Respondent, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, determined that, in respect of the income taxes of petitioners, Hans S. Hollander and Clemence Blum Hollander, husband and wife, for 1948 and 1949, there were deficiences aggregating $10,814.17 — $6,866.59 for 1948 and $3,947.58 for 1949. Admitting that there were deficiencies, but alleging that they did not exceed $4,652.83— $4,186.29 for 1948 and $466.54 for 1949 — petitioners sought and obtained a redetermination by the Tax Court of the United States. The Tax Court made findings, filed an opinion and entered a decision sustaining respondent’s determination. The decision is here for review.

The facts were stipulated and are summarized as follows:

On an undisclosed date between March 6, 1946, and June 12, 1946, Idy, then a a resident of Nevada, brought a divorce action against Hans in the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for Clark County, hereafter called the Nevada court. In that action, a decree of divorce was entered in her favor on June 12, 1946. Thereby the agreement of March 6, 1946, was ratified, confirmed, approved and made a part of the decree and the parties were ordered to comply therewith. Thereafter, pursuant to the decree, Hans performed all his obligations under the agreement of March 6, 1946. Thus, from and after June 12, 1946, Hans paid Idy $550 per month — 1/36 of his annual income — for alimony, support, maintenance and care of Idy and Barbara. However, Barbara, with Idy’s consent, lived with Hans from and after November, 1946.

On or before March 16, 1948, Idy informed Hans that she desired to remarry, and that the person whom she desired to marry was “relatively impecunious.” Hans, for obvious reasons, desired to facilitate Idy’s remarriage. Accordingly, on March 16, 1948, at Los Angeles, California, Hans and Idy entered into a written agreement which was, in part, as follows:

Idy remarried on March 29, 1948. On or about May 18, 1948, Hans brought an action against Idy in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for Los Angeles County, hereafter called the California court. In that action, a judgment was entered on June 30, 1948. Thereby the agreement of March 16, 1948, was ratified, confirmed and approved, and Hans was ordered to make payments to Idy pursuant thereto.

Petitioners (Hans and Clemence) were married on August 5, 1948. Under and pursuant to the agreement of March 16, 1948, Hans made to Idy nine payments of $550 each, aggregating $4,950, between March 29, 1948, and December 31, 1948, and twelve payments of $550 each, aggregating $6,600, in 1949. Petitioners, in their income tax return for 1948, deducted the $4,950 from Hans’ gross income for 1948 in computing his net income for 1948 and, in their income tax return for 1949, deducted the $6,600 from Hans’ gross income for 1949 in computing his net income for 1949. These deductions were ' disallowed by respondent and by .the Tax Court. Petitioners contend that they should have been allowed. This contention is based on §§ 22 and 23 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 22 (k), 23 (u), the applicable provisions of which were as follows:

At all times after June 12, 1946, Idy was a wife divorced from her husband (Hans) under a decree of divorce. The payments here involved — the nine payments, aggregating $4,950, made by Hans to Idy between March 16, 1948, and December 31, 1948, and the twelve payments, aggregating $6,600, made by Hans to Idy in 1949 — were periodic payments received subsequent to the decree in discharge of a legal obligation which, because of Hans and Idy’s marital relationship, was incurred by Hans under a written instrument incident to the divorce, namely, the agreement of March 16, 1948. Hence these payments were includible in Idy’s gross income. Hans paid Idy the $4,950 within his taxable year 1948, and paid her the $6,600 within his taxable year 1949. Hence the deductions mentioned above should have been allowed.

The Tax Court held, and we agree, that the agreement of March 16, 1948, was incident to Idy’s remarriage. However, being incident to Idy’s remarriage did not keep it from being incident to the divorce. It could be and was incident to both events.

The Tax Court found that the agreement of March 6, 1946, “was declared to be a permanent and final settlement of property or property rights and obligations for support ‘which each [party] has or may have or owe to the other or to the minor child [Barbara].’ ” This finding was unsupported by evidence and clearly erroneous. As indicated above, Hans and Idy, in and by the agreement of March 6,1946, “represented” that they desired “to make, on a fair and equitable basis, a permanent and final settlement and adjustment between themselves with regard to their assets, property and property rights and obligations for support and maintenance which each has or may have or owe to the other or to the minor child;” but they did not “represent” or declare that the agreement of March 6, 1946, was a permanent or final settlement or adjustment. Much less did they renounce their right to make a new agreement — a right which they exercised on March 16, 1948.

Although the agreement of March 6, 1946, was ratified, confirmed and approved by the decree of divorce, Hans and Idy were not thereby precluded from making a new agreement. The agreement of March 16, 1948, was ratified, confirmed and approved by the California court, but, so far as the record shows, was not ratified, confirmed or approved by the Nevada court — the court which granted the divorce. That, however, is immaterial; for Hans and Idy, being of age and under no legal disability, could make an agreement without any court’s authorization, ratification, confirmation or approval.

As indicated above, the payments here involved were received in discharge of an obligation incurred before Idy’s remarriage — the obligation incurred by Hans under the agreement of March 16, 1948. That the payments were received after Idy’s remarriage is immaterial.

As pointed out in the Tax Court’s opinion, Idy might have remarried even if the agreement of March 16, 1948, had not been made. Actually, however, the agreement of March 16, 1948, was made, and Idy did not remarry until after it was made. With what might or might not have happened if the agreement of March 16, 1948, had not been made, we are not concerned.

Decision reversed and case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

. Petitioners’ taxable years were calendar years. Therefore, in this opinion, “1948” means the calendar year 1948, and “1949” means the calendar year 1949. . Hollander v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 827 . . Thus the agreement of March 6, 1946, required Hans to pay to Idy each month 1/12 of $10,000 or 1/36 of his annual income. . Obviously, $550 is not 1/12 of $.10,000. However, it was stipulated that Hans paid Idy $550 per month and performed all his obligations under the agreement of March 6, 1946. Thus, in effect, it was stipulated that $550 was 1/36 of his annual income. See footnote 3. . The name of this person is not disclosed by the record. . Hans and Idy were residents of California on March 16, 1948, and at all times thereafter. . The name of the person whom Idy married on March 29, 1948, is not disclosed by the record. . See footnote 6. . In order that there be no difficulty in reconciling the figures in the record, it should be observed that a portion of the deduction claimed by petitioners in the income tax return of 1949 and disallowed was a series of payments made by Hans Hollander to tbe United States. Tbis sum of $1,225.45 was paid on account of tbe liability of bis former wife for income taxes for 1948. Likewise, another disallowed deduction was the sum of $42.00, . paid to the State of California because of the liability of bis former wife for income taxes to tbe state in the same year. There is no legal consequence involved as a result of such payments and disallowances. . See § 22(k), supra; Commissioner v. Miller, 9 Cir., 199 F.2d 597 ; Smith v. Commissioner, 1 Cir., 192 F.2d 841 ; Feinberg v. Commissioner, 3 Cir., 198 F.2d 260 ; Grant v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 209 F.2d 430 ; Newton v. Pedrick, 2 Cir., 212 F.2d 357 ; Holahan v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 222 F.2d 82 . . See footnote 1. . See § 23 (u), supra, and cases cited in footnote 10. . See footnote 6. . Newton v. Pedrick, supra. . Newton v. Pedrick, supra.