(concurring specially).

I think it is in order to say something about the specification of error based on the refusal of the court to require a production of customs office records for defendant’s inspection. Appellant’s presentation of this point is most inadequate. Wholly apart from the language of our Rule 18, 28 U.S.C.A., relating to the form and contents of briefs, it is fundamental that it is the duty of an appellant here to present an intelligible brief so that this court can learn therefrom what the party is talking about.

Here appellant argues about his motion, application or request to be permitted to examine or inspect records, but his brief contains not one single reference to any page of the ten-volume record, nor does it quote or state the substance of the asserted motion or application. By dint of a search, which no court should be required to make without the assistance of counsel, I find that midway of the trial appellant asked and was ordered to be allowed to inspect the export declarations covering the periods encompassing the dates of the claimed shipments specified in counts 1 and 3 of the indictment. Government witnesses had testified that in these periods there were no records of such shipments by appellant. Actually appellant did not inspect these records because counts 1 and 3, to which they related, were dismissed. No complaint can be made by appellant as to this.

Some 160 pages further along, and three days later, defendant asked for something else relating to counts 2 and 4, but the request as stated is, I think, wholly unintelligible. What was said is copied in the margin. 1

The Government’s proof had been that large quantities of surplus beans bought by appellant from Commodity Credit Corporation at reduced prices were sold by him on the domestic market, rather than exported as he represented. He had furnished the Corporation Mexican landing receipts which were proven to be false. A check of his truck, supposedly hauling lima beans to Mexico, showed that behind a thin layer of lima beans which was supposed to be its whole load, were other products.

The most liberal interpretation that can be given to appellant’s stated request is that he wanted to have for inspection all of the customs records of export declarations covering the period from March 1, to October 6, 1954. The evidence indicates that such export declarations numbered some 400 per day, *154 which would make, for this 150 days, something like 60,000 documents which appellant was asking to be produced for his use and examination at this stage of the trial. The court offered to require production of any documents of this character which defendant might specify as representing exports by him, but denied the blanket motion as “too broad and all-inclusive.”

The facts of this case present no problem similar to that treated in the Jeneks case (Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 , 77 S.Ct. 1007 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1103 ). What appellant was seeking here were documents solely for discovery, not for use on cross-examination of any Government witness. An accused’s rights of discovery, and the procedure to enforce the same, are stated in the Criminal Rules (Rules 16 and 17). The extent and reach of those rights is discussed in Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 , 71 S.Ct. 675 , 95 L.Ed. 879 . I think defendant’s rights to demand inspection of the customs records here referred to would be subject to the same limitations as his rights to obtain documents, or to have discovery, under Rules 16 and 17.

As noted in the Bowman Dairy case, supra, the right to procure documents in possession of the Government under Rule 17 is subject to the trial court’s power to quash or modify a subpoena therefor. Under Rule 17(c) the trial court may take such action “if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.” Here a demand, made midway of the trial, to inspect each of some 60,000 documents, which would involve suspension of the trial for that purpose, would appear to be a demand which the court in its discretion could properly find unreasonable. After all, appellant made no showing to indicate that his proposed search was likely to turn up any specified documents.

I have noted above that the court ordered produced for inspection the records covering the limited periods involved in counts 1 and 3. These were brought into court. They filled seven boxes and weighed 400 pounds. Even these, the court thought “sounds like many thousands of documents to me — dealing with other people, other transactions of confidential nature.” The demand for this larger, massive production resembles the demand for “a carload of personnel jackets” referred to in United States v. Echeles, 7 Cir., 222 F.2d 144 , certiorari denied 350 U.S. 828 , 76 S.Ct. 58 , 100 L.Ed. 739 .

There is also complaint about the refusal of the court to grant a motion, made by appellant in the midst of the trial, to take depositions in Mexico. There was no showing of any excuse for failure to comply with the rules relating to notice of taking depositions, or of any reason for such a belated request.

. “Mx-. Lavine: Wliat I wanted, your Hon- or, in reference to Counts 2 and 4, which are the only counts left—

“The Court: What you want is with relation to what?

“Mr. Lavine: Count 2 was as to the records on file of exports by Casaus, Inc., from March 1, 1954, to and including June 10, showing exports by Casaus, Inc., Casaus Bros., New Mexico Bean Company, and those others, those names I gave you as to the quantity of exports which they had to the Republic of Mexico between March 1st and June 10th.

“The Court: Go ahead and finish your motion.

“Mr. Lavine: Then as to Count 4, in the same manner, the same proof of export in possession of the Government as to lima beans from March 1, 1954, to October 0, 1954, showing the record on file with the Government of the quantity of lima beans exported to the Republic of Mexico by those named.”