(dissenting).

I find myself unable to agree with my colleagues regarding the proper disposition of this motion.

Our jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of-the Supreme Court of Hawaii is strictly limited by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1293 . That jurisdiction embraces appeals in three types of cases:

1. “Cases involving the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States or any authority exercised thereunder.”

2. “Habeas corpus proceedings.”

3. “All other civil cases where the value in controversy exceeds |5,-000, exclusive of interest and costs.”

Since this is not a habeas corpus proceeding, we need consider only groups 1 and 3.

1. This Case Does Not Involve Any Rights Protected, by “the Constitution, Laws or Treaties of the United States,” etc.

The right to practice law before a state or territorial court is not protected by the Constitution of the United States. In Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 1873, 16 Wall. 130, 138-139 , 83 U.S. 130, 138-139 , 21 L.Ed. 442 , the Court said:

See, also, In re Lockwood, 1894, 154 U.S. 116, 117 , 14 S.Ct. 1082 , 38 L.Ed. 929 ; Mitchell v. Greenough, 9 Cir., 1938, 100 F.2d 184, 185 , and the cases there cited, certiorari denied 1939, 306 U.S. 659 -660, 59 S.Ct. 788 , 83 L.Ed. 1056 ; Emmons v. Smitt, 6 Cir., 1945, 149 F.2d 869, 872 , certiorari denied 1945, 326 U.S. 746 , 66 S.Ct. 59 , 90 L.Ed. 446 .

*555 The very first case cited by the appellant on the subject of “the right to practice law” emphasizes the plenary power of a court to discipline the attorneys who practice before it. In Ex parte Garland, 1867, 4 Wall. 333, 378-379 , 71 U.S. 333, 378-379 , 18 L.Ed. 366 . Mr. Justice Field used the following language:

The appellant’s own “Motion for Stay Pending Appeal,” etc., establishes beyond cavil that “The complaint was referred by the [Supreme Court of the Territory] to its Legal Ethics Committee, which took testimony and other evidence in an adversary proceeding in which appellant was represented by counsel and had opportunity to defend.” [Emphasis supplied.]

I do not think that the case of Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City, 1956, 350 U.S. 551, 553 , 76 S.Ct. 637 , 100 L.Ed. 692 , is in point. There is a sharp difference between the right of a school board summarily to discharge a teacher for “a valid assertion of an admitted constitutional right”, and a court to discipline one of its own officers for “gross misconduct”.

2. The Jurisdictional Amount Is Not Present in the Instant Case.

The appellant has filed an affidavit setting forth that “her annual net income * * * has always exceeded * * * $5,000”, and that “The value of her interest in the law partnership of Bouslog & Symonds * * * greatly exceeds’” that amount.

But neither the value of the appellant's interest in a law partnership nor the appellant’s annual income is the subject matter of the present controversy. We are concerned here with the appellant’s right to hold a license and continue in the practice of the law: a right that is priceless, measureless, intangible, and imponderable. It cannot be reduced to the common denominator of the market place. It is surprising that any lawyer should deny this.

In Town of Elgin v. Marshall, 1883, 106 U.S. 578, 580 , 1 S.Ct. 484, 486 , 27 L.Ed. 249 , the Court said:

3. Conclusion.

The appellant has been condignly disciplined for misconduct by a court of which she is an officer. She is now seeking to blow up the chastisement into a Constitutional cause célebre. I, for one, do not propose to lend myself to any such effort.

I am of the opinion that this appeal should be dismissed, as one of which this-Court has no jurisdiction.