the parameters be spelled out in an enforceable side-letter agreement. (Id.) On July 12, 2004, Pacific Bell and the Union entered into “a side letter agreement:”

(Exh. B to Dec. of D. Flores.)

Pacific Bell uses GPS reports for a variety of reasons, such as ensuring that employees are working at assigned locations at particular times or to ensure that vehicles are being operated safely within the speed limits. (Dec. of G. Flores ¶ 8.) The reports generated by the GPS system report the following data: (a) the time and location of the vehicle every time the ignition is turned on and off; (b) the time and location of the vehicle every seven minutes; (c) the time and location of the vehicle every one mile driven; and (d) the time and location of the vehicle the first time it reaches 20 mph after the ignition is initially turned on. (Larson Dec. ¶ 4.)

According to Steve Larson, Manager of Vehicle Tracking Services since March 2001, GPS units attached to Plaintiffs vehicle on October 17, 2005 are extremely accurate. (Larson Dec. ¶ 1, 5.) Although there are times that the system has experienced problems, those instances are rare. (Larson Dec. ¶ 5.) If the GPS unit is not functioning properly, the report will indicate a problem. (Id.) According to Larson, the GPS records from Plaintiffs vehicle on October 17, 2005 did not report any malfunction or error. (Larson Dec. ¶ 4, 10.) Larson also stated that there was no record of any service request concerning Plaintiffs GPS unit in October 2005. (Larson Dec. ¶ 10.)

A. Theft of Plaintiff’s Work Vehicle

1. Undisputed Facts

On October 17, 2005, Plaintiffs company vehicle was stolen while he was locating cable in Keyes, California. (SUF 1.) At around 1:00 p.m., Plaintiff maintains he parked his vehicle, removed the keys from the ignition, locked the van, and proceeded to the rear of the van to remove his locating wand. (SUF 2; Dec. of A. Brown ¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiff then began walking to the worksite, away from his company vehicle. (Id.) Pacific Bell had a rule requiring that company vehicles be locked. Plaintiff was aware of this company rule. (SUF 8.) Plaintiffs van was also equipped with GPS equipment. (SUF 4.)

According to Plaintiff, sometime after 1:00 p.m., he was locating cable approximately 150 feet away when he saw a bicyclist approach his vehicle. (SUF 5.) Plaintiff noticed the bicyclist pick something up off of the ground and enter the cabin of his vehicle. (Id.) The bicyclist then proceeded to drive off in the vehicle. (Id.) Plaintiff immediately moved toward the van and dialed 911. (SUF 6-7.) After concluding this short pursuit and the 911 call, Plaintiff phoned his supervisor, Alan Brown. (SUF 7.)

Plaintiffs stolen vehicle was located approximately 20-30 minutes later. (SUF 8-9.) A CHP officer, who had arrived at the theft location (Nunes and Washington Streets), drove Plaintiff to the location of his recovered work vehicle (Nora Avenue and Ninth Street). (SUF 9.) Local Shop steward John Mastrangelo (“Mastrangelo”) and Brown were at the location of the recovered vehicle when Plaintiff and the officer arrived. (SUF 10.) Upon inspection, the keys were in the ignition, but the vehicle was not running. (SUF No. 12.) The vehicle was missing the company laptop, miscellaneous tools, and change from the ashtray. (SUF No. 11.)

On October 18, 2005, Plaintiff attended an investigatory meeting concerning the theft of his work vehicle. (SUF 13.) Plaintiff, Mastrangelo, Brown, and another Pacific Bell representative attended the meeting. (SUF 13.) Brown told Plaintiff that GPS data from the van showed that it had been idling at the time of the theft. (SUF 15.) Plaintiff was given an opportunity to explain his side of the story. (SUF 14.) Plaintiff denied leaving the keys in the vehicle while it was running and stated that the keys must have fallen off his keychain when he was locking the vehicle’s rear doors. (Dec. of A. Brown ¶ 9.) Although Plaintiff knew the company used GPS systems to verify technician whereabouts, he did not know it could tell if a vehicle was idling. (SUF 20, 23.) Plaintiff questioned the accuracy of the GPS data. (SUF 16-17.) At the conclusion of the meeting, Plaintiff was suspended pending further investigation. (SUF 18.)

Following the October 18, 2005 meeting, Plaintiff spoke with Mastrangelo and Lynn Johnson, president of Local 9333. (SUF 24.) When Plaintiff did not hear from Johnson within three days of the October 18th meeting, he faxed her a letter saying he was seeking legal counsel. (SUF 25.) A representative from District 9 contacted Plaintiff and told him that they were working on the status of his investigation and Johnson would call him. (SUF 26.) Thereafter, Johnson called Plaintiff but could not give him any information on the status of the investigation. (SUF 27.) Plaintiff holds the belief that Johnson “left him in the dark” about the investigation. (SUF 28.) However, Plaintiff did speak with Mastrangelo every other day during his suspension. (SUF 30.)

On November 1, 2005, during his suspension, Plaintiff was asked to meet with an investigator from the Pacific Bell’s Asset Protection Division. (SUF 31.) During this meeting, the Asset Protection investigator presented Plaintiff with GPS reports evidencing that the van was idling at the time the vehicle was stolen. (SUF 35. ) Plaintiff responded that he never left the vehicle unattended and could not explain why the GPS report said otherwise. (SUF 34.) At the conclusion of the meeting, the Asset Protection investigator drafted a statement summarizing the meeting, which Plaintiff was allowed to correct and edit before signing. (SUF 36. )

On November 18, 2005, Brown, Spencer, Ellen Singleton (Labor Relations), and Roger Odom (Human Resources), met to discuss the investigation, Asset Protection’s findings, and Plaintiffs disposition. (Dec. of A. Brown ¶ 16.) Brown and Spencer also provided the group with Plaintiffs previous disciplinary record-including the 2004 suspension for violating Pacific Bell’s Code of Business Conduct. (Dec. of S. Spencer ¶ 8-9.) Brown and Spencer determined that the evidence demonstrated that Plaintiffs vehicle was idling when it was stolen, which meant the keys were in the ignition and that Plaintiffs report of the facts was false. (Dec. of Brown ¶ 16.) Spencer and Brown decided to terminate Plaintiff for not safeguarding company property and misrepresenting facts during the investigation, i.e., that Plaintiff lied. (Id.)

On November 22, 2005, Plaintiff attended a meeting with Mastrangelo, Johnson, Brown, Spencer, union representative Virginia Santos, and cable repair manager Warren Anderson. (SUF 38-39.) Brown conducted the meeting and informed Plaintiff that he was terminated. (SUF 39.) Brown stated that the investigation determined that Plaintiff violated the Company’s Code of Business Conduct by failing to safeguard company property and that he misrepresented facts during the investigation. (SUF 40.) Brown asked Plaintiff if he had any questions regarding his dismissal. (Dec. of Brown ¶ 17.) Plaintiff responded in the negative. (Id.) Plaintiff was then given his final paycheck and the meeting concluded. (Id.)

Following Plaintiffs discharge, the Union filed a grievance on his behalf. The union asserted that the sole reason for Plaintiffs dismissal was the GPS report, which was in direct violation of the CBA and agreement governing Pacific Bell’s use of GPS records. (Exh. H, Dec. of L. Johnson; Exh. C, Dec. of D. Flores.) Pacific Bell denied that GPS was the sole reason for his dismissal and maintained that Plaintiffs explanation regarding the theft was not plausible. (Id.) Plaintiff had three prior disciplinary incidents, the most serious of which resulted in the warning that he could be terminated if another incident occurred. The union requested that Plaintiff be reinstated to his position at Pacific Bell and made whole in all other respects. (SUF No. 46; Exh. D, Dec. of D. Flores.)

A Step 1 grievance meeting was held on December 7, 2005. (Dec. of Brown ¶ 16.) Brown, representing Pacific Bell, and Johnson, representing Local 9333, attended the Step 1 meeting, at which time Johnson demanded that Plaintiff be reinstated. (Id.) Brown refused the Johnson’s request to reinstate Plaintiff and denied the grievance. (Id.) Brown also confirmed that Johnson received all of the documentation she requested, including copies of the asset protection report, interview notes, the GPS report, and the Stanislaus County Sheriffs report. (Doc. 50-4, Exh. F, pp. 18.)

A Step 2 grievance meeting was held on January 5, 2006. (Dec. of S. Spencer ¶ 17.) Larry Gordon, Juan Saralegui, John Mastrangelo, and Lynn Johnson attended on behalf of the Union. (Id.) Spencer and Tony Kobliska attended on behalf of Pacific Bell. (Id.) According to the minutes of the meeting, the group reviewed Plaintiffs grievance and Local 9333 representatives again requested that Plaintiff be reinstated to his full-time position. (Doc. 53, Exh. E, pp. 35.). Lynn Johnson asked why Plain tiff was terminated instead of suspended for 30/60 days. Kobliska stated that Plaintiff “was terminated because of his inherent risk to the business.” (Id.) Pacific Bell refused to reinstate Plaintiff and denied the grievance. (Id.)

A Step 3 grievance meeting was held on February 16, 2006. (Dec. of D. Flores ¶ 11. ) Larry Gordon and Lynn Johnson attended on behalf of the Union. (Id.) Murchison, Kobliska, and John Berringer attended on behalf of Pacific Bell. (Id.) Local 9333 again asserted that Plaintiff was dismissed solely because of the GPS report, contrary to the side-letter agreement. (Id.) Although Pacific Bell admitted that it “used GPS heavily on this,” it asserted that his termination was “based on the vehicle being stolen.” (Id.) Pacific Bell maintained that Plaintiffs explanation regarding the theft was not plausible, i.e., that Plaintiff lied. (Id.) Pacific Bell refused Local 9333’s request to reinstate Plaintiff and denied the grievance. (Id.)

On March 9, 2006, District 9 notified the company of its intent to arbitrate Plaintiffs grievance under Sections 7.10C, 7.10D, 7.11D, and 7.15 of the CBA. (Id. ¶ 12.) District 9 maintained that the termination was not justified and requested that Plaintiff be reinstated, that the company remove all the documentation concerning the incident, and that Plaintiff be made whole in every respect. (Id.)

Plaintiffs arbitration was set for September 27, 2006. (SUF 49.) An arbitrator was selected and the parties prepared for arbitration pursuant to the “Expedited Arbitration Procedures,” which specified that rules of evidence would not be followed and a court reporter would not be used. (Dec. of D. Flores ¶ 14.) Prior to the arbitration, the Union and Pacific Bell exchanged Plaintiffs personnel records, as well as numerous operating manuals, GPS-related documents, and information about other employees disciplined after reviewing GPS records. (Id. ¶ 13; Dee. of R. Hjort ¶ 3.)

In May 2006, Plaintiff met with Lynn Johnson for a couple of hours to review the incident, facts, and evidence against him. (SUF 48.) Also in May, he met with David Rosenfeld, attorney for District 9, at his offices in Alameda, California to prepare for his September 27, 2006 arbitration. (SUF 50.) Plaintiff was told to collect more evidence, specifically, to obtain a copy of his call to 911 on October 17, 2005. (SUF 51.) A few days later Plaintiff notified the Union that he could not obtain a copy of the 911 tape because of the extended lapse in time. (SUF 53.)

A week prior to the arbitration, Johnson and Rosenfeld called Plaintiff to discuss his grievance. (SUF 54.) Johnson and Rosenfeld told Plaintiff that District 9 would not take his grievance to arbitration because, in Rosenfeld’s opinion, District 9 did not have enough evidence to win. (SUF 54.) Rosenfeld requested that Plaintiff meet with him to discuss the reasons District 9 withdrew his grievance. (SUF 56.) Consistent with his pattern of non-participation in the grievance process, Plaintiff declined to meet with Rosenfeld. (SUF 57.)

On September 25, 2006, District 9 formally withdrew Plaintiffs grievance. In a letter to Pacific Bell’s arbitration counsel, Rosenfeld stated that District 9 decided not to pursue the grievance any further because “after reviewing the evidence, we determined that we could not prevail.” (Dec. of R. Hjort ¶ 5.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

On December 6, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint for wrongful termination against Pacific Bell, AT & T, SBC Telecom, Inc., Spencer, Brown, Local 9333, and District 9. (Doc. 2.) Count III alleges that Pacific Bell breached the CBA by terminating Plaintiffs employment without good cause. Also under Count III, Plaintiff alleges that the union breached the CBA by failing to protect his employment following his suspension and discharge.

Count IV alleges that the union defendants committed fraud when they deceived Plaintiff into making monthly payments with full knowledge that they would not fulfill their promise to protect his interests. Count V alleges that the union defendants breached their duty of fair representation by performing a perfunctory investigation and arbitrarily failing to pursue his claim to arbitration. Count VI recites state law claims for libel and blacklisting, arising out of the defendants allegedly telling third parties that Plaintiff was discharged for lying. Plaintiff alleges that these false statements have made it impossible for him to acquire employment in Stanislaus County.

Defendants Local 9333 and District 9 filed their motions for summary judgment on December 28, 2007. (Docs. 38, 43.) With their motions, Defendants filed Statements of Undisputed Facts, supported entirely by Plaintiffs own deposition testimony. (Docs. 40 & 45.) Defendants seek judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot: 1) establish his breach of contract claim outside of § 301 of the LMRA; and 2) produce evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the union’s conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith — the necessary showing to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation. Defendant argues the state law claims should be dismissed because the unions: 3) acted lawfully; and 4) Plaintiff lacks evidence to support his claims.

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment were noticed for hearing on January 28, 2007. By Stipulation and Order filed on January 22, 2008, (Doc. 59), the hearing on the motions for summary judgment was continued to March 17, 2008.

Plaintiff filed his oppositions to Defendants’ summary judgment motions on February 29, 2009. (Docs. 69, 70.) In support of his opposition, Plaintiff submitted: (1) a single Memorandum opposing all the motions (“Memorandum”); (2) the affidavit of John Mastrangelo; (3) the affidavit of Michael Caloyannides, PhD; and (4) a single Statement of Disputed Facts (“PSDF”). (Docs. 72-74.) Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendants’ statements of undisputed facts.

Plaintiff opposes summary judgment on grounds that the union performed a perfunctory investigation and arbitrarily failed to take his claim to arbitration.

On March 10, 2008, Defendants filed a reply and evidentiary objections. (Docs. 77 & 86.) Defendants objected to the affidavits of John Mastrangelo and Michael Caloyannides, PhD., (Docs. 78, 79, 82.), and Plaintiffs Statement of Disputed Facts. (Docs. 80, 89.)

By Minute Orders filed on March 10, 2008, April 23, 2008, June 11, 2008, and August 5, 2008, the hearing on the motions for summary judgment were continued due to the press of court business. (Docs. 76, 97, 98, 100.) The August 5, 2008 Minute Order continued the hearing from August 11, 2008 to August 25, 2008.

On August 11, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Affidavit of Michael Caloy annides, PhD, in opposition to the motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 101.) On August 12, 2008, Plaintiff filed his “Reply and Objections to Defendants’ Separate Statements of Undisputed Facts” in opposition to the Employer Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 102), his “Reply and Objection” to Defendant Local 9333’s statement of undisputed facts in support of Local 9333’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 103), and his “Reply and Objection” to Defendant District 9’s statement of undisputed facts in support of District 9’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 104). Also on August 11, 2008, Plaintiff filed a “Supplemental Statement of Disputed Facts.” (Doc. 105).

On August 18th, 2008, Local 9333 filed a motion to strike the documents filed by Plaintiff on August 11th and 12th. (Doc. 109.) District 9 filed their motion to strike the same documents on August 20th, 2008. (Doc. 112.) The hearing on the motions to strike was set for August 25, 2008, the same day as the summary judgment hearing.

By Minute Orders filed on August 20, 2008, August 28, 2008, and September 2, 2008, the hearing on the motions for summary judgment and motions to strike were continued. (Docs. 118, 120, 121.) The September 2, 2008 Minute Order continued the hearing from September 15, 2008 and to September 29, 2008.

The parties appeared before the court on September 29, 2008, for argument on Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and motions to strike. During the September 29, 2008 hearing, the Court stated to Plaintiffs counsel “if you can find me a case, I’ll let you do it, that says that the making a[sic] negligent or an incompíete investigation that breaches the duty of fair representation.” On October 2, 2008, Plaintiff filed a “Submission of Supplemental Authority After Oral Argument Re: Motion for Summary Judgment”. (Doc. 130.)

On October 7, 2008, Pacific Bell, Spencer, and Brown moved to strike Plaintiffs Supplemental Authority on the ground that it was not authorized to be filed by the Court and constituted a re-briefing of arguments and authority already presented to the Court. (Doc. 133.) District 9 joined the motion on October 10, 2008. (Doc. 134.) The Court denied Defendants’ motion on October 27, 2009 and granted Defendants an opportunity to file responsive papers to the supplemental authority. (Doc. 135.)

On November 10, 2008, District 9 and Local 9333 filed responses to Plaintiffs “Submission of Supplemental Authority After Oral Argument Re: Motion for Summary Judgment.” (Docs. 138 & 140.)

A. Motions to Strike (Docs. 109, lllp.)

These motions for summary judgment were filed by Defendants on December 28, 2007 and noticed for hearing on January 28, 2007. By Stipulation and Order filed on January 22, 2008, (Doc. 59), the hearing on the motions for summary judgment was continued to March 17, 2008. The Stipulation and Order provided:

Plaintiffs oppositions to these motions were filed on February 29, 2008. Although Plaintiff filed his Statement of Undisputed Facts in opposition to the motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff did not comply with the requirements of Rule 56-260(b), Local Rules of Practice:

Defendants’ reply papers were filed on March 10, 2008. By Minute Orders filed on March 10, 2008, April 23, 2008, June 11, 2008, and August 5, 2008, the hearing on the motions for summary judgment was continued due to the press of court business. The August 5, 2008 Minute Order continued the hearing from August 11, 2008 to August 25, 2008.

On August 11, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Affidavit of Michael Caloyannides, PhD, in opposition to the motions for summary judgment (Doc. 101). On August 12, 2008, Plaintiff filed his “Reply and Objections to Defendants’ Separate Statements of Undisputed Facts” in opposition to the Employer Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 102), his “Reply and Objection” to Defendant Local 9333’s statement of undisputed facts in support of Local 9333’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 103), and his “Reply and Objection” to Defendant District 9’s statement of undisputed facts in support of District 9’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 104.) Also on August 11, 2008, Plaintiff filed a “Supplemental Statement of Disputed Facts,” (Doc. 105), which purports to add Plaintiffs disputed facts Nos. 300 to 463. Plaintiff did not seek or obtain leave of Court to file these papers, which sought to correct the deficiencies and noncompliance with the rule of court in his earlier submissions.

Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs August 12, 2008 filings on the grounds that they were filed six months after Plaintiff was required to file them. (Docs. 109, 112.) Defendants note that, although the Court continued the hearing dates for the motions for summary judgment, the Court did not continue the filing deadlines and, in fact, all briefing on the motions for summary judgment was complete as of March 10, 2008. Defendants further note that Rule 78-230, Local Rules of Practice, does not provide for the filing of sur-reply papers.

Plaintiff argues that Rule 78-230(c) allows the filing of the papers filed on August 11 and 12, 2008:

Plaintiff asserts that, because the hearing date for the motions for summary judgment was continued by the Court several times, his supplemental opposition papers are timely and no leave of Court to file them was necessary. This is categorically wrong. The law and motion rules do not provide for a game of ping-pong. The moving party has a right to file a motion a reply to the non-moving party’s response. The opposing party is permitted a response, not a sur-rebuttal.

By Declaration filed on August 22, 2008, Plaintiffs counsel avers that he filed the Supplemental Caloyannides Declaration:

Plaintiffs reading of Rule 78-230(c) misses the mark. Plaintiffs opposition to the motions for summary judgment was filed on February 29, 2008. Defendants’ replies were filed on March 10, 2008, the date on which the Court first continued the hearing date on the motions for summary judgment due to the press of Court business. All briefing in connection with the motions for summary judgment was complete as of March 10, 2008. By the Stipulation and Order filed on January 22, 2008, Plaintiff agreed to file his oppositions to the motions for summary judgment by February 29, 2008. Plaintiffs construction of Rule 78-230(c) is further belied by the fact that Plaintiff did not file his supplemental opposition papers fourteen days prior to the April 28, 2008 hearing date, the June 16, 2008 hearing date, or the August 11, 2008 hearing dates set by the Court’s Minute Orders. All of these hearing dates were continued by the Court after that two week period elapsed.

Plaintiff asserts that, if the Court does not construe Rule 78-230(c) as Plaintiff does, Plaintiff requests “tardy leave of court to cure our inadvertent error” and that Plaintiff “sincerely believed that we were in compliance with the rules.”

Plaintiffs protestations are not reasonable given the sequence of events described above. It is apparent that Plaintiffs untimely filings were not the result of a misreading of the Local Rule, but rather an attempt to correct his previous failure to comply with Rule 56-260(b), and to get a second bite of the apple in opposing the motions for summary judgment.

District 9 and Local 9333’s motions to strike the late filings are GRANTED.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD.

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Where the movant will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must “affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir.2007); see also S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885 , 888 (9th Cir.2003) (noting that a party moving for summary judgment on claim as to which it will have the burden at trial “must establish beyond controversy every essential element” of the claim) (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to an issue as to which the non-moving party will have the burden of proof, the movant “can prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984 . When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the non-movant cannot defeat the motion by resting upon the allegations or denials of its own pleading, rather the “non-moving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). “Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment.” Id.

To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must show there exists a genuine dispute (or issue) of material fact. A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 . “[Sjummary judgment will not lie if [a] dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 . In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court does not make credibility determinations; rather, the “evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 .

V. DISCUSSION.

A. Plaintiffs Evidence

1. Affidavit of John Mastrangelo

In opposition to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff presented an affidavit from Mastrangelo as rebuttal evidence. Defendants District 9 and Local 9333 object to large portions of Mastrangelo’s affidavit on various grounds. Specifically, Defendants raise the following objections:

Defendants District 9 and Local 9333 object to the first paragraph of Mastrangelo’s affidavit on relevance grounds. Relevant evidence is defined as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed R. Evid. 401. Rule 402 provides that “[all] relevant evidence is admissible [¶]... ] Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” Although definition of “relevant evidence” is broad, it has limits; evidence must be probative of a fact of consequence in the matter and must have tendency to make existence of that fact more or less probable than it would have been without evidence. U.S. v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 943-44 (9th Cir.2007).

The circumstances underlying Mastrangelo’s retirement and his difficulties as a steward have no connection to Plaintiffs claims against the Union Defendants. Mastrangelo’s prior budgetary concerns are irrelevant to the investigation and grievance procedures at issue in this litigation. There is no evidence the union’s investigation of plaintiffs case was compromised by any budget issues. The first paragraph of Mastrangelo’s affidavit has nothing to do with the issues of this case, nor is it probative of any material issue, except to show his bias against the union. Defendants’ objections are sustained.

The above portion of Mastrangelo’s affidavit is irrelevant to Plaintiffs claims. Plaintiffs status as a “fill in” technician and the details behind his advancement to a full-time position are not connected to his claims of fraud, defamation, or breach of the duty of fair representation. Defendants’ objection is sustained.

Defendants District 9 and Local 9333 object to the above portion of Mastrangelo’s affidavit on grounds it contains conjecture and was not made on the basis of his personal knowledge. Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re quires that affidavits supporting and opposing a motion for summary judgment “shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters therein.”

Mastrangelo recites that he has “personal knowledge” of the matters set forth in his affidavit based on his “then position as Union Steward.” Yet the claims contained in his third paragraph require knowledge about every instance in which Plaintiff spoke with SBC/Pacific Bell officials and/or union representatives. As a union steward, and not a manager or human resources associate, Mr. Mastrangelo was not present nor in a position to acquire such comprehensive knowledge. Ms. Mastrangelo’s opinion about Plaintiffs credibility is generally inadmissible, except as provided by Fed.R.Evid. 608. Plaintiff has not provided a foundation for the opinion testimony on credibility, which would only be for a person’s reputation in the community for truthfulness. Defendants’ objections are sustained.

Defendants District 9 and Local 9333 object to the first sentence of paragraph four on grounds it contains conjecture and was not made on the basis of his personal knowledge. The objection is sustained for the reasons stated above. The witness was not present. He expresses no more than inadmissible opinions that lack personal knowledge. Defendants object to the remaining portion of paragraph four on hearsay grounds. To the extent that the statements are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, they are inadmissible. See Fed R. Evid. §§ 801-802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence [•••]”).

Paragraph five of Mastrangelo’s affidavit spans seven pages and contains sixteen subparts. Defendants District 9 and Local 9333 object to the bulk of paragraph five on the grounds it contains inadmissible hearsay, conjecture, speculation, and was not made on the basis of his personal knowledge. Defendants’ objections to the fifth paragraph of Mastrangelo’s affidavit are, in the majority, sustained. For example:

Defendants’ objections are sustained. There is nothing in the affidavit to establish Mr. Mastrangelo is knowledgeable about or qualified to give an expert opinion on the reliability of GPS equipment. The affidavit shows no basis for Mastrangelo to form a legal opinion as to conduct sufficient to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation.

Paragraph five, subpart (c), includes several hearsay statements, including statements attributable to Lynn Johnson regarding how the Union would handle Plaintiffs grievance, her report of the company’s investigation that Mr. Smith “lied,” and the alleged extension of time for the company to respond to the second step grievance. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Fed. Rule Evid. 802. These statements were made outside of court, not by the affiant, and are offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Such inadmissible hearsay evidence cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.

Defendants’ objections concerning paragraph five, subpart (e), are sustained. There is no foundation or source of knowledge for Mastrangelo’s opinion regarding the police officers’ interest. There is no basis to establish personal knowledge for Mastrangelo’s conclusion that nobody spoke to the officers and that the company simply accepted the reports at face value. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e).

Paragraph five, subparts (f) and (g), contain inadmissible hearsay and improper opinions which cannot be considered to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff offers improper opinion testimony and lacks personal knowledge concerning Ms. Diaz’s competence as an investigator and what investigation Brown could perform. To be cognizable on summary judgment, evidence must be competent. It is not enough for a witness to tell all she knows; she must know all she tells. Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School District, 237 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir.2001). Defendants’ objections are sustained.

The claims contained in Mastrangelo’s fifth paragraph, subpart (h), require knowledge about every instance in which Pacific Bell officials questioned individuals about its equipment. The claims contained in paragraph 5(h) also require Plaintiff to have comprehensive knowledge about Pacific Bell’s internal key/vehicle policies, as well as every instance in which an employee did not report to work because of an illness. Mr. Mastrangelo has no basis nor was he in a position to acquire such comprehensive knowledge. There is no information to establish personal knowledge. The statements contained in paragraph 5(h) cannot be considered on summary judgment.

Testimony calling for a legal conclusion is an inappropriate matter for expert testimony. See U.S. v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir.1999) (excluding expert testimony offering a legal conclusion); Aguilar v. International Longshoremen’s Union, 966 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir.1992) (noting matters of law are for the court’s determination, not that of an expert witness); see also Marx & Co. v. Diners’ Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 509-10 (2d Cir.1977) (expert testimony consisting of legal conclusions inadmissible). Mastrangelo inappropriately forms and offers legal conclusions whether Plaintiff suffered “disparate” and/or “hostile” treatment. These opinions are inadmissible.

There is no information to establish personal knowledge regarding Mr. Riddle’s alleged past; nor is there any information to support the claim that Mr. Riddle knew about the multiple key/single truck problem. Further, to the extent that the statements are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, they are inadmissible and improper opinions. Fed R. Evid. §§ 801-802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence [¶]... ]”). The statements contained in paragraph 5(1) cannot be considered on summary judgment.

Defendants object to paragraph five, subpart (m), on grounds it contains conjecture and was not made on the basis of his personal knowledge. Defendants’ objections are well-taken. There is no evidence to support the speculative legal conclusion that the grievance would have been resolved in Mr. Smith’s favor. There is also no showing that Mr. Mastrangelo is qualified to opine on what conduct constitutes a bad faith failure to bargain, an inadmissible legal opinion. Defendants’ objections are sustained.

Defendants object to the above portion of Mastrangelo’s affidavit on grounds it contains conjecture, hearsay, and was not made on the basis of his personal knowl edge. For the reasons discussed above, the objections are sustained. Most of the information is improper argument. The last sentence of Paragraph 5(o) is also stricken because Mastrangelo inappropriately reaches legal conclusions on whether Plaintiff suffered “disparate treatment.”

A substantial portion of Mastrangelo’s fifth paragraph and its subparts are inadmissible to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Mastrangelo’s statements concerning how the union failed in its duty to adequately represent Plaintiff, his opinions on the functionality of the GPS system, his criticisms of Lynn Johnson, and his musings on vehicle keys are all improper argument and are sustained.

Defendants District 9 and Local 9333 object to paragraphs 6-9 of Mastrangelo’s affidavit on grounds they are speculative, irrelevant, lack foundation, contain conjecture and were not made on the basis of personal knowledge. In addition, the statements are argumentative opinions. Defendants’ objections are sustained.

In paragraphs 6 through 9 of Mastrangelo’s affidavit, he gives several examples of his interactions with the local union, especially Lynn Johnson. Mastrangelo also details the reasons behind his departure. Mastrangelo’s statements concerning the circumstances of his dismissal and his continuing conflict with the local union are not probative of any consequential facts in this litigation, except his bias. Fed.R.Evid. 401-402; U.S. v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 943-44 (9th Cir.2007). The statements contained in paragraph nine are speculative and argumentative. They are not admissible. See National Steel Corp. v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 496, 502 (9th Cir.1997) (conclusory state- merits without factual support are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.). Mastrangelo simply did not have the personal knowledge to conclude that the Union Defendants conducted “zero investigation.” His knowledge as a union steward did not extend so far.

Defendants raise numerous objections to paragraphs 10 through 14 of Mastrangelo’s affidavit. Mastrangelo’s statements concerning the technician’s physical description, Alan Brown’s thoughts about the GPS system, the installation and repair history of the GPS system, and Pac Bell’s counseling of employees with a history of absences, are sustained. The majority of these statements are not based on evidentiary facts in the record, are argumentative improper opinion, and are too speculative; others, such as the appearance of the technician, are irrelevant to the Plaintiffs claims and, for the most part, do not involve Plaintiff.

Paragraphs ten through fourteen also contain inadmissible hearsay. To the extent that the statements are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, they are inadmissible.

A substantial portion of Mastrangelo’s affidavit is inadmissible to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Hearsay assertions by Mr. Mastrangelo and matters not supported by the record or by a demonstration of personal knowledge or corroborating evidence, are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

2. Affidavit of Michael Caloyannides

On February 29, 2008, Plaintiff filed an affidavit from Michael Caloyannides (“Caloyannides”) in support of his opposition to Union Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In his affidavit, Caloyannides, a purported GPS expert, questions the accuracy of GPS systems and criticizes Brown’s October 18, 2005 test verifying the functionality of the GPS system attached to Plaintiffs work vehicle. Caloyannides states that “it was irresponsible for the Company Defendants and Union Defendants to dismiss Plaintiff solely based on this @road GPS information” and he “would not trust this system for any purpose whatsoever beyond providing basic advisory information that is understood to be inherently unreliable, and certainly not to discharge an employee utilizing this system as the sole basis.” (Dec. of Caloyannides ¶ 16.)

Defendant Local 9338 objects to Caloyannides’ affidavit on grounds that he opines that Pacific Bell and the Union Defendants could not use GPS information in discipline and discharge cases. (Doc. 78. ) However, it is undisputed Pacific Bell and the Union reached a binding side-letter agreement concerning the use of GPS in disciplinary actions. The side letter agreement stated:

As the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative, the Union “enjoys broad authority ... in the negotiation and administration of [the] collective bargaining contract.” Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 739 , 108 S.Ct. 2641 , 101 L.Ed.2d 634 (1988). But this broad authority “is accompanied by a responsibility of equal scope, the responsibility and duty of fair representation.” Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 , 84 S.Ct. 363 , 11 L.Ed.2d 370 (1964). The employer has a corresponding duty under the NLRA to bargain in good faith “with the representa tives of his employees” on wages, hours, and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5); see also § 158(d). Through collective bargaining, a public employer and union can reach agreement on detailed factual questions having important implications. Bolden v. Southeastern Penn. Trans. Auth., 953 F.2d 807 , 828 (3rd Cir.1991) (emphasizing the rational for preventing an individual employee from raising a constitutional claim on an issue that is the subject of a CBA).

In this instance, it is undisputed that the Union and Pacific Bell collectively bargained in good faith and agreed that GPS could be used to discipline employees. As part of any contractual negotiation, an employer may agree to the inclusion of a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement in return for other concessions from the union. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett , — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 1464-65 , 173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009). Courts generally may not interfere in this bargained-for exchange. (Id.; Utility Workers of Am. v. Southern Cal. Edison, 852 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.1988)) (“to the best of our knowledge, ... no court has held that the right to be free from drug testing cannot be negotiated away ...”). It is undisputed that CWA and Pacific Bell entered into a valid agreement governing the use of GPS records by Pacific Bell. The agreement between the CWA and Pacific Bell is valid and enforceable.

As Pacific Bell and the Union collectively bargained that GPS data could be used, Plaintiff cannot offer expert testimony challenging its accuracy and usage to negate the contract. Caloyannides’ opinions are inadmissible to create a genuine issue of material fact that the GPS device could not be used.

Even assuming his opinions on the use and accuracy of GPS data are admissible, Defendants object to Caloyannides’ affidavit on the grounds that he lacks personal knowledge, fails to consider all the facts in the record, and his expert opinions violate Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, expert testimony is admissible if: “(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Fed.R.Evid. 702. As a general matter:

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (footnotes omitted). Based upon the foregoing principles, the Daubert Court discussed four factors which a trial court may use to determine the admissibility of proposed expert testimony: “testing, peer review, error rates, and ‘acceptability’ in the relevant scientific community.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (citation omitted) (holding that Daubert analysis also “applies to the testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists”).

In this case, Plaintiff offers the affidavit of Michael Caloyannides, who holds a PhD in Applied Mathematics and a Master of Science degree in Electric Engineering. Based upon his affidavit, Plaintiff plans to introduce Caloyannides for the opinion that “it was irresponsible for the Company Defendants and Union Defendants to dismiss Mr. Smith solely based on this @road GPS information.” Defendants argue, correctly, that Mr. Caloyannides’ opinion is inadmissible because it does not meet the requirements of Rule 702.

It cannot be fairly disputed that Caloyannides is qualified, based upon his education and experience, to testify as an expert in the fields of GPS technology and computer forensics. The problem is not one of GPS expertise or experience, per se, but a lack of expertise and experience with respect to the subject matter at issue— whether the Union Defendants breached the duty of fair representation and whether the Pacific Bell dismissed Plaintiff based solely on the @road GPS information.

Mr. Caloyannides’ lack of expertise in these critical areas is best demonstrated by his expert opinion that it was “irresponsible for the Company Defendants and Union Defendants to dismiss Plaintiff solely based on GPS data.” Contrary to Caloyannides’ assertions, the Union Defendants neither suspended Plaintiff nor terminated him in 2005; all adverse employment actions taken against Plaintiff in 2005 were initiated and implemented by Pacific Bell, his former employer. Perhaps because Mr. Caloyannides is unfamiliar with the appropriate standards with respect to Plaintiffs legal challenge, he completely disregards the facts, including that Plaintiff was terminated by Pacific Bell for failure to safeguard company assets and misrepresenting facts during an investigation. Whatever the reasons, Caloyannides’ expertise does not extend to Pacific Bell’s employment decisions or the grievance procedures authorized by contract, and administered by the Union. Mr. Caloyannides simply cannot address these critical issues based upon his expertise and experience.

Defendants also contend that Caloyannides’ affidavit lacks the requisite reliability because it is based on incomplete and selective documents. Defendants state that Caloyannides’ affidavit relies heavily on the mistaken belief that Plaintiff was terminated solely based on GPS information, an improper legal conclusion. According to Defendants, this critical error, along with Caloyannides’ limited review of the record, led him to assert an alternative timeline that is inconsistent with the undisputed evidence in this case.

If the basis for an expert’s opinion is clearly unreliable, the district court may disregard that opinion in deciding whether a party has created a genuine issue of material fact. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 (if “the trial court concludes that the scintilla of [expert] evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to ... grant summary judgment”). Relevant expert testimony is admissible only if an expert knows of facts which enable him to express a reasonably accurate conclusion. Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 662 (11th Cir.1988). Opinions derived from erroneous data are appropriately excluded. Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 919 F.2d 304 (5th Cir.1990). Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under Fed.R.Evid. 702. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999).

Caloyannides opines that the “only plausible explanation” of the evidence is that “Plaintiff turned off his vehicle at 1:12 p.m. and it was stolen at 1:19 p.m.” Caloyannides’ timeline is inconsistent with the undisputed facts of this case and casts doubt on his reliability and impartiality. All of the evidence in the record supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs vehicle was stolen before 1:12 p.m.:

Caloyannides’ timeline is also inconsistent with Plaintiffs version of events, as communicated to the Deputies on the day of the theft and repeated in his deposition on August 1, 2007. According to Plaintiff, he parked the car near the corner of Nunes Road and Washington Street and began cable locating 200 yards away. He then noticed an individual enter the vehicle and take off westbound on Nunes Road. Plaintiff states that he lost track of the vehicle when it turned northbound on Ninth Street (toward Dora Avenue). According to the Sheriffs report, Plaintiffs vehicle was spotted at 13:15 near the corner of Dora Avenue and Ninth streets, about a mile away from the intersection of Nunes and Washington. At this time, the deputies observed two individuals flee the vehicle, apprehending one suspect in the backyard of 5312 8th street, a block from the corner of Dora and Ninth. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff arrived at this location with a Sheriffs deputy.

According to Caloyannides, the above evidence does little to demonstrate that the vehicle was stolen before 1:12 p.m. on October 17th. Caloyannides states that a lack of calibration among time keeping devices — of the GPS provider, California Highway Patrol, cellular phone company, and Stanislaus County Sheriffs Department — contributed to the faulty timeline. He also blames daylight savings time. Caloyannides further states that “it is important to note that this [GPS] system ... could have been manipulated intentionally” and the electronic data “has been destroyed by the defendant companies.” Caloyannides appears to allege that Pacific Bell and the Union conspired to fraudu lently alter or destroy the GPS results to support his theory. This is unsupported by the record.

Nonetheless, whether Caloyannides does or does not have sufficient (or reliable) evidence to support his alternative time-line, Pacific Bell was entitled to use GPS under the CBA. Caloyannides opinions are insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (“A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data.”); see also Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49 , 57 (2d Cir.1985) (Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment). Here, Plaintiffs untruthful statements and failure to protect company property were additional grounds for termination. There is no evidence Pacific Bell solely relied on the GPS, or had knowledge that the some of the information was true and could no be relied on.

If the Daubert court was less than perfect in articulating the gatekeeper function, it did make clear that the trial judge has an inescapable obligation to determine whether proffered expert testimony in a particular case is “scientific” and whether the proffered expert’s “knowledge” will assist the trier of fact. Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2795 . To fulfill this obligation the court must determine that the proposed expert’s testimony must be both “reliable” and “relevant.” See U.S. v. City of Miami, Florida, 115 F.3d 870, 873 (11th Cir.1997) (stating that “[r]elevant expert testimony is admissible only if an expert knows of facts which enable him to express a reasonably accurate conclusion.”).

Taken cumulatively, Caloyannides’ testimony is unreliable. Consistent with the role of the district court as “gatekeeper”, see General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 , 118 S.Ct. 512 , 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997), Defendants’ objections to the Caloyannides affidavit are sustained.

Caloyannides’ affidavit offers legal conclusions. Caloyannides did not limit his opinions to the functioning and accuracy of GPS; rather, Caloyannides opined as to the legal standards which he believed to be derived from the collective bargaining agreement and what standards should have governed the conduct of Pacific Bell and the Union. He did not testify about common practice concerning GPS data, but rather opined what was necessary to satisfy the CBA. Such testimony is a legal conclusion and is an inappropriate matter for expert testimony. See U.S. v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir.1999) (excluding expert testimony offering a legal conclusion); Aguilar v. International Longshoremen’s Union, 966 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir.1992) (noting matters of law are for the court’s determination, not that of an expert witness); see also Marx & Co. v. Diners’ Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 509-10 (2d Cir.1977) (expert testimony consisting of legal conclusions inadmissible). Caloyannides’ inappropriately expressed legal conclusions on the issue of terminations under the CBA. These opinions are inadmissible.

Finally, Defendants object that Caloyannides never reaches conclusions on the ultimate issues, such as whether the Union breached its duty of fair representation based on the GPS’s functionality. Defendants’ argument has merit. Caloyannides’ only opinion concerning the union is that they “were irresponsible to dismiss Mr. Smith solely based on this @road information.” Pacific Bell’s decision to terminate Plaintiff has no bearing on whether the union breached the duty of fair representation. A survey of the current case law reveals there are few cases in which expert testimony on a union’s duty of fair representation was found necessary or useful to a jury. See Pease v. Production Workers of Chicago and Vicinity Local 707, 2003 WL 22012678 at *4-5 (summarizing the case law on expert testimony in fair representation cases and finding that Plaintiffs expert “would not be useful in helping the jury understand whether the Union’s conduct was so fair outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be actionable.”).

3. Deemed Admissions

In his Statement of Disputed Facts, Plaintiff relies on a number of his Requests for Admission, asserting that the facts requested to be admitted or denied are deemed admitted because Defendants did not timely respond to them.

Defendants dispute that their responses to the Requests for Admission were untimely.

Caren P. Sencer, counsel for District 9, filed a Supplemental Declaration on March 10, 2008 (Doc. 88). Ms. Sencer avers:

Rule 36(a) provides that the “matter is deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request ... the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party .... ” “Failure to respond to requests for admission results in automatic admission of the matters requested ... No motion to establish the admissions is needed because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) is self-executing.” Federal Trade Commission v. Medicor LLC, 217 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1053 (C.D.Cal.2002). Here, the record establishes that Plaintiffs counsel agreed to an extension of time to respond to his requests for admission. Plaintiffs assertions in his Statement of Disputed Facts that the Requests for Admission are deemed admitted because Defendants’ failed to timely respond is without merit.

B. Plaintiffs Statement of Disputed Facts

On February 29, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Statement of Disputed Facts (Doc. 72, (“PSDF”).) in support of his opposition to Union Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs 73-page Statement of Disputed Facts is a series of excerpts from purported “deemed admissions” and summarized testimony of affiants John Mastrangelo and Michael Caloyannides. The Statement of Disputed Facts is organized according to witness and deemed admission. Most of Plaintiffs “disputed facts” are taken verbatim from the deemed admissions and affidavits of Mastrangelo and Caloyannides. (Fact Nos. 6, 10-172, 297, pp. 3-45, 71). Plaintiffs Statement of Disputed Facts includes disputed facts that are immaterial (e.g., Fact No. 79, Mr. Dan Devine brought a loaded gun to work, but there were shotgun shells on the seat next to the weapon, so it is of little consequence to me and my workers). The Statement of Disputed Facts contains non-enumerated statements unaffiliated to the indexed “disputed facts” (e.g., Doc. 72, 72:26-72:27, why would the thief have dropped the bike at the back of the van unless he had to pick up the keys to gain entry?). Approximately fifty “disputed facts” concern Plaintiffs deposition testimony. These facts are either undisputed or irrelevant to the ultimate issues of this case.

At issue in this action is the effect of Plaintiffs failure in many instances to provide support for the allegations in the Complaint, and now in his opposition to summary judgment. The Eastern District of California’s local rules have strict requirements regarding opposing summary judgment motions; the local rules require litigants in response to the movant’s statement of undisputed material facts (admitting or denying the facts with citation to the record). See E.D. Cal. R. 56-260(b). The opposing party may also file a concise “Statement of Disputed Facts,” of all additional material facts as to which there is a genuine issue precluding summary judgment or adjudication. Id. Here, Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts; rather, he filed a “Statement of Disputed Facts” as part of his opposition to Defendants’ motion.

The rules are specifically designed to avoid the procedural morass that has developed in this case. When Plaintiff fails to file an opposition to the movant’s undisputed facts, instead filing a 73-page statement of disputed facts, it is extremely difficult to identify the universe of actual, material, factual disputes, and their legal effect. The time required to decipher the filings in this case imposed on limited judicial resources.

In light of the rulings on the objections to the affidavits of Mastrangelo (Fact Nos. 60-99) and Caloyannides (Fact Nos. 6, 10-59), as well as the determination concerning the deemed admissions (Fact Nos. 100-172), Plaintiffs Statement of Disputed Facts is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.

C. Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action.

Plaintiffs third cause of action is a breach of contract claim against all defendants. District 9 and Local 9333 argue that Plaintiffs third cause of action should be construed as a hybrid cause of action under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). Under the hybrid cause of action, Plaintiffs third cause of action for breach of the collective bargaining agreement is viable only against Pacific Bell.

Where “the union representing [an] employee in [a] grievance/arbitration procedure acts in such a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion as to breach its duty of fair representation,” the employee “may bring suit against both the employer and the union, notwithstanding the outcome or finality of the grievance or arbitration proceeding.” See DelCostello v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 , 103 S.Ct. 2281 , 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). “Such a suit, as a formal matter, comprises two causes of action,” specifically, a suit against the employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA ( 29 U.S.C. § 185 ), and a suit against the union for breach of the union’s duty of fair representation, which “is implied under the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act”. See id. The Supreme Court has held that the two claims “are inextricably interdependent”; to prevail against either the company or the union, the employee “must not only show that [his] discharge [or discipline] was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating a breach of duty by the Union.” Id. at 165 , 103 S.Ct. 2281 . Accordingly, Plaintiffs third cause of action is construed as a suit only against Pacific Bell for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA. For the reasons stated above, there has been no breach. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of District 9 and Local 9333 as to Plaintiffs third cause of action.

D. Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action.

The Union Defendants move for summary judgment in connection with the fourth cause of action for fraud, which is alleged only against “AFLCIO — CWA and AFLCIO — District 9.” (Compl. 12:21— 12:22.)

“The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law (9th ed. 1988), Torts, § 676, p. 778. “ ‘Promissory fraud’ is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. A promise to do something necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable fraud.’ ” Agosta v. Astor, 120 Cal.App.4th 596, 603 , 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 565 (2004).

In his complaint, Plaintiffs alleges that the Union committed fraud when they accepted his union dues but failed to protect his employment following his suspension and discharge. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that as a union member he believed he would be protected against wrongful termination and that he would continue to be employed with Pacific Bell until such time as there was good cause or justifica tion to terminate his employ. (Pl.’s Compl. 12:26-13:12.) Plaintiff goes on to allege:

(Id. at 13:12-13:25)

Plaintiff presents no evidence to support the required elements of the common law cause of action for fraud and testified at his deposition that he had no such evidence. The record is clear that the Union Defendants in this and other instances processed Plaintiffs grievances and represented him as required by the CBA. The Union’s attorney ultimately determined that Plaintiffs termination was justified, indefensible, and without merit. That Plaintiff is disappointed with the outcome of that process or that the Union Defendants may have breached the duty of fair representation in the processing of Plaintiffs grievance is not evidence of promissory fraud on the part of the Union Defendants. They did not promise to win meritless cases.

Summary judgment for Local 9333 and District 9 on the Fourth Cause of Action is GRANTED.

E. Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action.

In his fifth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Local 9333 and District 9 breached their duty of fair representation by performing a perfunctory investigation and arbitrarily failing to pursue his claim to arbitration.

1. Duty of Fair Representation

The duty of fair representation doctrine serves as a “bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 , 87 S.Ct. 903, 912 , 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). “Under the doctrine, a union must represent fairly the interests of all bargaining-unit members during the negotiation, administration, and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements. Id. In particular, a union breaches its duty when its conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith ...” International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 , 99 S.Ct. 2121 , 60 L.Ed.2d 698 (1979). “A union’s conduct is ‘arbitrary if it is ‘without rational basis,’ ... or is ‘egregious, unfair and unrelated to legitimate union interests,’ ” Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 , 106 S.Ct. 1642 , 90 L.Ed.2d 187 , (1986), or is “so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness’ .... as to be irrational.” Air Line Pilots Assoc. v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 , 111 S.Ct. 1127 , 113 L.Ed.2d 51 (1991). Under these exacting standards, “unions are not liable for good faith, non-discriminatory errors of judgment made in the processing of grievances.” Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1254 . Rather, “something more than negligence must be shown.” Peters v. Burlington Northern R.R., 931 F.2d 534 , 538 (9th Cir.1991).

In determining whether a union has breached its duty of fair representation to a member, the Court must apply slightly different standards of review, depending on whether the union’s act or failure to act involved the union’s judgment, or was procedural or ministerial in nature. If the alleged union misconduct was “procedural or ministerial, then the plaintiff may prevail if the union’s conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Marino v. Writers Guild of America, East, Inc., 992 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir.1993). The union is not liable for “mere negligence”; rather, “to be arbitrary, the union must have acted in ‘reckless disregard’ of the union member’s rights.” Id. Thus a union may be liable when it simply fails to perform a ministerial act which is required of it and that failure “completely extinguishes the employee’s right to pursue his claim.” Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir.1983) (liability imposed where union failed to complete its investigation of member’s complaint of improper discharge before grievance filing deadline had expired, and member’s right to challenge employer’s action was extinguished).

In contrast, if the conduct in question involved the exercise of the union’s judgment, “then the plaintiff may prevail only if the union’s conduct was discriminatory or in bad faith.” Marino , at 1486. When the union’s judgment is challenged — such as its decision whether and to what extent to pursue a particular grievance — “the union must balance many collective and individual interests,” and thus “courts should accord substantial deference to the union’s decisions,” even when its decision results in a loss to some of its members. Dutrisac, 749 F.2d at 1274-75 (union will not be liable for “mere errors of judgment in processing grievances”).

a. Allegations Against Local 9333.

In his fifth cause of action Plaintiff alleges that Local 9333 breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of his grievance when it:

(Pi’s Opp. 2:3-6:15.)

i. Extension of Time to Step 2 Grievance

Pursuant to the CBA Chapter 7.05, the failure to timely respond within 30 days by the company results in the grievance being resolved in favor of the union. Plaintiff alleges that “on or about December 21, 2005, Lynn Johnson unilaterally contacted the company to notify them that the deadline to respond to the 2nd step grievance was about to expire and she asked the company whether they wanted an extension of time to respond.” (Pl.’s Opp. 26:8-26:16). Plaintiff alleges that if no extension had been granted, “grievance would have been resolved in his favor” and “he would have had his job back prior to Christmas of 2005.” (Id.) Union actions that are commanded or prohibited by union rules or policies involve little or no discretion and are ministerial in nature. See Wellman v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 146 F.3d 666, 671 (9th Cir.1998) Thus the Union breached its duty to Plaintiff in failing to enforce Chapter 7.05’s requirement if its conduct in granting an extension of time was “arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith” and prejudiced his rights. Id.

While Plaintiff argues that the extension of time was in violation of the CBA and dispositive of his grievance, he presents no evidence that the extension was “arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.” However, in Ms. Johnson’s declaration, she states that the one-week extension was provided to ensure that Pacific Bell employees with settlement authority could attend the grievance meeting. (Dec. of L. Johnson ¶ 22.) Further, Ms. Johnson’s extension is specifically authorized by Section 7.05D.2.b. of the CBA and entirely consistent with CBA’s mission to work in good-faith and jointly plan and evaluate employee grievances. CBA Art. 7.01-7.07. “[T'jbe union must balance many collective and individual interests,” and thus is “afforded substantial deference in its decisions.” Hays v. National Electrical Contractors Assoc’n, Inc., 781 F.2d 1321, 1324-25 (9th Cir.1986).

Plaintiff fails to provide probative evidence of the union’s bad faith, arbitrary, or discriminatory conduct on the part of the union in exercising discretion to extend time for respond to the Step 2 grievance.

ii. Investigation & Handling of Grievance

Plaintiff makes numerous attacks on the union’s handling of the grievance and investigatory process. Specifically, he calls into question the union’s decision regarding which witnesses to interview; the refusal not to let Mastrangelo proceed as his union steward; the reliance on the GPS data to support his discharge; the failure to hire a GPS expert; and the overall perfunctory nature of the union’s investigation.

A union has wide discretion in the exercise of judgment in representing its members and will only be held in breach of the duty of fair representation where its conduct is “discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Burkevich v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int'l, 894 F.2d 346, 349 (9th Cir.1990). However, a union may not ignore a meritorious grievance or fail to conduct a minimal investigation of a grievance that is brought to its attention, but an investigation which is pursued in good faith and according to the union’s rational judgment will not be found to be a breach of the duty of fair representation. Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 , 106 S.Ct. 1642 , 90 L.Ed.2d 187 (1986). Although most investigations could be made more thorough through added diligence, courts have been “unwilling to subject unions to liability for such errors in judgment.” Id. at 1256.

In this case, the union did conduct an adequate investigation and quite clearly pressed Pacific Bell to reinstate Plaintiff. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Local 9333 filed three grievances on Plaintiffs behalf and negotiated extensively with Pacific Bell in an attempt to resolve the situation. Further, the documents jointly submitted by District 9 and Local 9333 chronicle the thorough investigation performed by them on his behalf. They show that the union was familiar with the nature of the grievance and pursued reasonable steps to resolve Plaintiffs complaints. The union appears to have spent numerous hours interviewing witnesses, reviewing documents, and meeting frequently with Plaintiff and Pacific Bell regarding Plaintiffs grievances. The union clearly exceeded the minimal investigation required by the duty of fair representation. Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1254 .

Plaintiffs opposition focuses on his claim that he was “terminated solely based on the GPS data from Plaintiffs company assigned work vehicle.” (PL’s Opp. 2:6-2:7.) Plaintiff alleges that the union breached its duty of fair representation because it did not “challenge the admissibility of the GPS under the CBA” and “never hired a GPS expert to validate the data.” (Id. at 2:26-2:27, 10:20-10:24.) In essence, Plaintiff claims that the union did not support his conclusion that he was terminated solely based on the GPS data.

As detailed in Part II, supra, it was proper for Pacific Bell to use GPS reports as a tool in investigating the theft of Plaintiffs work vehicle. However, GPS reports were not to be “used as the sole basis for disciplinary action, but may be used to substantiate information obtained from other sources.” (Dec. of G. Flores ¶ 8-9; Exh. B to Dec. of G. Flores.) Here, it is undisputed that Local 9333 took Plaintiffs grievance through three grievance procedures and, in each one of them, argued that Plaintiffs should be reinstated because his termination was based solely on the use of the GPS reports. (Exh. H, Dec. of L. Johnson; Exh. C, Dec. of D. Flores.) Pacific Bell denied this, countering that Plaintiff was terminated because he lied about the events surrounding the theft of the vehicle and failed to safeguard corporate property. Relevant to the dispute is the following exchange, which occurred during Plaintiffs Step 3 grievance meeting, held on February 16, 2006:

(Dec. of D. Flores, Exh. C.)

Plaintiffs allegations regarding the GPS data amount to nothing more than his opinion that the grievance proceedings should have been handled differently-that different evidence should have been presented and that a different approach should have been taken concerning the GPS data. But the record is clear that the Union challenged the use of the GPS data and pursued Plaintiffs grievance in good faith. Plaintiffs disagreement with the union’s tactics simply does not establish bad faith or discriminatory conduct on the part of the union.

Plaintiff does not cite a single case in support of his claims, instead relying on the affidavit of Michael Caloyannides and a series of factual arguments. However, Smith v. UPS, 96 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir.1996), presents a close analog to the issues in this litigation. In Smith, the Eighth Circuit considered whether a union breached its duty of fair representation by failing to present certain evidence following Smith’s termination for failing a random drug test. Smith claimed that the union breached its duty of fair representation by failing to obtain certain laboratory information and reports concerning his drug test in order to challenge the test as unreliable and failing to hire an expert witness to attack the reliability of the drug test. Id. Affirming the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the employer, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the union “adequately represented Smith at all grievance hearings, presenting both oral and written arguments in his favor.” Id. at 1069. According to the Smith decision, “Whether the union should have obtained more records is a matter within the wide range of reasonableness afforded to a union in pursuing a grievance.” Id.

Here, the record demonstrates that the Union interviewed Plaintiff multiple times and reviewed the GPS records and other documentary evidence (e.g., sheriffs report and Brown’s cellular records), determining that it did not support Plaintiffs dismissal. Like Smith, the Union used this evidence during the first, second, and third grievance hearings to press Pacific Bell into reinstating Plaintiff. The arguments presented by the Union were both written and oral. Although it did not order additional testing of the GPS equipment, this decision was within the wide range of reasonableness afforded to a union in pursuing a grievance. Id. Further, the fact that a Union failed to represent a member’s interests “as vigorously as it could have does not establish a breach of the duty of fair representation.” Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 971 F.2d 522, 531 (10th Cir.1992).

Plaintiffs claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation by failing to obtain an expert witness to challenge the reliability of the GPS report is also without support. A union is not necessarily required to obtain an expert witness to fulfill its duty of fair representation. Walk v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 958 F.2d 1323, 1328 (6th Cir.1992). The decision whether to procure an expert witness in this situation is a matter within the wide range of reasonableness afforded a union in pursuing grievances on behalf of its members. See Smith, supra, 96 F.3d 1066 , 1069.

Ultimately, the GPS device was authorized by the CBA. Plaintiff has no evidence there was any reason to further challenge the use and function of the GPS device. Even if the Union breached its duty of fair representation, Plaintiff must show that the breach “seriously undermined” the grievance proceedings. Webb v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 155 F.3d 1230 , 1242 (10th Cir.1998); see also VanDerVeer v. UPS, Inc., 25 F.3d 403, 405 (6th Cir.1994) (“[T]he plaintiff must meet the onerous burden of proving that the grievance process was seriously flawed by the union’s breach of its duty to represent employees honestly and in good faith and without invidious discrimination or arbitrary conduct.”). Plaintiff does not satisfy this standard. Pacific Bell terminated Plaintiff for failure to safeguard company property and misrepresenting facts during an investigation. Even assuming arguendo, the GPS is unreliable, it is undisputed that Plaintiff dropped his keys while cable locating, resulting in a substantial loss of company equipment. These facts alone support Plaintiffs termination on grounds that he failed to safeguard company property.

Plaintiff has not produced any material disputed facts from which a reasonable jury could find that Local 9333 did not pursue his grievance in good faith. Local 9333 represented him through three levels of grievances, arguing that he should be reinstated and made whole in every other respect. Plaintiff had a history of four prior disciplinary actions and was on notice that another violation of the employer’s rules would result in termination of his employment. The events of October 17, 2005, along with the cellular phone records and police records, support the GPS data compiled by the employer. Plaintiff did not provide necessary expert testimony that the GPS tracker was not capable of detecting whether the vehicle was idling when it was stolen. These justifications and failure of proof are fatal to Plaintiffs claims against Local 9333.

Plaintiff has not created a genuine issue of material fact that the union’s conduct in this regard was discriminatory or in bad faith.

iii. Remaining Allegations Against Local Union.

Plaintiffs remaining allegations in his fifth cause of action are a laundry list of complaints about employee infighting at Pacific Bell, unprofessional demeanor by Local 9333, and an isolated incident of a co-worker having a firearm on Pacific Bell property. (Pl.’s Opp. 3:15-3:21, 7:10-9:18, 26:26-28:5, 31:3-33:4.) None of these complaints amount to a breach of the duty of fair representation.

In the first place, any bad feeling or tension between Pacific Bell employees, union representatives and Plaintiff rises to a breach of the union’s duty to Plaintiff only if the union handled his grievance improperly as a result. That is, for the hostility to be actionable, there must be a nexus between it and the improper handling of Plaintiffs grievances and/or the decision not to arbitrate his case. VanDerVeer v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 25 F.3d 403, 405-06 (6th Cir.1994) (evidence that union steward attempted to have employee discharged by reporting that he had falsified his employment application did not establish breach of duty of fair representation absent evidence of nexus between alleged hostility of union steward and outcome of arbitration); Hardee v. North Carolina Allstate Services, Inc., 537 F.2d 1255, 1258 (4th Cir.1976) (while record supported employee’s contention that there was “considerable tension” between himself and union hierarchy, “mere existence of bad feeling is not enough to obviate the finality of an arbitration award; [employee] must show that his grievance was handled improperly”).

There is simply no evidence to support the conclusion that Local 9333 mishandled Plaintiffs grievance because of Plaintiffs personal differences with or animus against Plaintiff by Steve Bayes, Spencer, or Brown. Local 9333 represented Plaintiff through three levels of grievances, asserting oral and written arguments in favor of reinstatement and back pay. Local 9333 investigated his claims, interviewed witnesses, and kept him adequately apprised of the status of his grievance. Plaintiff has not provided necessary testimony that Local 9333 mishandled the grievance based on Plaintiffs disagreements with co-workers or union personnel. There is no nexus evidence. The same holds true for Plaintiffs allegations that the union abused its power and did not allow him to select his union steward. Plaintiff had no right to have a specific steward present his case.

Plaintiff has not created a genuine issue of material fact that the union’s conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.

b. District 9’s Decision Not to Arbitrate.

Plaintiff argues that District 9’s decision not to take his grievance to arbitration is a breach of its duty of fair representation. District 9 argues that it had a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for declining to pursue that grievance on Plaintiffs behalf, and that it therefore did not breach its duty.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence to support a finding of bad faith or discrimination. Rather, the record reflects that District 9 conducted a fair and reasonable review of Plaintiffs grievance and concluded that it was in the best interest of all of its members not to pursue it, as it did not think it could prevail. That decision was within the bounds of District 9’s power and discretionary authority:

In the context of employee grievances, the duty of fair representation is not a straitjacket which forces unions to pursue grievance remedies under the collective bargaining agreement in every case where an employee has a complaint against the company. Individual employees do not have an absolute right to have their grievances taken through the arbitration process. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191 , 87 S.Ct. at 917 . A union is accorded considerable discretion in dealing with grievance matters, and it may consider the interests of all its members -when deciding whether or not to press the claims of an individual employee. Thus, the failure of a union to process an employee’s grievance, even if it is possible to demonstrate that the grievance is meritorious, does not necessarily give rise to a breach of the duty of fair representation. 386 U.S. at 192-3 , 87 S.Ct. at 917-18 ; Turner v. Air Transport Dispatchers’ Association, 468 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir.1972).

Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 208 (5th Cir.1982); see also Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1253 (“Because a union balances many collective and individual interests in deciding whether and to what extent it will pursue a particular grievance, courts should accord substantial deference to a union’s decisions regarding such matters.”).

In support of his claims, Plaintiff relies solely on his reading of the CBA and his personal conclusion that his grievance should have been arbitrated. However, Plaintiff misreads the standard under which the Court is required to evaluated the Union’s conduct: even if her grievance had merit, it was within the Union’s sound discretion to investigate the grievance, weigh the interests of all of its members, and decline to pursue Plaintiffs grievance based on its non-discriminatory conclusion that its entire membership would be better served if it did not. Moore v. Bechtel Power Corp., 840 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir.1988) “((A) disagreement between a union and an employee over a grievance, standing alone, [does not] constitute evidence of bad faith, even when the employee’s grievance is meritorious.”). Further, an employee has no absolute right to have the union take her grievance through every stage of the grievance process. Chernak v. Southwest Airlines, 778 F.2d 578, 581 (10th Cir.1985) (citing Vaca, 386 U.S. 171 , 87 S.Ct. 903 (1967)). Nor can the plaintiff compel the union to pursue a grievance having no legal merit. Id.

Slevira v. Western Sugar Co., 200 F.3d 1218 , (9th Cir.2000), is instructive. In Slevira , the Ninth Circuit considered whether a union breached its duty of fair representation by fading to arbitrate Slevira’s grievance and to assert a certain defense on his behalf. Slevira relied on Peters v. Burlington N. R.R., 931 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.1990) for the proposition that “[w]hen a union inexplicably ignores a strong substantive argument ... the egregious nature of its failure transcends mere negligence.” In distinguishing Peters from the facts of Slevira, the Ninth Circuit stated:

The Ninth Circuit further distinguished Peters, finding that the union considered Slevira’s argument at length, interviewed 70 Slevira for two hours about the incident, examined the employee statements taken by the employer, and obtained the advice of counsel regarding whether Slevira had a viable claim. The Ninth Circuit also stated that the union offered a reason for not pursuing Slevira’s grievance to arbitration, namely that union counsel reviewed the evidence and decided that “Slevira had no defense against the grounds of termination.” Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[i]f we were to require a more detailed explanation, we would be second-guessing ‘the union’s judgment as to how best to handle a grievance.’ ” Id. citing Patterson, 121 F.3d at 1349 .

Here, like Slevira , District 9’s attorney, Mr. Rosenfeld, who was experienced in representing union members in grievances, considered witness statements, GPS evidence, and interviewed Plaintiff. During Plaintiffs interview, District 9 asked Plaintiff to locate the 911 call and other evi dence, to confirm Plaintiffs version of events — and his timeline — that the vehicle was not idling at the time it was stolen. Plaintiff did not obtain the evidence. Rosenfeld then concluded, in his professional judgment, that Plaintiff was not credible and could not prevail at arbitration. Rosenfeld withdrew Plaintiffs grievance. District 9 has adequately explained the basis for its decision not to arbitrate Plaintiffs grievance. See O’ Neill, supra, 499 U.S. 65, 78 , 111 S.Ct. 1127 (finding that a union’s decision not to pursue a grievance is entitled to great deference.).

In accordance with the broad discretion traditionally owed to unions, quality of the union’s decision is not scrutinized. See Stevens v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 18 F.3d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir.1994) (“[W]e have held consistently that unions are not liable for good faith, non-discriminatory errors of judgment made in the processing of grievances.”); Herring v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 894 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.1989) (“[A union] must be able to focus on the needs of its whole membership without undue fear of law suits from individual members.”); Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir.1983) (“Because the union must balance many collective and individual interests when it decides whether and to what extent to pursue a particular grievance, courts should accord substantial deference to the union’s decisions.”). Further “[a] union may screen grievances and press only those that it concludes will justify the expense and time involved in terms of benefitting the membership at large.” Carnes v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 51 F.3d 112, 116 (8th Cir.1995) quoting Griffin v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Wkrs. of Am., UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir.1972). Even during an individual grievance procedure, the union’s own credibility, its integrity as a bargaining agent and the interests of all its members may be at stake. The union is therefore entitled to enjoy a somewhat different perspective than the individual employee it represents in a grievance matter.

Plaintiff has not produced any material evidence on which a reasonable jury could find that District 9’s decision not to arbitrate his grievance was discriminatory or made in bad faith. The local union represented him through three levels of grievances. The District 9 attorney then reviewed the evidence and interviewed Plaintiff, making the independent decision that Plaintiff was not telling the truth. Plaintiff had a history of disciplinary action and was on notice that another violation of the employer’s rules would result in his termination of employment. Plaintiff did not provide necessary expert testimony that the GPS tracker was not capable of detecting if the vehicle was idling when it was stolen or that such lack of capacity was known to Pacific Bell. These justifications and failure of proof are fatal to Plaintiffs claims against District 9.

Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the union’s breach of the duty of fair representation.

Summary judgment for District 9 and Local 9333 on the Fifth Cause of Action is GRANTED.

F. Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action.

The Union Defendants move for summary judgment in connection with the Sixth Cause of Action for defamation by slander and “blacklisting,” which is alleged against all Defendants.

Plaintiff alleges:

1. Slander

Union Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead the substance of his slander claim. Under California Civil Code § 46, “slander is a false publication, orally uttered ... which ... tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires.” The statutory definition of slander is very broad and includes any language which, on its face, has a natural tendency to injure a person with respect to her occupation. Semple v. Andrews, 27 Cal.App.2d 228, 232 , 81 P.2d 203 (1938).

Plaintiff presents no evidence that any representative of the Union Defendants made defamatory statements about Plaintiff. The individuals named in the Sixth Cause of Action, Shane Spencer and Alan Brown, are employees of Pacific Bell and are not alleged to be officials of Local 9333 or District 9. Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to the Union Defendants’ motions for summary judgment does not address this ground for summary judgment.

2. “Blacklisting”

Union Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead the substance of his blacklisting claim. The claim of “blacklisting” evolved from California Labor Code Sections 1050 and 1054, which allow an employee to initiate litigation against his former employer for misrepresentations made after he has left employment that preclude him from finding future employment. Newberry v. Pacific Racing Asso., 854 F.2d 1142, 1151-1152 (9th Cir.1988).

Section 1050 of the California labor Code provides that “any person ... who, after having discharged an employee from the service of such person ... by any misrepresentation prevents or attempts to prevent the former employee from obtaining employment, is guilty of a misdemean- or.” Cal. Lab.Code § 1050. Section 1054 authorizes a civil action to recover for violations of section 1050. Id. § 1054.

Plaintiff presents no evidence or argument that the Union Defendants violated the California Labor Code. Alan Brown and Shane Spencer are employees of Pacific Bell and are not alleged to have any official connection with the Union Defendants. Plaintiffs evidence that an SBC technician told the owner of a Napa Auto Parts store in Turlock that Plaintiff was fired for lying does not constitute evidence that the Union Defendants engaged in conduct proscribed by the California Labor Code.

Summary judgment for the Union Defendants on the Sixth Cause of Action is GRANTED.

VI. CONCLUSION.

For the reasons set forth above, District 9 and Local Union’s motions to strike are GRANTED and motions for summary judgment are:

(1) GRANTED as to Plaintiffs third cause of action for breach of contract.

(2) GRANTED as to Plaintiffs fourth cause of action for fraud.

(3) GRANTED as to Plaintiffs claim for breach of the duty of fair representation.

(4) GRANTED as to Plaintiffs sixth cause of action for slander and black listing.

Defendants shall submit a form of order consistent with this memorandum decision within five (5) days of electronic service.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

. AT & T Communications of California, Inc. and SBC Telecom, Inc. were dismissed pursuant to stipulation (F.R.C.P.41(a)) on February 1,2008. (Doc.62.) . The First and Second Causes of Action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were dismissed with prejudice as preempted by L.M.R.A. § 301 by Order filed on April 13, 2007, 2007 WL 1114044 . (Doc.29.) . The motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Pacific Bell Telephone Company, Inc.; Shane Spencer; and Alan Brown is resolved by separate Memorandum Decision. . Defendants Local 9333 and District 9 filed separate motions for summary judgment. Due to the overlapping facts and issues presented by these motions, the court addresses both Defendants’ motions together. . Unless otherwise noted, the facts are undisputed. (See Stmt, of Undisp. Facts in Support of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“SUF”), filed by District 9 on Dec. 28, 2007). Defendants Local 9333 and District 9 each submitted identical Statements of Undisputed Facts. Plaintiff filed a single "Statement of Disputed Facts” in response to each of the pending motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff objects to much of the evidence submitted by defendants on various grounds. Virtually all of Plaintiff's objections are without merit. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff's sole dispute with facts is based upon the inadmissibility of Defendants’ evidence, and is not challenged by any admissible evidence submitted by Plaintiff, these facts are viewed as undisputed. . Under CWA's grievance handling procedures, the local union is responsible for the preliminary investigation and the filing of a grievance. (Dec. of L. Sayre ¶ 5.) The local union is also responsible for participation in the first, second, and, if applicable, third steps of the grievance process. (Id.) . The California Highway Patrol's Report concerning the incident states: "On October 17, 2005, at approximately 1310 hours, I was advised of a victim standing by for a report to be taken on a stolen vehicle that was taken while he was doing cable repairs on Nunes Road and Washington Avenue.” (Doc. 50-7, Ex. A, pp. 13.) . Brown's cellular phone records indicate an incoming call from Plaintiff’s phone at 1:12 p.m. on October 17, 2005. (Doc. 50-11, Ex. B, pp. 6.). Brown was Plaintiff’s first level supervisor from February 2005 through November 2005. (SUF 65.) Shane Spencer ("Spencer”) was Plaintiff’s second level supervisor from March 2003 through November 2005. (Dec. of S. Spencer ¶¶ 1-2.) Before Brown, Plaintiff’s first level supervisor was Todd Bayes ("Bayes”). (SUF 65.) Both Bayes and Brown reported directly to Spencer. (Dec. of S. Spencer ¶¶ 1-2.) . Stanislaus County Sheriffs Incident Report states: “On 10-17-05 at approximately 13:15 hours: Detective Mendonca from the Sheriff’s Department came on the radio saying he was in the Keyes area and had spotted a stolen 'SBC', telephone repair van being operated on 9th street in Keyes.” (Doc. 50-7, Ex. A, pp. 10.) . Following the theft, Brown also contacted Spencer and Asset Protection, the corporate security investigation department for Pacific Bell. (Dec. of M. Ferrara ¶ 3.) . Prior to the meeting with Plaintiff, Brown contacted Steve Larson ("Larson”), who handles vehicle tracking services ("VTS”) for Pacific Bell. (Dec. of A. Brown ¶ 11.) Brown asked Larson to pull the October 17, 2005 vehicle activity report for Plaintiffs vehicle. (Id.) Larson transmitted the vehicle's daily log to Brown and Spencer, who discussed the significance of the GPS coordinates. (Id.) Because the GPS data indicated that the Plaintiff's vehicle was idling during at the time of the theft, Brown called Plaintiff into a meeting later that day. (Id.) . On November 2, 2005, Brown conducted a test of Plaintiff's vehicle to ensure the GPS unit functioned properly. (Dec. of A. Brown ¶ 15.) Brown made four stops at specific addresses near where Plaintiff's vehicle was stolen. (Id.) Brown also restarted the vehicle along Plaintiff's route. (Id.) After returning the vehicle to the garage, Brown had Larson pull the vehicle's GPS report. (Id.) The report confirmed that the GPS unit was functioning properly as all the starts, stops, and times matched Brown's contemporaneous notes of his movements earlier that day. (Id.) Brown sent a summary of his findings to Spencer and Asset Protection. (Id.) From the fact that GPS tracks when the engine starts and stops, it can reasonably be inferred that a period after the engine start with no movement in location before the engine stop is idling, contrary to Plaintiff's assertion. Plaintiff produced no expert testimony to the contrary. . During his employment, Plaintiff had been disciplined for violations of Pacific Bell Policy and was advised, on at least four occasions, that any further incidents could lead to his termination. (Pl.’s Dep. 35:11-35:15, 54:1-54:7, 64:9-64:15.) . A few days after his termination, Mastrangelo spoke with Plaintiff about the status of his grievance. (SUF 41.) Plaintiff believed the termination grievance was an extension of his suspension grievance. (SUF 42.) Further, Plaintiff stated in his deposition that he was unfamiliar with the grievance process. (SUF 44.) However, Plaintiff knew the union sought his reinstatement and a make-whole remedy. (SUF 45-46.) . Although he did not attend the grievance hearings, Plaintiff was aware they occurred. (Pl.'s Dep. 148:9-150:22.) . See "Step 3 Meeting Notes,” Doc. 50-10, Exh. C to Dec. of D. Flores. . Defendants Local 9333 and District 9 filed identical statements of undisputed facts. (Docs. 40, 45.) . District 9 filed an amended motion the same day. (Doc.114.) . The hearings were continued either by stipulation or due to the press of court business. . District 9 filed a reply to Plaintiffs response to District 9’s statement of undisputed facts and to Plaintiff’s supplemental statement of disputed facts. (Docs. 116 & 117.) Local 9333 did not file a reply. As its motion to strike was granted, District 9's reply is moot and will not be considered. . In some cases it can be inferred from the affidavit that the personal knowledge requirement is met. See Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n, 897 F.2d 999, 1018 (9th Cir.1990) (inferring from the affiant’s position and nature of participation in the matter, as an investment banker who represented the defendant in certain negotiations, that he had personal knowledge of the circumstances of those negotiations and the intent of the parties with respect to the agreement reached). Barthelemy is distinguishable; such a situation cannot be inferred from the present facts. . As discussed in Part V(B)(2), infra, there are few cases in which expert testimony on a union's duty of fair representation was found necessary or useful to a jury. Pease v. Production Workers of Chicago and Vicinity Local 707, 2003 WL 22012678 at *4-*5 (N.D.Ill.2003). . Plaintiff has not established these statements come within any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. . Mastrangelo was terminated prior to Plaintiff's 2nd grievance hearing. This event limits the scope of his knowledge. . Local 9333 adopted and joined the objections filed by Defendants Pacific Bell, Adam Brown, and Shane Spencer. (Doc. 92.) Caloyannides’ affidavit did not opine on the conduct of Defendant District 9. . Caloyannides concludes, without an apparent basis in either expertise, experience, or acknowledged principles in the field of employment practices, that he "would not trust this system for any purpose whatsoever beyond providing basic advisory information that is understood to be inherently unreliable, and certainly not to discharge an employee utilizing this system as the sole basis.” It appears the Union and Pacific Bell considered this proposition when they negotiated the side-letter agreement. (See "Side Letter Agreement”, Exh. B to Dec. of D. Flores, "GPS will not be used as the sole basis for disciplinary action, but may be used to substantiate information obtained from other sources.”) . Dora Avenue and Nunes Street are parallel to one another. Ninth street is the main artery between the two streets. . Caloyannides' opinions are based on his personal experience with GPS ("I would not trust this [GPS] system for any purpose whatsoever”), a hypercritical critique of Brown's GPS test on October 18, 2005 (“the first event states that Mr, Brown stopped at 5851 Washington but the @road reflects 5927 Washington”), the @road disclaimer, and accusations of fraud. Caloyannides does not provide any evidence specific concerning the GPS device attached to Plaintiff’s vehicle on October 15, 2005; Caloyannides also readily admits that he needed additional information to complete his review of Pacific Bell’s GPS devices. (Caloyannides Dec. ¶ 13.) . In contrast to Caloyannides’ affidavit, Mr. Larson states that the GPS device was affixed to Plaintiff’s vehicle several years ago; it is extremely accurate and reliable; it indicates when the vehicle is idling and when it is turned on and off; and there was no problem with Plaintiff's GPS unit on October 17, 2005. (Larson Dec. ¶¶ 1-8.) . In support of their position, Defendants also argue that the court has discretion to allow for a longer period to respond, that the admissions are not binding on other defendants, and that the requests for admission are not authenticated. In light of the ruling on the deemed admissions, these arguments are not considered. . The remaining portions of Plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Facts are either irrelevant to the issues of this case, repetitive, admitted (but not material), or otherwise objectionable. . Plaintiff's fourth cause of action for fraud appears to. Proper party is Local 9333. To dle extent fraud is alleged against District 9, it is granted for the same reasons. . When asked whether he had any facts to support his allegations that Union Defendants did not intend on fulfilling their promise of protecting his interests, Plaintiff responded "No.” (Dep of PL 195:23-196:3.) . As explained in Part II, supra, the Union's use of the expedited arbitration procedure was discretionary — not mandatory — and required "mutual agreement” between the Union and Pacific Bell. . Plaintiff's fourth cause of action alleges that Union Defendants committed fraud "[o]n or about September of 1997 and throughout Plaintiff's tenure at SBC ....” (Compl. ¶ 42.) Local 9333, Plaintiff's local union, appears to be the proper party for his fraud allegations. To the extent Plaintiff alleges fraud against District 9, summary judgment is granted for the same reasons. . Although not asserted by the Union Defendants, it is arguable that the Fourth Cause of Action is preempted by Section 301. See Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795, 801-802 (6th Cir.1990). . The fifth cause of action alleges that Plaintiff exhausted the grievance procedures set forth in the CBA or should be excused from exhausting those procedures. Exhaustion of the grievance procedures is not raised by Defendants as a ground for summary judgment. . The response time was extended to January 5, 2006. (Id.) . Moreover, the 2004 side-letter agreement between Pacific Bell and the Union controls the issues concerning GPS usage. . CBA Section 7.02 "Request For Union Representation’’ provides that “a Union representative shall be present, if the employee requests” at any meeting between management and an employee regarding discipline or an investigative interview. The provision allows for a union representative, but does not give the employee the right to choose the representative. Similarly, Section 7.05 of the collective bargaining agreement defines the Grievance Procedure. Section 7.05 .A. pertains to "a grievance involving the dismissal of any Regular or Term employee.” In pertinent parts, Section 7.05.A. provides that paid Union representatives "designated by the Local” may attend the meetings at Steps I, II and III. . Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he had no facts to suggest the union’s decision not to arbitrate his grievance was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. (PL’s Dep. 192:22-192:25, 193:1-193:5, 193:18-193:21.) . When asked whether he had any allegations that anyone at the union spread rumors about him, Plaintiff responded "No.” (Dep. of PL 180:24-181:1.) . Plaintiff presents no evidence from which it may be inferred that Plaintiff applied for a position with the Napa Auto Parts store or that the unnamed technician acted on behalf of the Union Defendants or SBC.